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1 V
Chapter One:
In tro d u c tio n
Although the five Suenos o f Francisco de Quevedo y V illegas 
may certainly be read and enjoyed as independent artistic c rea tio n s, 
the works do present a num ber of in terpretive challenges that can 
only be resolved by placing them  in their larger context. Q uevedo 
begins delineating that larger context on the first page o f the firs t
Sueno with references to Homer, Propertius, Claudian, and o th e rs .
However, such direct references are atypical; Quevedo only o ffe rs
occasional indications within the text of the Suenos as to his li te ra ry
and philosophical influences. In order to get some indication of w h a t 
Quevedo thought of such writers as Lucian, Juvenal, and D ante—all of 
whom have been suggested as significant models for the S u e n o s --one 
must look to what he says about them in his other works. One of th e
principal methods of in terpretation  in this present study is to allow
Quevedo to com ment on Quevedo, to find passages in the Suenos in 
need of some explication and to investigate what Quevedo has to say  
about the issue elsewhere in his extensive and varied corpus of
extant writings. By placing the Suenos within the context of
Quevedo's writings as well as those o f his influences, a clearer p ic tu re  
em erges with regard to the philosophical doctrines of the works as 
well as the exact nature of their satire, the two chief focuses of th is 
study. O f course, along the way, some reference will be made to th e
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socio-political context as well, since the Suenos are as much a p ro d u c t 
o f their age as they are of Quevedo's genius.
Quevedo was born in 1580 during the reign of Philip II. His 
father, Pedro Gomez Quevedo had served in a number of capacities a t  
court, including the position of secretary to Anne of Austria, Philip 's 
fourth wife. Quevedo's mother, Marfa Santibahez, had served A nne 
as la d y -in -w a itin g .' Enrique Ortenbach refers to the p res tig e  
enjoyed by Quevedo's father at court (14). It was in part due to th a t 
familial prestige, in addition to the attention he attracted as a 
talented young poet, that Quevedo would later have access to th e  
court of Philip III. U nfortunately Quevedo would not be able to 
count on the guidance of his father in such situations; when he w as 
just a boy of six, his father died. A few years later, his older b ro th e r, 
Pedro, also died, leaving him the heir, but still a boy in the care of h is 
m o ther.
In addition to these personal losses at an early age, Q uevedo 
would soon see death on a much larger scale, as the plague th a t 
struck Spain in 1596 reached its height in 1599-1600, "ravaging in 
its passage the densely crowded cities of Castile" (Elliot 294).- In  
1601 Quevedo's m other would die.^ It is probably no coincidence 
that in the years immediately following these events, Quevedo began  
to show an intense interest in the works of Justus Lipsius and th e
* A num ber o f b io g rap h ie s  have been w ritten  about Quevedo. I h a v e  
consulted  those o f E n rique  O rtenbach , Quevedo (1991), and L. A strana M a r i n ,  
La vida turbulenta de  Q uevedo (1945).
^ "The great plague o f 1599-1600 probably wiped out in a single blow th e  
15 percent population increase o f  the sixteenth cen tury , and opened a n e w  e r a  
of Castilian d em o g rap h ic  h isto ry : an era o f s tag n a tio n  and perhaps o f
dem ographic decline" (E llio t 294).
 ^ Some place the date o f  her death as 1605. Cf. Ortenbach (26).
teachings of the Neostoics, since the most im portant of th o se  
teachings have to do with the nature of death, especially its  
inevitability. The subject of death suffuses much of Quevedo's p ro se  
and poetry, including the Suenos. He returns to the theme again a n d  
again, but normally, he does so in a philosophical and d idactic  
fashion, rather than reveal his feelings about his personal losses. 
Even his less didactic poems on death tend to look forward to  
contemplate his own passing or that of a loved one, rather than dw ell 
on the losses of his childhood or youth. Still, those early, d ifficu lt 
experiences probably played a significant role in the formation o f 
Quevedo's philosophical and theological interests.
Little is known of Quevedo's early childhood until 1592, w h en  
he began his studies under the Jesuits in the "Estudio de los T eatinos " 
that would later become the "Colegio Imperial. " He rem ained th e re  
until 1596. Jesuit instruction and Tridentine Catholicism have a t  
times been considered im portant contributing social factors to th e  
developm ent of the Baroque (see Maravall, Culture 9). Of course, as 
with any attem pt to define the Baroque, any such connections 
require a great deal of qualification. Even with reference solely tp  
Spain, it is an oversim plification to define the Baroque as the art o f  
the Counter-Reform ation. Nonetheless, these social factors a re  
entirely relevant when studying the work of Quevedo. His 
denunciations of Jews, Protestants and Moslems, as well as h is 
apparent hatred of most foreigners should be understood within th e  
larger context of the religious intolerance and xenophobia that h a d  
become widely institutionalized in Spain. Such sentim ents in
Quevedo are indicative of his education and the socio-political 
environm ent in which he was raised and later worked.
In 1596, Quevedo enrolled in the University of Alcala, w h e re
he studied logic—for which he would later express tre m e n d o u s
disdain—, m etaphysics, and several languages, both classical a n d
modern. He graduated "bachiller" in 1599, and then "licenciado e n
Artes" in 1600. In addition to knowledge gained through fo rm al 
studies, Quevedo also experienced and observed many facets of th e  
typical life of a student, inform ation he incorporated into his fam o u s 
picaresque novel, El buscon. published in 1626, but g en e ra lly
believed to have been written just a few years after leaving Alcala.
In 1601, Quevedo did leave Alcala for Valladolid, where th e  
court of Philip III had recently relocated. The new king, unlike h is  
father who had died in 1598, had little interest in the duties o f  
governance, and had handed over the reigns of his kingdom to
favorites and ministers, p riva d o s  and validos. As a result, w h e re
Philip II had largely rem ained apart from the nobility of the rea lm , 
the court of Philip III teamed with nobles who had left their e s ta te s  
in order to curry favor with those in power. Not only did this lead to  
im prudent opulence and extravagance in which each noble tried to  
outshine the others, many living well beyond their means, but it also  
lead to widespread corruption in which favor and advancem ent w e re  
not only curried, but were also bought outright. It was in th is
environm ent that the Suenos began to take shape, since the e a r l ie s t  
m anuscript for El sueno del Juicio final dates from 1605, the y e a r
before both Philip's court and Quevedo returned to Madrid.
Quevedo continued to work on the Suenos in M adrid, and b y  
1608, he had finished the second and third in the series, El alguacil 
endem oniado. and El sueno del In f ie rn o . In 1609, an im p o rta n t
event occurred in his life; he met Pedro de A lcantara Téllez-Girôn y
Guzman, the third Duke of Osuna. The two men very qu ick ly
developed a great adm iration for one another, and their re la tio n sh ip  
would very soon become significant to Quevedo’s literary career, 
since Osuna would be appointed Viceroy of Sicily in 1610, and in 
1613, he would call Quevedo to Italy to serve as his secretary. In th e  
meantime, Quevedo left M adrid to spend some time at his p ro p erty , 
Torre de Juan A bad, where, in 1612, he finished the fourth Sueno. H 
mundo por de dentro. which he dedicated to Osuna.
From 1613 to 1619, Quevedo devoted him self to a political 
career in Italy. His duties in the service of Osuna left him little tim e 
for writing. He claims to have written the first part of the Politica de  
Dios during those years, and he undoubtedly wrote some poetry, b u t 
the period essentially represents a gap in his literary p roduction .
Traveling in the service of the Duke throughout Italy and France, h e  
acted as em issary and negotiator in many difficult situations. To all 
indications, he perform ed his duties successfully. On a number o f 
occasions, he returned to Spain to deliver monies and reports from  
Osuna to Philip III. During these trips, Quevedo saw him self fo rced  
to engage in an activity that he must have found p a rtic u la r ly  
distasteful, giving not only official funds to the king, but also 
distributing  large cash gifts to nobles who were in a position to 
further the Duke's career and ambitions. As much as Q uevedo 
deplored the corrupting power of money, he could not avoid tak in g
part in such corruption as long as he was so deeply involved in 
politics. His efforts, and the duke's expenditures, were rewarded, as 
Osuna was named Viceroy of Naples in 1616. Good fortune, how ever, 
would soon turn to disaster.
The historical details surrounding the episode that has come to
be called the "Conjuracion de Venecia" still remain unclear. It has
generally been suggested and assumed that, during a p riv a te
audience with Philip III, Quevedo gained approval for Osuna's 
am bitious plan to invade and overthrow the Republic of Venice.
Relations between Spain and Venice had become strained, but Philip 
did not wish to declare war openly. If he did indeed give his 
approval, it was only with the condition that Osuna take full 
responsibility, allowing the king to maintain credible den iab ility . 
The date was set for May 19, 1618. Osuna had his galleys, spies and  
insurgents in place. According to Ortenbach, Quevedo h im self 
entered Venice in disguise (58). However, the Venetian police, at th e  
last moment, learned of the duke's plans. Arrests were made; th e  
plot was foiled, and Quevedo was forced to flee. He returned to Spain 
and attem pted to plead Osuna's cause at court, but to no avail. 
Osuna's star had fallen, and, forced to return to Madrid, the duke w as 
eventually placed in jail and died there. Quevedo was exiled from  
court, and in 1621, still under house arrest at Torre de Juan Abad, he 
wrote El sueno de la muerte. the fifth and last in the series.
Quevedo begins El sueno de la muerte with an imitation of 
Boethius's Consolation of Philosophv. an influence that is discussed in 
Chapter Two. Boethius wrote the Consolation in prison and w as 
executed not long afterward. So disastrous had been Osuna's fall th a t
Quevedo may have thought an end such as that suffered by B oeth ius 
to be imminent, hence the description of Death herse lf ap p ro ac h in g  
the dream er in the last Sueno. However, Quevedo would live u n til 
1645, and his fortunes would change briefly with the death of P h ilip  
III in 1621. The change in m onarch ended Quevedo's exile, but n o t 
his troubles. His acerbic wit and satiric writings had gained h im
many enemies in addition to the politcal ones. Even d u r in g  
Quevedo’s time in Italy, his early writings, including the first Suenos. 
had continued to circulate in m anuscript form, m aintaining h is 
literary reputation with some, but provoking negative reaction fro m  
o th e rs .
The contrast between Q uevedo’s adm irers and detractors can  
be seen in the reaction to the first published edition o f the Suenos in  
1627. On the one hand, the book was so popular that it went in to  
several editions in both Barcelona and Zaragoza, but on the other, it  
gave Quevedo's enemies the m aterial with which to  accuse him o f 
heresy in a tract written against him entitled Tribunal de la Ju s ta  
Venganza. eregido contra los escritos de D. Francisco de Q uevedo. 
m aestro en errores. bachiller de suciedades. catedratico  de vicios y 
protodiablo de todos los hombres (see Ortenbach 85). The p o p u la r ity  
of the works is a testam ent to the success of Q uevedo's sa tir ica l 
humor; the scandal seems prim arily a reaction to his decision to ta k e  
the very serious notion of Divine Judgem ent and turn both H eaven  
and Hell into vast stages for his comedy and buffoonery.
Many readers from the beginning have apparently  not b e e n  
able to find a positive moral message within the works, as is a t te s te d  
by a comment from one of Quevedo's more famous co n tem p o ra rie s .
Baltasar Graciân. Graciàn seems to refer to the Suenos when he says, 
"...estas hojas de Quevedo son como las del tabaco, de mas vicio q u e  
provecho, mas para reir que aprovechar" (724). To a certain ex ten t, 
Gracian's com m ents are accurate. Quevedo, in his satires, does 
describe and depict vices and sins rather than beneficial examples o f 
moral conduct, and his purpose in doing so does seem at times to b e  
nothing more than an attem pt to provoke laughter. However, th is  
initial im pression m erely indicates how successfully Quevedo's w o rk  
reflects the traditional characteristics of satire, whose models for th e  
comedic ridicule of vice date back to A ntiquity. What G racian 's 
comment does not acknowledge is that beneath the laughter, b e n e a th  
the depiction o f vice, Quevedo consistently suggests a higher m oral 
goal throughout the Suenos. both implicitly and in explicit co m m en ts  
of moral exhortation.
Perhaps the longest passage of moral exhortation occurs at th e  
beginning of El sueno del Infiemo. where large and diverse groups o f 
humanity march along the two allegorical roads of life, one leading to  
Heaven, the o ther to Hell. At one point, a soldier on the road to  
Heaven calls out to some comrades who have chosen the easier p a th  
leading to danm ation, and he urges them to cross over and return to  
the path of righteousness:
Soldados, por aca! esso es de valientes, dejar este camino d e  
miedo de sus dificultades? Venid, que por aqui de ç ie rto  
sauemos que solo coronaràn a quien legitim am ente p e lea re . 
Que vana esperanza os arrastra tras las antizipadas p ro m essas  
de los Reyes? No siempre con almas vendidas es bien q u e  
tem erossam ente suene en vuestros oydos, Mata o m u ere .
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Reprehended la hanbre del premio, que de buen varon es 
seguir la virtud sola, y de cudiciosso los premios de ella. Quien 
no sosiega en la virtud, y la sigue por el interes y merçedes qu e  
se le siguen, màs es m ercader que virtuosso, pues la haze 
prezio de perezederos bienes. Ella es don de si mi s ma:
quietaos en ella. Y aqui alzô la voz diziendo: Auertid que la
vida del mundo es guerra consigo mismo, y que toda la v ida 
nos tienen en harm a los enemigos del aima, que nos am en azan  
màs dahosso venzim iento. Y aduertid que ya los P rincipes 
tienen por deuda nuestra sangre y vidas, pues perdiendolas p o r 
ellos, los màs dizen que los pagamos y que no seru im os. 
Volued! Volued! fSuenos I, 163-64).'*
Although some of the com m ents are specific to those involved in 
m ilitary campaigns, others apply equally well to all of h u m an ity , 
such as the teaching that virtue should be sought as its own rew ard : 
"de buen varon es seguir la virtud sola." M oreover, there is a
redefinition of warfare in moral terms: "la vida del mundo es g u e rra
consigo mismo,"" meaning the most im portant struggle in ones life is 
against one s own desires and passions, the true enemies of the soul.
In spite of such readily apparent moral sermons in the Suenos. 
there has been a tendency, even among more modern critics, to  
reduce the works to essentially a satire of types, and to ch a rac te rize
* As the texts for both the Suenos and the Politica de D ios. I will cite th e
ed itions o f James O. Crosby, g en e ra lly  the most accurate ed itions a v a i l a b l e ,
n e ith e r  o f which has m odern ized  spelling  or accen tu a tio n . For the O bra 
poética. I cite the edition o f José M anuel Blecua. E lsew here, w hen c iting  th e
w orks o f Quevedo, I w ill use the O bras com plétas prepared by Felicidad Buendia.
Quevedo as a witty but malicious and negative social critic. T he 
comments o f  Emest Mérimée are typical o f this perspective:
Nothing could be funnier than the procession of odd fish  
that Quevedo’s comic muse discovers in the Infernal Regions. 
He presents a highly malicious caricature of society, o u tw a rd ly  
so solemn and stiff in the days of Philip III and Philip IV. T he 
satirist takes a malign pleasure in laying bare all its b lem ish es, 
vices and hypocrisy. (277)
M érimée's use of the words "malicious" and "malign" serves to 
indicate the extent to which he focuses on the satirical d en u n c ia tio n s  
and either overlooks or discounts the positive moral content.
That positive message can adm ittedly become lost amidst th e  
horrific descriptions of piemakers who use human flesh in their m e a t 
pies, and the word plays in which Quevedo shows his hatred fo r
tailors by linking the words "sastre" and "desastre." These w ittic ism s 
and grotesque presentations of humanity have caught the a tte n tio n  
of readers and critics more than any other aspect of the works, a n d  
with good reason, since these features fascinate and entertain; th e y  
grab the reader’s attention, evoking imagery and am u sem en t, 
whereas moral sermons do not. In spite of this, in spite of th e  
negative, pessimistic representation of hum anity and human society , 
in spite of the tremendous preoccupation with death and th e  
dam nation o f souls, the Suenos still provide substantial ind ica tion
that Quevedo was in many ways morally, philosophically, a n d
socially, an idealist. This thesis contravenes much of the tra d itio n a l 
wisdom about Quevedo. The suggestion that he denounces in th e
hope of reform  rather than to merely provoke laughter, that h e
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offers positive philosophical and social alternatives to the d ec ad en ce  
and corruption he decries, is, at the very least, a shift away from th e  
traditional avenues along which the Suenos have been ap p ro ac h ed  
and in terp reted .
In order to identify and discuss the idealism  of the Suenos. 
much of which is merely implied, it will be necessary to set aside, to  
a large degree, the more readily accessible caricatures and focus f irs t 
on the philosophical content of the works, then on the larger social 
and political concerns reflected in them. This is not to say that th e  
depiction o f characters and types will be entirely unhelpful in th is  
endeavor. In his presentation of those on the road to H eaven, 
Quevedo breaks with the normal constraints o f satire to p re s e n t 
idealized portraits, clearly indicative o f his own idealism and social 
concerns. And even in negative caricatures, an ideal may at times be 
inferred, since by showing how society should not be, Q uevedo 
suggests the inverse.
A necessary part of establishing the philosophical and sa tirica l 
context of the Suenos naturally involves correctly id e n tify in g  
Quevedo's sources and influences. Among the possible sa tirica l
influences, Quevedo is widely known to have adm ired Juvenal,
Persius, and Martial. And yet, there has been a widespread te n d e n c y  
on the part o f critics to identify Lucian as the prim ary model for th e  
Suenos. This issue will be discussed in detail in Chapter Six, but a 
rep resen tative  passage taken from Ortenbach will suffice to in d ica te  
the extent to which Lucian's influence has been taken for g ran ted .
Ortenbach refers to the period 1599-1601, during which time he
believes Quevedo began to form ulate the Suenos: "...Quevedo lee a
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Luciano de Sam osata e, inspirado p er este, comienza a idear una se r ie  
de obras en las que, por medio de im aginados suenos, p u e d a  
reprender y criticar a sociedad tan corrom pida y lamentable" (36). 
This type of assertion is typical, despite the lack of evidence to  
support it. Critics associate the Suenos with Lucian's Dialogues of th e  
Dead because o f a few similarities in setting, theme, and su b je c t 
matter, questions having to do with genre, not because of any te x tu a l 
references, d irect parallels, or expressions o f adm iration for L ucian  
on the part o f Quevedo. The fact that both writers satirize ty p e s  
from their society in an underworld setting can hardly be taken as  
positive proof o f influence, yet it has been traditionally. The issu e  
deserves to be revisited.
The question  of genre itself presents a number of problem s in  
identifying Quevedo's sources. Although he brings together a v a r ie ty  
of elements from  different traditions, and different genres, Q uevedo  
refers to the works simply as "suenos." The term  at times may se e m  
either nondescriptive, or even inaccurate, since only three of the five  
works contain the word "Sueno" in their title, and only two of th e m  
describe the narrato r falling asleep and dream ing, but they w e re  
envisioned as a unified series, as Quevedo affirm s in the in tro d u c tio n  
to El sueno de la muerte:
He querido que la m uerte acaue mis desuarios, como las 
demas cosas; quiera Dios que tenga buena suerte.
Este es el vltimo tratado al Sueno del Juiçio, al A lguazil 
endem oniado, al Infierno y al M undo por de dentro: no m e
queda ya en que sonar. (216)
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Even though El mundo per de dentro contains a perplexing re fe ren ce  
to falling asleep and resting a fte r  the narrator's stroll along the s tre e t
of Hypocrisy with the allegorical Desengaho as his guide, Q uevedo
here refers to that episode, and all the rest, as having been dreamt.
The presentation of these works as dream s initially creates a 
feeling of tension, or incongruity between content and context. 
Traditionally, literary visions have been used as a means of 
conveying serious lessons to the dream er and consequently th e  
reader, whether the subject matter be philosophical, theological, o r 
even political. Quevedo reflects this tradition as well as th e  
seriousness of his subject when, at the beginning of El sueno del 
Juicio final, he cites Homer, stating that dream s are divinely in sp ired  
and should be believed. He then proceeds to present farcical scenes 
that seem to have no other intention than to provoke laughter, in 
which resurrected bones try to find their mates, and rid icu lous 
characters, heading toward their judgem ent, offer every type o f
inane excuse for their sinful behavior in life. The comic con ten ts
seem to contradict the serious presentation. More than one critic h as  
attem pted to resolve the contradiction by simply denying th e  
sincerity of Quevedo's opening comments and asserting that he has 
begun with a parody o f Homer.^ However, this type of reso lu tion  
seems unnecessary, and the contradiction nonexistent, if one tak es  
into account Quevedo's actual views on satire. He read, for exam ple, 
the satires of Juvenal as political documents which he cites as 
supporting texts in his ascetic works Virtud militante an d  
Providencia de Dios. In his own introductions to the Suenos. he
^ This issue will be discussed in more detail in C hapter Two.
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reiterates that he presents "desnudas verdades” that are to be 
believed. The reference to Homer is but the first attem pt to urge the  
reader to look beneath the laughter in order to receive instruction on 
more weighty m atters.
The dream as a literary device, then, helps provide a ce rta in  
measure of seriousness to the overall comic tone. S im ilarly,
Quevedo's decision to use aspects of the Christian afterlife as well as 
allegorical realms also places the comedy in a context that should  
indicate to the reader the need to be aware of larger issues. The 
allegorical realms and characters evoke the m edieval d ream -v iso n s  
that trace many of their characteristics back to Boethius, and the use 
of the Christian afterlife evokes another tradition, that of Dante. 
Although Quevedo is the only major figure in seventeenth  ce n tu ry  
Spanish literature to have been substantially influenced by Dante, 
that influence still represents a significant revival of interest in th e  
Florentine poet. During the fifteenth century, Dante had heav ily
influenced Spanish men of letters, most notably the Marqués de
Santillana and Enrique de Villena. By the early sixteenth cen tu ry , 
the Commedia had been translated into Spanish and Catalan sev era l 
times (see G. Amezua 31-33). However, as the R enaissance 
progressed, interest diminished in medieval works that had relig ious 
themes as their prim ary focus, and accordingly, Dante seems to hav e  
had very few Spanish readers during much of the sixteenth cen tu ry . 
The limited revival of interest during the seventeenth  century is a 
reflection of the religious intensity that existed during the C ounter- 
Reformation. Emilio Orozco Diaz makes the following com m ent ab o u t 
the relationship between the Middle Ages and the Baroque: "Hay,
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pues, una corriente de m edievalism o que sustancializa apectos d e
nuestro arte y que en lo referente a la esfera religiosa viene a
rep resen tar lo que después se producirâ con el m o v im ien to  
contrareform ista" (56). With the Counter-Reform ation, there came a 
renewed in terest in medieval poetics that allowed art to exist in
ugliness, w hereas the Renaissance had sought beauty and p e rfec tio n  
(see Orozco Diaz 58). Quevedo’s use of the Christian afterlife, h is 
interest in Dante, his grotesque represen tations of hum anity, all
reflect w ider trends in the Spanish Baroque.
In addition to these aesthetic questions, the Baroque was also  
accom panied by a num ber of changes in philosophical t r e n d s  
relevant to Quevedo and the Suenos. During the sixteenth c e n tu ry  
certain brands of fideistic scepticism gained many adherents, am ong  
them the French essayist Montaigne. With the spread o f  scep tic ism , 
some of the Renaissance emphasis on human beauty and p e rfe c tio n  
gave way increasingly to a d istrust of outer a p p e a ra n c e s . 
A ppearance vs. reality became one of the great them es of th e  
Spanish Baroque, and it is certainly one of the principle themes of 
the Suenos. At its core, however, the central purpose of scepticism  is 
to deny the validity of knowledge. O f course, during the R enaissance, 
most Sceptics carefully qualified their views in order to take by fa ith  
the validity o f divine revelation. Still, the Church tended to 
disapprove of scepticism  even when accom panied by fideism. So, in 
Spain, while the topos of appearance vs. reality is w id e sp re ad , 
philosophical works that defend the doctrine that forms its b as is  
appear far less frequently. Quevedo only makes a few o p en ly  
sceptical rem arks in his works, making his sources and in flu en ces
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difficult, though not impossible, to trace. He does say enough to  
indicate the im portant role this branch of philosophy has in h is 
thought, with a num ber of those rem arks appearing in the Suenos. 
particularly El mundo por de dentro.
M aureen Ihrie refers to Quevedo’s scepticism  as "nihilistic," an d  
"a destructive tool" (27). The characterization is, in part, correct, 
since Quevedo uses scepticism to declare invalid any know ledge 
gained through logic, dialectic, or natural philosophy. In general, h e  
distrusts any inform ation purportedly gleaned through the study o f 
nature or natural phenom ena. This may partially explain why he  
repeatedly satirizes astronom ers and alchem ists in the Suenos. 
although the regular condem nations of those groups by the Church 
would have been sufficient justification. However, once Q uevedo's 
scepticism has done its destructive work, it does leave positive  
alternatives, ideals of knowledge and instruction that Quevedo does 
not assail, moral philosophy and Christian doctrine.
While some question exists as to the sources of Q uevedo's 
satire, and scepticism , there is no doubt with regard to his m oral 
philosophy; his adm iration of Lipsius and the Neostoics is w ell 
known, as is his devotion to the Stoic doctrines of Classical w rite rs , 
particularly Seneca. However, Quevedo's use of Stoic doctrines still 
presents significant challenges in in terpretation, since it has becom e 
common to read Quevedo's Stoicism as a nihilistic com plaint aga inst 
life rather than a positive tool for dealing with the in ev itab le  
injustices and suffering that accompany all mortal life. For exam ple, 
in one o f his better known sonnets entitled “Represéntase la 
brevedad de lo que se vive y cuân nada parece lo que se viviô”
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(Obras poéticas I, 149-50), Quevedo provides the following verse: 
"soy un fue, y un sera, y un es cansado." Elias Rivers, re ly in g  
principally on this verse, has described the sonnet as both Stoic a n d  
yet an existential protest at the same time:
Personally, we may not like the baroque world view, th e  
Counter-Reform ation Stoicism, implied by this sonnet; as a 
m atter of fact, the poet himself seems to be rebelling an d  
protesting against such a harsh reality or way of re p re se n tin g  
reality. But we must at least admit that Quevedo som ehow  
anticipates in his metaphysical sonnets certain aspects of L ’Etre 
et le néant. Sartre's Being and Nothingness, and this is no m ean  
poetic accomplishment. (25)
The words "rebelling" and "protesting" in this context simply can n o t 
be squared with the tenets of Stoicism as taught by the ancients a n d  
espoused by Quevedo. When Quevedo speaks of life ending, a n d  
dwells on death, he is following traditional Stoic teaching reg a rd in g  
the need to think on death as a positive means to prepare for it a n d  
deal with it. The preoccupation with death in his philosophical tex ts  
and the Suenos. rather than reflecting a morbid nihilism, ac tu a lly  
leads to the Christian doctrine that one should be aware of th e  
inevitability of one day facing God in the afterlife, and accord ing ly  
live this life justly.
Quevedo is one of the great figures of the Spanish Baroque. His 
reputation and popularity through the centuries has rested p r im a rily  
on his poetry, El buscon. and the Suenos. However, even these m ore 
popular works, which have been sufficiently entertaining an d  
accessible to reach a wide audience, give ample indication of
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Quevedo's com plexity and difficulty. At times in the S u en o s— 
because of that com plexity, and because he attem pts to reconcile  
such a variety of literary and philosophical trad itio n s—certain ideas, 
statem ents, and presen tations appear in the texts that seem to  
contradict what he has said elsewhere. However, by placing th e se  
apparent contradictions within their larger context, by es tab lish in g  
the true nature o f Quevedo's satire and its sources, and by s im ila rly  
examining the philosophical doctrines o f the Suenos. many of th e  
contradictions can be resolved. The clarity that comes with co n tex t 
then begins to reveal the positive moral and social message, a n 
idealism that at times even seems to approach a utopian vision, 
hidden amidst the grotesque deform ations of hum anity, and th e  
damned souls in Hell.
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Chapter Two:
Dream Theory and Convention in the Suenos
Quevedo presents the Suenos to the reader as his own d ream s, 
and, following the classical and medieval models o f literary  visions, 
his dreams take the form  of spiritual jo u rn e y s .' His use of th is  
literary  form lends support to the general assertion of E. R. C urtius 
that "Spanish Baroque' is descended from medieval Latin theory an d  
practice " (282), for, as Helen Phillips notes, "No other literary  genre, 
with the possible exception o f the romance, was more popular th a n  
the dream  narrative w ith m edieval writers, and none em ployed w ith  
more versatility and creativity" (3). In spite o f this rich an d
im portant tradition, little scholarship has been devoted to analyzing  
the many conventional dream -vision elements in the Suenos. 
Typically, com m entators have referred to the Suenos as "prose
satire, " and not even considered the designation "dream -vision."^
Some, such as Joan Estruch Tobello, have considered it only to just as 
quickly dismiss it: "Observem os que el sueno es d ific ilm en te
clasificable dentro de los géneros literarios establecidos por la 
p receptista de tradiciôn grecolatina, codificada en la I ta lia
 ^A. C. Spearing  m akes th is point w ith regard to the n a tu re  o f  l i t e r a r y
visions: “ M eanw hile I w ish to look m ore closely at the trad itio n  o f  v i s i o n s
w hich as m edieval poets w ere aw are, lay behind th e ir d ream  poem s. T he  
trad itio n  in question  is one no t spec ifica lly  o f dream  but o f s p i r i t u a l  
a d v e n tu re ” (6).
2 See for exam ple, P. E. R ussel (333), or F. W. M uller (225). The l a t t e r
uses the expression “obra sa tirica  en prosa."
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renacentista" (10). This comment passes over the Middle A ges, 
precisely the period when the dream -vision became f irm ly  
established as a literary form.^
A dm ittedly, Quevedo has w ritten Baroque, not m e d iev a l 
dreams. The social-political satire of the early seventeenth c e n tu ry  
does tend to overshadow the more medieval experience of th e  
dream er on a m etaphysical journey of enlightenm ent. As a re su lt, 
the oneiric elem ents may seem nothing more than a "fram e" 
established by Quevedo as a "requisite for indulging his fan tasy "  
(Iffland 20). R. M. Price briefly comments on the "features o f th e  
medieval dream  poem" in the Suenos and recom m ends the book b y 
A. C. Spearing for general information on the genre (53). Yet P rice  
sees these dream  features primarily as "scene setting devices" (5 2 ) 
and concludes that "for Quevedo the dream convention was not m u ch  
more than a known satirical device" (53). Quevedo arguably took th e  
tradition of the literary vision more seriously. He frequently m o v es 
away from the social satire—which does indeed dominate the w o rk s -  
-into moments of serious enlightenm ent for the dreamer, w ho  
ostensibly represents Quevedo himself and yet a medieval e v e ry  m an  
at the same time. In these moments, the dream  features and m o tifs  
serve as a means o f introducing serious philosophical and theological 
issues.
 ^ Some debate exists as to w hether the d ream -v ision  should b e  
considered  a genre  in and o f itself. S pearing  seem s re lu c tan t to do so ( s e e  
Spearing 2). M ore récent w riters on the sub ject argue that it is. A ccording to  
K athryn L. L ynch, "The literary  vision, then, is p ro p erly  a genre, defined  b y 
the external form  o f  the dream  o r vision that provides its structure" (Lynch 7 ). 
See also Steven F. K ruger (124).
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Quevedo consciously strove to include serious ph ilosoph ical 
matters within his satire, as he acknowledges in the introduction to  
the last dream, El sueno de la muerte: "Ni entre la risa me h e
olbidado de la dotrina" (Suenos I, 216). These words, in addition to  
reflecting the maxim of Horace, well known to Spaniards of th e  
period as "deleitar y ensenar," also reflect the tradition o f th e  
satirical dream of the Middle Ages. Helen Phillips explains:
Dream literature began as a religious and philosophical gen re , 
and even when medieval writers use it for satire or am u sin g  
and amorous subjects, it carries still the potential for se rio u s  
purpose and enlightenm ent, which makes it p a r tic u la r ly
amenable for parody and satire. .. (3)
Phillips makes these general comments with Chaucer and his F ren ch
models in mind, but they no less applicably indicate the trad itio n a l
nature of Quevedo's satire which incorporates serious elements. U se 
Nolting-Hauff, perhaps more lucidly than any scholar to d a te ,
acknowledges the satirical-philosophical nature of the Suenos at th e  
same time that she refers to the works as examples of the d re a m -  
vision genre:
El género de la vision satirica, ya existente, aunque a u n  
orientado muy unilateralm ente hacia Luciano, enriquecido p o r  
Quevedo con adquisiciones de las poesias sérias de visiones d e  
la Edad Media, se m uestra como el medio e sp ec ia lm en te  
apropiado para su estilo conceptista. (295)
The "poesias sérias" to which Nolting-Hauff refers are primarily th e  
philosophical dream -visions that trace their roots back to th e  
Consolation of Philosophv of Boethius. As in these works, Q uevedo
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incorporates classical authorities to support his serious ideas, 
beginning w ith his dream theory.
I. Classical Dream Theory
Quevedo appropriately gives the fullest statem ent of his d re a m  
theory at the beginning of the first dream, El sueno del Juicio fin a l. 
He begins w ith a reference to Homer: "Los suenos, Senor, d ice
Homero que son de Jupiter, y que èl los inbia; en otro lugar dice q u e  
se a de creer que esto es asi quando tocan en cosas im portantes o los 
suenan Reyes o grandes senores..." (Suenos I, 131). The first w o rd s  
regarding the divine origin o f dream s come from the Iliad I. 6 2 -6 4 . 
The second reference regarding their believability, or truth, com es 
from Iliad II. 76-83, the first passage spoken by Achilles, the seco n d  
spoken by Nestor concerning a specific dream sent by Zeus to 
Agamemnon. Strangely, Homer indicates that the dream  sent b y 
Zeus was a false and evil one, m eant to deceive A gam em non. 
Quevedo makes no mention o f this, choosing instead to emphasize th e  
general principle given by N estor that the dreams of kings should be  
heeded. In order to include his own dream under this p rinc ip le , 
Quevedo conveniently adds to the dreams of "Reyes o g ra n d es  
senores" those dreams that "tocan en cosas im portantes," and he  
supports the addition with a passage from  Propertius: "Nec tu s p e rn e
piis venientia somnia portis / Cum pia venerunt somnia p o n d u s
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habent"'* (Suenos I, 131). The serious nature of the subject, th e n , 
adds to its believability.
Quevedo opens with these lines, he explains, because of h is  
conviction concerning the divine nature o f a recent dream h e 
experienced: "Digolo a proposito de que tengo por caydo del cielo v n o
que tuue estas noches passadas..." (131). These first lines give no  
indication of the satirical nature of the m aterial to come. On th e  
contrary, Quevedo insists on the seriousness and the truthfulness o f  
his dream. James Crosby comments on the irony of this insistence:
En un sentido literal, el sueno del poeta se tiene por caydo d e l  
cielo  porque trata de un asunto de supuesta providencia d iv in a . 
Sin embargo, es una ironia muy fuerte presum ir atribuir a la  
disposicion divina el origen de una sâtira tan irreverente com o 
la presente. De la misma manera, es una parodia com parar la  
fuente de este Sueno con el origen divino de los de la épica d e 
Homero (Suenos II, 929).
Crosby in his com m ents, however, does not m ention the se rio u s  
nature of Quevedo's subject, the Last Judgem ent, and far from b e in g  
a parody of Homer, the references to the Iliad serve as a t r u e  
homage to Homer, likely inspired by Justus Lipsius.
Quevedo began corresponding with Lipsius in September, 1604 . 
By that time, the Belgian humanist had gained a reputation as a 
serious hispanophile because of his works on Seneca and Lucan,^ a n d
^ From the Poem s. Book IV, poem 7. "And pay  good heed to dream s t h a t  
com e from the Gates o f  Duty; when dream s o f  du ty  com e they carry  w e ig h t ."  
From  the translation o f  G uy Lee (121).
 ^ Because Seneca and Lucan had lived in the Roman prov ince o f  
H ispania, they w ere fre q u e n tly  thought o f as p art o f  the Spanish  h e r i t a g e .  
Q uevedo and o thers com m only  referred to  Seneca as "nuestro  S eneca /'
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had corresponded extensively with many Spaniards. In his letter to  
Luis Tribaldos de Toledo, dated July 30, 1601, Lipsius refers to a 
polemic that would become an im portant part of Quevedo's ea rly
intellectual life:
Delectavit me autem epistola tua & scite scripta (rem dico;) & in  
ea judicium  de summo virorum, que fuerunt aut erunt, & cujus
magnitudenem non nisi magni capiunt, nec plane etiam  ipsi. Is
Homerus est, o apex ingeniorum, o fastigium  & cu lm en 
scientiae, prundentiae, sapientiae, que peryngere ho mi ni
quidem datur. [...] Et aliquem  huic conferem us? aut V irgilium  
aliquis anteponet? (Ram irez, Epistolario 310-311)®
"Summo virorum" Lipsius calls Homer, the greatest of men, an d  
toward the end of his remarks asks with derision who will put Virgil 
before Homer. Lipsius alludes to Julius Caesar Scaliger (1 4 8 4 -1 5 5 8 ) 
who, in his Poetica. gives Homer a secondary place to Virgil,
prim arily out of a bias for Latin. Quevedo also speaks of Scaliger 
with derision, although he does not limit him self to allusion, te rm in g  
Scaliger and his followers "abom inables idiotas"^ in his philosophical 
work Defensa de Epicuro (Obras I, 1095).
® I shall leave the co rre sp o n d e n c e  of L ipsius and Q uevedo in t h e  
original Latin, as well as any Latin texts inserted  by Q uevedo into his S p a n is h  
works. In all o ther in s tan ces , when c iting  suppo rting  texts o rig in a lly  i n 
Latin, G reek, or H ebrew , I shall cite  them  in tran s la tio n  prov ided  that a n 
adequate  transla tion  ex ists .
7 The passage in con tex t is as follows: "En todo tiem po ha h a b id o
hom bres infam es que ban ten ido  en mas precio in fam ar a  los fam osos q u e  
hacerse  famosos siendo in fam es. En Epicuro ya lo hem os visto; en Homero y a 
se vio en Zoila, que hu b ie ra  sido el m is vil ign o ran te , si Ju lio  E sc a lig e ro , 
s igu iéndo le , y a E scaligero  o tros abom inab les idiotas, no h u b ie ra n  excedido su  
afrenta" (Obras I. 1095).
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In the correspondence between Lipsius and Quevedo, the la t te r  
first broaches the subject of Homer in his letter written fro m  
Valladolid on November 22, 1604. He mentions that, at the urging o f 
their mutual friend, Bernardino de M endoza, he intends to v in d ica te  
Homer in the Spanish language against the insults of Scaliger: "Cuius
patrio sermone (id fortasse haut m aturo consilio) iniurias H om ero 
illatas a Scaligero vindicare fuit animus: occasione sumpta a tuis in  
Velleium notis" (Ramirez 400-401). Coincidentally, Quevedo in th e  
same letter asks Lipsius for his opinion regarding a difficult p assag e  
from Lucan that deals with Cerberus and the underworld. Q uevedo 
would soon be writing about such topics in the Suenos. L ipsius 
responded January 25, 1605. He thinks even more of M endoza 
because of his advice that Quevedo defend Homer, and he adds h is 
own encouragem ent: "llle mihi hoc nomine maior est, quod te
hortatur Hom erum  tueri, & defendere; o fac, non potes dignius, & 
sapientibus gratuis, argum entum  tractare" (Ramirez 412). This w as 
to be the last contact between Lipsius and Quevedo, judging from th e  
still extant correspondence. Lipsius died in March, 1606, but a few  
months before, sometime in 1605, Quevedo wrote El sueno del Juicio 
final, beginning the project at a time in which Lipsius and th e  
defense of Homer occupied his thoughts.
The prom ised defense of H om er—w ritten  in Latin rather th a n  
Spanish—is not among Quevedo's extant works, but the desire to  
defend Homer and attack Scaliger continued to manifest itself in  
Quevedo's writings. In El sueno del Infiem o. Scaliger appears as one  
of the damned, tormented by the lies that he wrote about Homer:
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Julio Çessar Escaligero le estaua atormentando por otro lado con 
sus Exerçitaziones doctissimas, m ientras penaua las 
desuergonçadas m entiras que escriuiô de Homero y los 
testimonios que leuantô por levantar a Virgilio Aras, hecho 
ydolatra de Maron. (Suenos I, 186)
Also, in one part of his com m entary to his A nacredn castellano. 
Quevedo writes "... como yo probaré en la defensa de Homero co n tra  
las calunmias de Julio Scaligero y otros de esta secta, apostatas de la 
buena fama del padre de todas las ciencias..." (Obras H. 738). In ligh t 
of this continued preoccupation, there seems little room  for d o u b t 
that Quevedo had the defense of Homer in mind when he wrote th e  
opening lines of El sueno del Juicio final, and that he meant th e  
references to Homer as a serious tribute, not a parody, of the classical 
authority whom he considered the father of all sciences.
After all, Quevedo could have easily appealed to some classical 
authority other than Homer to begin his dream s. For example, h e  
knew the work of M acrobius and could have referred  to th e  
Commentary on the Dream of Scipio. Of the five types of dreams th a t  
Macrobius defines in his com m entary, the s o m n iu m ,  visio^ oraculum,  
in som n ium ,  and v isum ,  the first three are said to have some type o f 
prophetic value and are to be believed. This would certainly h av e  
suited Quevedo's purpose since he wishes to insist on the veracity o f 
his dream. In addition, Quevedo employs a great many of th e  
features and characteristics described by M acrobius as s ta n d a rd  
parts of true dreams. Even his reference to Hom er regarding th e  
believability of the dream s o f great men has a sim ilar precedent in  
the com mentary of M acrobius (Macrobius 91). However, Q uevedo
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nowhere in the Suenos appeals directly to Macrobius, quite p ro b a b ly  
for his own ideological reasons relating to Cicero and Epicurus.
A lthough the dream theory of Macrobius can stand on its ow n, 
its association with the name of Cicero is inevitable for the sim p le  
reason that Macrobius developed his work around the last book o f 
Cicero's Republic, which relates Scipio's dream. During the M iddle 
Ages, the entire text of the Republic had not been available, only th a t  
portion preserved in Macrobius. By the seventeenth century, th e  
hum anists had recovered a great many Ciceronian texts not known to  
m edieval readers (see Kristeller 25-26). Quevedo had read th o se  
texts carefully, but he had little regard for Cicero as an in te llec tu a l. 
In his Defensa de Eoicuro. Quevedo notes that Cicero frequently  tr ie s  
to im pugn Epicurean doctrine and praise it at the same time. I n 
Quevedo's opinion, this dem onstrates more Cicero's ability as a 
lawyer than as a philosopher: "Y es cierto que en los libros d e
filosoffa mostro Ciceron mas su oficio que su seso" (Obras I, 1101). 
Quevedo also expresses surprise that Cicero should fail to u n d e rs ta n d  
things that could be understood by "cualquier ignorante, " such as th e  
Epicurean and Homeric descriptions of the nature of the gods (O bras 
I, 1101).^ Even in his philosophical works, Quevedo re g u la r ly  
employs such caustic and satirical rem arks against his ideological 
enemies, dem onstrating just how passionately he felt about d e b a te s  
of a philosophical, religious, political, theological, or aesthetic n a tu re . 
He carries this passion into his satire, and such strong conv ic tions 
make any prom inent appeal to Cicero or Macrobius seem unlikely in  
this context, especially since M acrobius, in Chapter II of h is
8 See Ettinghausen (48-53), for m ore on Quevedo's attack on C icero.
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com mentary, refers to "the whole sect o f Epicureans, co n sis ten tly  
misapprehending the truth..." (Macrobius 83), a sentiment not sh a re d  
by Quevedo.
Quevedo undoubtedly began with Homer for serious ideological 
reasons, then. Homer's authority for Quevedo and Lipsius is ea s ily  
understandable, since he had been christianized since the time o f  
Clement and Origen (see Lamberton 78-82). In the Renaissance, 
many hum anists, including Lipsius, had continued the an c ien t 
tradition of conscripting pagan poets and thinkers to ex p o u n d  
Christian truths. Quevedo no differently christianizes Homer. F irs t 
he indicates the divine nature of dreams in general, saying they a re  
from "Jupiter," then he applies this to his own dream, affirming th a t  
he considers it "caydo del cielo," which the reader understands to  
mean that it originates from the Christian deity, especially in light o f  
the subject. However, he seems to contradict him self in the second  
half of the same sentence;
Digolo a proposito de que tengo por caydo del cielo vno q u e  
tuue estas noches passadas, hauiendo cerrado los ojos con e l 
libro del beato Hypolito, del fin del Mundo y segunda venida d e  
Christo, lo cual fue causa de sonar que veya el Juicio final. 
(Suenos I. 131)
The reference to falling asleep over a book is conventional, a n 
im portant motif in some medieval dream -visions, but Quevedo's u se  
of it implies that his dream  has a psychological rather than a d iv in e  
origin. He says as much, naming the book of blessed Hypolitus as th e  
cause that made him dream he was seeing the Last Judgement.
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Such psychological and physiological explanations of d re am in g  
had become more prom inent during the late Middle Ages a n d  
throughout the Renaissance as m edical learning d is se m in a te d  
A ristotelian teaching regarding the cause and nature of images seen  
in one's sleep (see Kruger 83-89). In two works in particular. De 
somniis and De divinatione per so m n u m . Aristotle argues th e  
absurdity of thinking that dream s m ight be sent by God, an d  
develops his doctrine of images produced in the body by the se n se  
organs and normal bodily functions. He reduces the nature o f 
dreams to nothing more than a response to external and in te rn a l 
stimuli. As the influence of this doctrine grew, so did the d istrust o f 
dreams as possible vehicles for prophecy and truth.
A certain am ount of d istrust had always been present. In th e  
Odyssey XIX. 562-65, Homer presents the notions of the Gates o f 
Horn and Ivory; through one passed true dreams, through the o th e r, 
false ones. W riters such as M acrobius had added fu r th e r  
explanation, describing certain dream s of a physiological cause th a t  
were not to be trusted, but never discounting the true and p ro p h e tic  
nature of some dreams. In contrast, A ristotle presents an a lm o st 
unilateral doctrine that allows for little but scepticism and d is tru s t. 
Because of this, as Kruger observes, "[F]ull acceptance of A ris to te lian  
positions [...] was the exception, not the rule. The denial of d iv in e  
dreams clashed with biblical and patristic authorities and th u s  
presented difOculties for Christian writers" (87). And while A ris to tle  
may have been the prevalent authority on the physiological causes o f 
dreams, Quevedo, based on the supporting  texts he gives, ac tu a lly  
seems to derive his idea of "book as cause" from Epicurean doctrines.
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He refers Arst to Claudian: "... per la raçon que da Claudiano e n
la prefation al tercero libro De Raptu, diciendo que todos los a n im a le s  
suenan de noche cosas como som bras de lo que tratan de d ia"  
(Suenos I, 131). Claudian makes this com m ent not in the preface to  
the third book o f the Rape of Proserpine, as Quevedo says, but r a th e r  
in the opening lines of the Panegyric on the Sixth Consulship of th e  
Emperor Honorius. Crosby has shown that during the sixteenth a n d  
seventeenth  centuries, a  number of editions of the De raptu w e re  
published w hich included the preface from  the Panegvric. Q uevedo 's  
copy was doubtless one of those ed itions.^  The minor co n fusion  
seems them atically  fortuitous for the Suenos. however, since the De 
raptu contains many scenes set in the underw orld, indicating y e t  
another probable influence on the infernal themes in the S u en o s. 
The original passage from Claudian is as follows:
All the desires that our waking minds ponder by d ay , 
these does friendly sleep bring back to us when once o u r  
spirits are lulled in slumber. W hen the huntsman lays d o w n  
his weary limbs upon his bed, all the same his mind returns to  
his fam iliar coverts and the woods. Judges dream of law su its , 
and the charioteer of his chariot as w ith his horses of the n ig h t 
he steers safely past a phantom  turning-post. In s to len  
delights the lover finds his joy, the m erchant barters his goods, 
and, on waking, the miser seeks in vain the riches that h a v e  
slipped from  his grasp, while to poor m ortals stricken by th i r s t
9 See Jam es O. C rosby’s essay. "The Poet C laudian in F rancisco  d e  
Q uevedo's 'Sueno del Juicio  Final "
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sleep stream ing in lavishes—but all in vain—pleasing d rau g h ts  
from cool springs. (Claudian 3)
For Claudian, one's professional occupation has much to do with th e  
nature of his dreams, but he does provide other possibilities, such as  
the lover and the miser, to support the general principle that w ak ing  
concerns dictate the images that haunt one's sleep.
Quevedo gives the principle with the reference to Claudian, 
then supports it with a quote from Petronius: "Et canis in som nia
leporis vestigia la trat"‘° (Suenos I. 131). The quote comes from p o em  
XXX, according to the traditional numbering of the fragments o f
Petronius. J. P. Sullivan, in his notes to his edition of the tex t, 
observes that the poem is based on Epicurean doctrines (P e tro n iu s 
205). A very sim ilar passage occurs in the De rerum natura o f
Lucretius, another o f the noted Epicureans produced by Rome:
Hunters' dogs often in soft sleep all at once jerk  their legs a n d  
suddenly give tongue, and often sniff up the air, as though th e y  
had and were holding the track of a wild beast; and if  
awakened they often chase the empty images of stags, as
though they saw them in flight, until they dissipate th e ir
delusions and come to themselves. (De rerum 4. 991-97)
The De rerum, as noted by In wood and Gerson, "should be read in its  
entirety as crucial evidence of Epicureanism" (65). Quevedo, re fe rs  
to both Lucretius and Petronius positively in the Defensa de Epicuro 
as faithful disciples of Epicurus, and cites Lucretius in El sueno de la 
muerte when discussing the attitude men should have toward d e a th
"And the hound in his slum bers bays at the hare's tra c k s .
Translation by J. P. Sullivan (171).
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(Suenos I, 217). Epicurean doctrine regarding death coincided in  
many ways with that taught by the Stoics, and Christian writers such  
as Quevedo could easily adapt those ideas to their own beliefs. On 
the subject of death, Quevedo could juxtapose passages fro m  
Lucretius and the book of Job with no difficulty. Dream theory w as 
much more problem atic.
The Epicurean doctrine regarding dreams is perhaps m o st 
succinctly stated in the Vatican Sayings, num ber 24: "Dreams h av e
neither a divine nature, nor prophetic power, but they are p ro d u ced  
by the impact of images" (Inwood 37). O f course, the Vatican Sayings 
were not available to Quevedo, having only been discovered d u rin g  
the nineteenth century. Quevedo relied on the passages fro m  
Epicurus that had been transcribed by Diogenes Laertius as well a s  
the doctrines repeated and reflected in the works of writers such as  
Petronius and Lucretius. Nonetheless, Quevedo did have the e n t ire  
doctrine in these writings. In the first lines of the poem w hich  
Quevedo cites about the slumbering hound, Petronius clearly s ta te s  
that dreams do not have a divine origin: "Dreams, / The flee tin g
shadow-play that mocks the mind, / Issue from no temples, / No 
heavenly power sends them- / Each man creates his own" (P e tro n iu s  
171). Lucretius repeatedly states that the gods have no interest in  
the affairs o f men and do not involve th e m se lv e s ,"  and he in d ica tes  
that dreams come as a result of the mind's own ac tiv ity .(2 As a
"  See D e rerum. 1. 44-49, 150-158; 2. 167-183, 646-651, 1090-1104; 4. 1233- 
1239; 5. 76-90. 110-234, 1194-1240; 6. 58-89, 379-422.
'2  As E lizabeth  Asmis explains: "W hatever the mind most strained  f o r
during the day, he [L ucretius] points out, is w hat it g en e ra lly  experiences i n 
its dream s; the reason is that passages rem ain  open in the mind at n ight to  
receive the sam e im ages that were received  d u ring  the day. The mind, t h e n ,  
focuses on certa in  im ages rather than on o thers during sleep because the s ta te
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Christian familiar with the many biblical examples o f divinely s e n t 
dream s, Quevedo could not wholly accept this part o f E p icurean  
dream theory. He knew that Epicurus, though admirable, was not th e  
"father of truth" as his follow ers called him, and that his teach in g s
must be rejected where they differ with the teachings o f the Church:
Yo bien sé que no hallo la verdad, y que sôlo la h a lla
quien halla a Cristo nuestro  Senor, que es verdad, camino y
vida. Bien sé que no fue padre de la verdad; porque sé q u e
Dios es solo verdadero. Y sé por las palabras del Apôstol: "Que
Dios es verdadero, y todo hombre mentiroso, com o esta escrito." 
Condeno en Epicuro todas las palabras y opiniones que co n d en a  
la santa y sola verdadera  Iglesia catôlica rom ana. (Obras I, 
11 0 4 )
Such a disclaimer, typical o f  the period, could have been made b y  
any Christian about a pagan source, but in this instance, it g en u in e ly  
seems to describe Q uevedo's method of appealing only to th o se  
Epicurean doctrines not inim ical to his faith.
Still unresolved rem ains the question of the am bivalent a n d  
seemingly contradictory nature o f Quevedo's assertion that his d re a m  
came to him from Heaven, and yet was caused by the reading of a
o f tension that it experienced d u rin g  the day persists du ring  the n ight. W h e n  
aw ake, the mind is likew ise in a ce rta in  state o f tension, w hich  causes it to  
adm it ce rta in  eidola ra th e r  th an  o thers  out o f the large num ber that a r e
co n tin u a lly  bom bard ing  it fro m  outside. This state o f  ten sion  may b e  
co n d itio n ed  by prev ious e x p e r ie n c e s  ju s t as much as the state o f  the m i n d  
du ring  dream s; hence the act o f  se lec tion  is de lib era te  only  w hen the m i n d  
has, in addition, made a re so lv e  to m ake the selection . L u cre tiu s  is q u i t e
em phatic that the effort made by the m ind in selecting im ages is an act o f s e l f ­
preparation , undertaken o f  its ow n  accord. W hat he stresses here, how ever, is
not that the mind is ac ting  d e lib e ra te ly , but ra th e r that it is an agen t t h a t
makes a response o f  its own to fo rces  that come upon it from  the outside. T h i s
response, Lucretius insists, is n o t im posed by ex ternal fo rces, but is due to t h e  
nature o f  the mind i t s e l f  (A sm is 123).
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book. The first part of the answ er lies in the passage from C laudian  
to which Quevedo refers. A fter Claudian states with su p p o rtin g  
examples that waking preoccupations dictate the dream s of sleep, h e  
applies this principle to himself, describing how he, as a poet, saw  
him self standing before the gods singing a story. Then he connects  
the dream with the poem  he has ju st w ritten, "See how co n firm atio n  
is now granted me, and my vision has not played me false, nor has 
the deceitful Gate o f Ivory sent me dream s that come to no th ing" 
(Claudian 3). Claudian clearly ascribes prophetic weight and truth to  
his dream. In spite o f the fact that the dream  may initially have a 
psychological cause, it will still proceed either through the Gate o f 
Ivory or the Gate o f Horn; it will be either true or false according to  
the dictates of Heaven. For Claudian, no contradiction a p p a re n tly  
exists between the notions of divine origin and psychological cause. 
Similarly, Macrobius in his analysis never describes the dream  o f 
Scipio as anything but true and prophetic, in spite of the sp ecu la tio n  
on the part of Scipio that his dream  was caused by the long 
conversation he had with the King of M assinissa about h is 
grandfather the prior evening. According to the general ru le s  
outlined by M acrobius, dream s caused by waking concerns are of no 
value and not worth in terpreting  (see M acrobius 88). A p p aren tly , 
the tandem of daytim e concerns and what he considers c lea rly  
prophetic characteristics poses no problem.
One more classical author should be m entioned who p ro v id e s  
more closely than any other the am bivalent model of dream  th e o ry  
adopted by Quevedo in the Suenos. Lucian of Samosata. Lucian w ro te  
most of his satires as dialogues, but one work in particular, v a r ia b ly
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entitled Lucian's Career or Mv Dream , contains a dream  p u rp o rte d ly  
of the author himself. As the work begins, Lucian describes how, as 
a boy, he was apprenticed to his uncle to leam  the craft o f  
stonecutting. During a disastrous first day on the job, the young  
Lucian unwittingly destroyed an expensive piece of stone a n d
received a severe beating from his uncle. He returned hom e
distraught, determ ined not to work again with his uncle, and had a 
dream. As he begins to tell the dream, he insists that it is a se rious 
matter, "not som ething to be dismissed lightly; it d ese rv es, 
gentlemen, your closest attention" (Lucian 4). He continues with a
reference to Homer, and quotes from Book II of the Iliad:
For, to put it in Homer's words, there "came unto me as I
slumbered, a dream  sent by heaven / Through am brosia l
night, " so clear it was all but real. Even now, after so m uch  
time has passed, the shapes that appeared to me then still 
remain before my eyes, and the words I heard still echo in m y 
ears. That's how vivid it was. (4-5)
In his dream, two allegorical figures visit him, female figures,
offering him two different career choices. One of the figures calls 
herself the Lady of Statue Making, the other E d u c a t i o n . A f t e r
hearing their respective proposals, Lucian in the dream, makes his 
choice: "[Wjith joy in my heart, I crossed over to Lady Education... "
(8). Only at the end of his story does Lucian add an in te re s tin g  
comment: "This is the vision I rem em ber came to me when I w as
Lucian apparently  m odeled th is dream on "The Choice o f H ercules," a 
b rie f piece from the sophist P rodicus, preserved in X enophon 's M em orabilia. 2. 
1. 21-34, in which two a lleg o ric a l fem ale figures. Vice and V irtue, o ffer t h e  
young Hercules a choice on which path his life will take.
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still a boy— perhaps because I was so emotionally disturbed by th e  
beating I had received” (9).
Quevedo knew the work of Lucian, although he had little  
regard for him (see Chapter Six). Lucian's account of his d ream , 
however, presents intriguing sim ilarities. Like Quevedo, Lucian 
begins with a reference to Homer, stating that his dream came fro m  
Heaven and should be taken seriously. Like Quevedo, Lucian th e n  
adds a psychological explanation, the beating he received. K ruger 
has difficulty reconciling the two ideas:
After Lucian has recounted his dream, however, he ab an d o n s 
the notion that its source is divine. .. [...] Lucian calls the s ta tu s  
of his dream into question by framing it with these conflicting  
explanations of origin. Is the dream to be trusted as "god- 
sent, " or disregarded as the meaningless product o f 
psychological disturbance? (Kruger 17)
Contrary to Kruger's stated opinion, Lucian never at any m o m en t 
abandons the notion that his dream 's source is divine. His 
acknow ledgem ent of the role played by the beating in causing h is 
dream  should not be in terp reted  as a de fac to  denial of his e a r l ie r  
assertion that the dream came from Heaven. For Lucian, no conflict 
or contradiction apparently  exists between divine origin a n d  
psychological cause any more than it does for Claudian or Q uevedo. 
Modem readers may find it diffîcult to reconcile the two ideas, but it  
was a commonplace for many classical and medieval w riters w ho 
recognized both the spiritual and physical natures o f mankind.
Certainly, even those who espoused the truth and divine n a tu re  
of dreams frequently expressed the scepticism of those who did not.
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The words imagination  and f a n t a s y —in contrast to their m o d ern  
connotations associated almost com pletely with personal c re a tiv ity --  
in the M iddle Ages tended to evoke a certain wariness of the im ages 
received and stored in the mind, and of the dream s caused by th o se  
images. Quevedo reflects this tradition when he briefly again ta k e s  
up the subject o f dream  theory at the beginning of El sueno del
Infiem o: "...como sè que los suenos las mas vezes son burla de la
fantasia y oçio del alma..." (Suenos I, 160). N evertheless, th e se  
writers also viewed the imagination as the possible receptacle o f  
divine in s p i r a t io n . I m m e d ia te ly  after dism issing most dreams as 
false, Quevedo asserts the truth of his particular dream  of Hell 
because o f what he considers the involvem ent of Providence: "...vi
guiado del Angel de mi Guarda lo que se sigue: particular p ro u id en ç ia  
fue ensenarm elo para atraherm e con el miedo a la V erdadera Paz." 
Just as poets have always sought to couple their intellectual g ifts 
with the divine inspiration of the Muses, dream ers like Q uevedo 
have also invoked the divine to attribute truth to their dream s at th e  
same time that they acknowledge the participation of their ow n 
facu lties .
A lthough Quevedo refers to Homer to support the notion th a t
dream s come from Heaven, he knew very well the co rre la ting
biblical passages, especially as it finds expression in one of his 
favorite works, the book of Job:
Lynch makes this point of Dante in p a r tic u la r  re fe r r in g  to a p a s s a g e  
in the C om m edia in w hich he apostroph izes  the im ag in a tio n : "O i m a g i n a t i o n ,
that do som etim es so snatch from us from outw ard th ings that we give no h e e d ,  
though a thousand  trum pets sound around us, who moves you if the s e n s e  
affords you naught? A light moves you w hich takes form  in heaven , of i t se l f ,  
or by a  w ill that downward guides it." From  Purgatorio XVII. 13-18. Lynch u s e s  
S in g le to n 's  tran s la tio n  (L ynch  33).
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For God speaketh once, yea twice, yet man perceiveth it not. In  
a dream, in a vision of the night, when deep sleep falleth u p o n  
men, in slumberings upon the bed; then he openeth the ears o f 
men and sealeth their instruction, that he may w ithdraw  m an  
from  his purpose, and hide pride from man. (Job 33:14-17) 
Q uevedo's dream  theory attempts to rem ain true to biblical tra d it io n  
at the same time that it closely follows classical models, u ltim a te ly  
reflecting the philosophical tradition of Epicurus. If an y th in g , 
Quevedo, as a Baroque writer, could follow those models more closely  
than his m edieval counterparts, since he had at hand the texts o f 
Homer, known only indirectly in the Middle Ages, as well as the te x ts  
of the other authors to whom he refers or quotes. An analysis of th e  
dream conventions in the Suenos will reveal a similar adherence to  
tradition and philosophy.
II. Dream Convention
Most o f the conventions o f literary dreams in some w ay  
revolve around the idea that the dream er needs to leam s o m e t h i n g .  *5  
Consequently, in those dreams that present the author as p ro tag o n is t, 
the author describes a version of him self either ignorant of e s se n tia l 
truths, or in need of the philosophical and moral conso la tion  
necessary to overcome a spiritual crisis. The difference b e tw e e n  
author and narrator may seem one of mere chronology, since th e  
narrator, describing the experience of the dream in the past, n e e d s
“The v is io n a ry  goes to the o th e r  w orld in order to leam  s o m e t h i n g ;  
that is the usual p a tte rn , and it is an im p o rtan t feature o f m edieval d r e a m -  
poem s” (S p earin g  18).
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instruction, w hile the author, contem poraneous to the writing of th e  
dream, has presum ably already learned the lessons taugh t. 
However, any direct association between author and narrator m u s t 
be made with great caution. The “I” of the dream -vision may in d eed  
refer to the historical author, and the experience of the dream, a 
genuine life-changing revelation, but the narrator may also speak as 
a representative of m ankind.'^ In the latter instances, the ignorance 
of the dream er becomes the ignorance of mankind, and the lessons 
taught obviously intended for the reader. Thus the voice of the d im - 
witted first person narrator is frequently nothing more than a fiction, 
while the true voice of the author reveals itself in the events an d  
characters that appear to disabuse the dream er of his illusions. The 
dream, then, may either be a personal journey, an interior p ilgrim age 
that redefines the w riter’s interior life (see Lynch 48), or a n  
elaborate fiction created as a means of portraying tran sc en d e n t 
truths to the reader; or it may be both.
The predom inantly  social and satirical message of the Suenos 
may seem to preclude a reading of them as personal pilgrimage. I n 
the first two dream s in particular, the dream er serves as little m ore  
than a witness to the satirical condem nation of many segments a n d  
members of his own society. However, the passive nature of th e  
dreamer at the beginning of the Suenos results not so much from its  
social em phasis as it does from the apocalyptic and biblical m odels 
Quevedo follows as he begins this series o f visions. El sueno d e l
M ichael M eans m entions this with regard  to m edieval literatu re  i n 
general (19), and re fe rs  to the article by Leo Spitzer, “Note on the Poetic a n d  
Em piric ‘I ’ in M edieval A uthors," R om anische L iterastud ien  1936-1956
(Tübingen, 19): 100-112.
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relates a prophetic vision of a future event, the L ast 
Judgment. In accordance with tradition, the visionary m e re ly  
observes and does not take part in the future events revealed. W ith  
El sueno del Infiemo. the narrator begins to take a much more ac tiv e  
role in his dreams, wandering through Hell as a pilgrim in a m a n n e r  
rem iniscent of Dante. In El sueno de la muerte. the depiction of th e  
dream er as individual becomes much more sharply drawn, as th e  
narrator describes the crisis he has experienced during h is  
im prisonm ent—an historical event for Quevedo—, and th e  
subsequent consolation he receives from the personified image o f  
death, modeled after the consolation given by Lady Philosophy to  
Boethius in the Consolation of Philosophv. Quevedo draws on a 
variety of traditions for the Suenos. and as a result, the depiction a n d  
involvement o f the dreamer vary from  dream  to dream.
Quevedo’s use of other dream  conventions also v a rie s  
considerably, not following a particular pattern for the five w orks. 
For example, in only the Hrst and the last dream s does the n a r ra to r  
tell us that he fell asleep after reading literary texts that in som e 
way deal with the subject m atter o f the dream  that follows. I n 
Juicio. he mentions the book of blessed Hypolitus which deals w ith  
the end of the world and the second coming of Christ. In Muerte. h e  
cites passages from Lucretius and Job that deal with death. He 
probably arrived at this innovation independently , using it as a w ay  
of referring to authoritative texts at the same time that he adheres to  
classical theory regarding the connection betw een waking concerns 
and dreams. However, the practice of leading into literary v isions 
with descriptions o f the narrator reading books seems to have b eg u n
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in the Middle Ages. Chaucer does so in The Book of the Duchess a n d  
The Parliam ent of Foules. Although Quevedo did not know th e se  
particular works, he does follow the tradition o f the medieval d re a m - 
vision which begins with classical models and then incorporates th e  
author’s own innovations.
Another characteristic  typical of m edieval literary visions 
involves the creation o f in tertex tual relationships w ithin the d ream . 
Helen Phillips describes how Chaucer places "em bedded stories" in  
his dream -visions to create an in tertextual narrative (16 -18). 
Quevedo never employs the technique to the extent that Chaucer 
does, choosing to rely more heavily on his own Actions. Still, he  
em ploys this literary device to great effect, especially in Juicio in  
which the narrator begins his dream with a description of th e  
Resurrection of the Dead, initially very sim ilar to events foretold in I 
Corinthians, Chapter 15. Quevedo the narrator says he thought h e  
saw a young man in the air sounding a trum pet, and in obedience, 
the dead began to rise physically from their graves, each bone 
looking to join its match (Suenos I, 131). The descrip tion becom es
increasingly comic as the narrator relates how some sinners, realizing
they were facing the Last Judgment, began to flee from those parts o f 
their reanim ated bodies that they had used to com mit their sins; 
"Los ladrones y m atadores gastauan los pies en huyr de sus mi s ma s 
manos" (Suenos I, 132).
Because of such comic passages, as well as the denunciations o f 
parades of innkeepers, tailors, shoe makers, book sellers, law yers, 
doctors, and other groups from early seventeenth  century Spanish
society, it becomes easy to focus on the social satire and think of th e
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biblical referents and apocalyptic tradition as nothing more than a n  
artistic recourse used to establish a scenario of co n d em n atio n . 
However, Quevedo provides lists other than those made up o f 
members of his own society, describes other groups passing b efo re  
the Throne of Judgm ent, indicating something other than a p u re ly  
comic intent.
The judgm ent begins with Adam, and Quevedo m entions th e  
rigorous questioning that ensues on account of a certain apple. By 
doing so, he creates an intertextual relationship with the p assag es  
from Genesis that relate the Fall of man. As the Judgment con tinues, 
Judas, Herod, and Pontius Pilate soon appear. With the inclusion of 
these three biblical figures, Quevedo "embeds" the stories o f C hrist's 
betrayal, the persecution of the Christ child that caused Joseph an d  
Mary to flee w ith the babe into Egypt, as well as the death se n te n c e  
given Christ by a Roman governor who was more in terested  in 
politics than justice. Why would Quevedo bring these events into h is 
text if his purpose were merely to satirize his own society? Clearly, 
he wishes to dem onstrate how evil he considers the vice a n d  
decadence he observes around him on a daily basis. These b ib lical 
episodes establish a frame within which to view and understand  th e  
comedy of the dream , a serious fram e of sin, rebellion against God, 
and rejection of Christ. Quevedo presents this denunciation of h is 
own society as a comic panorama; he eagerly displays his w it a n d  
skill as a satirist, but he does so within the larger, much more se rio u s 
theological fram ew ork established by his intertextual approach.
While in tertex tuality  may be a typical feature of the m e d iev a l 
dream -vision, there is nothing particularly  oneiric about allusions to
4 2
biblical or historical characters. What is oneiric, is the sp iritu a l
setting provided by the dream, which allows the dream er to see  
these characters as they supposedly were in life. The dream se ttin g  
also allows for other im possibilities. For example, the dream er m ay  
see and even interact with allegorical constructs. In Juicio. Q uevedo 
makes use of allegorical personiHcation to add to the intertexuality o f  
his work, m entioning first the appearance of the Ten 
Commandments, then that of the New Testam ent fSuenos I, 134) as 
characters participating in the vast spectacle observed by th e  
dreamer. These characters receive only passing mention in the text, 
but they add significantly to the larger theological framework of th e  
satire, the Ten Com m andm ents associated with the proper m oral 
conduct of individuals, and the New Testam ent with the C hristian 
faith. Such personification of texts may, for Quevedo, represent an  
ingenious substitution of the ecphrastic passages much more typ ical 
o f medieval dream visions. Rather than describe another piece of a r t  
within his own, he personifies literary texts, allowing them to tak e  
part in the action. However, personification of abstractions, r a th e r  
than texts, represents a far more common feature of the d ream - 
vision genre. Among those taking part in the Last Judgement as 
envisioned by Quevedo are “Locura” (133), and then “las Desgracias, 
las Pestes y las Pesadum bres” ( I 3 4 ) ‘ ,^ the latter three groups giving 
witness against doctors.
Personification plays a relatively small role in Juicio. w hich 
would be called a visio, a prophetic dream, according to th e
Later in his life, Quevedo w rote at length about "las cuatro pestes d e l 
mundo" in his ascetic w ork, V irtud m ilitan te , com posed during  1634-36 (Obras  
I, 1364-1423).
4 3
categorization o f M acrobius. Allegorical personification becom es 
increasingly im portant, however, in the later Suefios. In El m undn  
por de dentro. an old man called Desengano  serves as guide an d  
teacher to the narrator. In El sueno de la muerte. a female c h a ra c te r  
called M u er te  perform s a similar function. These two d ream s 
represent what M acrobius calls an oraculum,  a dream  "in which a 
parent, or a pious or revered man, or a priest, or even a god c learly  
reveals what w ill or will not transpire, and what action to take o r 
avoid" (M acrobius 90). This definition does not specifically include 
personifications, but during the Middle Ages, personifications re la te d  
to specific subjects increasingly took the place of revered or d iv in e  
messengers such as saints or angels in oracular dream s.' ^
An angelic guide does almost make an appearance at th e  
beginning of Infierno. where the narrator states that he saw th e  
subsequent infernal vision guided by his guardian angel. Q uevedo 
may have initially  intended to follow the models of apocalyp tic  
works, or even the satirical sixteenth century work El Crotalon. w hich  
included angelic guides, but he appears to have abandoned th e  
notion, since now here else in Infierno does he again mention h is 
guardian angel. Instead, the narrator wanders through Hell w ith o u t 
any type of guide, conversing with demons and the dam ned in o rd e r  
to leam the tru th  of what he observes. Other exam ples occur in th e
M eans com m en ts on the possible reasons for this: “For one t h i n g ,
using  person ifica tio n  is s tra te g ic a lly  safer than using  angels or saints: t h e s e
poets strive for m ore p ro found , hence less safe, m ean in g s  than do most p i o u s  
legends. M ore im p o rta n tly , though, p e rso n if ic a tio n s  enable  the poet to  
p a rtic u la riz e  the a rea  o f  abso lu te  tru th  being d iscussed . The reve la tio n  o f  
angels or saints should  be a ll-e n c o m p a ss in g  since in p e rce iv in g  God t h e y  
p erce ive  all know ledge , but ch a ra c te rs  nam ed P h ilo so p h y , for exam ple, o r  
D aunger, or Im ag in a tif cou ld  hardly rise to such expecta tions ' (13).
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Suenos that might seem to correspond more closely to the M acrob ian  
notion of characters who are, if not divine or revered, at le a s t 
famous, such as the conversation that takes place between th e  
narrator and the "Marqués de Villena" in M uerte (see Price 45), b u t  
that scene is prim arily a comic episode. The scenes that specifically  
relate to the dream er’s need to leam  philosophical or moral t ru th s  
are those in which personified abstractions play the part of th e  
in s tru c to r-g u id e .
For Franz W. Muller, the depiction of realistic p e rso n ae
alongside personified abstractions in the Suenos represents part o f 
an unresolved tension between the medieval and the modem (M uller 
225). He refers to a "dialéctica del alegorism o y el rea lism o
m odem o..." (226), defining the latter concept prim arily by th e
presence o f realistic personae;
Sus personificaciones alegoricas de conceptos religiosos,
morales y psicologicos se mueven en medio de una a b ig a rra d a  
m uchedum bre de tipos profesionales contem poraneos, e n tre  
jueces, abogados, zapateros, sastres, cocheros, p as te le ro s ,
comediantes, politicos, rameras y pfcaros. (227)
This "dialéctica," according to Muller, provides the explanation as to  
why "en los Suefios. la alegorfa no es total" (226). The implication is
that a truly medieval allegory would be total, or pure, and that a n y
im purities must be due to Quevedo’s m odernity. However, w ith o u t 
dim inishing the Baroque, or modern, aspects of the Suefios. it sh ou ld  
be mentioned that many works from A ntiquity onward contain b o th  
personifications and personae; Lucian’s Dream, cited earlier in th is  
chapter, is but one example. In the M iddle Ages, pure, or to ta l
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allegory was somewhat more the exception than the rule (see Van 
Dyke 65-67), The inclusion of personae, then, should not be taken in 
and of itself as a sign of m odernity, especially in those scenes th a t 
depict one persona, the narrator, interacting with one personification , 
the allegorical instructor.
Such scenes follow firmly in the tradition established by  
Boethius’ Consolation of Philosophy, a seminal work of trem en d o u s 
influence throughout the Middle Ages. Van Dyke refers to it as 
“allegorical instruction” (66). Muller, in his analysis, m en tions 
neither Boethius nor the traditional nature of Quevedo’s construction  
of these scenes. Rather than recognize the tradition, he refers to th e  
originality of Quevedo’s allegories: “Lo que los destaca es la
originalidad con que transform a Quevedo los lugares com unes 
alegoricas, renovandolos, conforme avanza su labor en los Suenos. po r 
medio de visiones alegôricas ùnicas” (Muller 228). He supports his 
thesis with reference to Quevedo s description of Death that ap p ears  
in Muerte:
En esto entrô vna que pareçia muger mui galana, y llena de  
coronas y de çetros y oçes y abarcas y chapines y tiaras y 
caperuzas y mitras y m onteras y brocados y pellexos y seda y 
oro y garrotes y diamantes y terrones y guijarros y perlas, y vn  
ojo abierto y otro çerrado, vestida y desnuda y de todos colores; 
por el vn lado era moça y por el otro vieja; vnas veçes venia de 
espaçio y otras apriesa, y pareçia que estaba lexos y e s tab a  
çerca, y quando pensé que començaba a entrar, estaba ya en mi 
cabecera. fSuenos I, 222)
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For Muller, the originality of this character lies in the fact th a t  
Quevedo does not describe a skeletal figure, "...dejando a un lado p o r  
prim itiva e inadecuada la tradicional representacion del e sq u e le to  
con su guadaha y su reloj de arena, la reemplaza por una fîgura de su  
propia invenciôn..." (Muller 229). Had Quevedo followed tradition, in  
other words, he would have simply described the Grim Reaper. S ince 
he did not do so, his Hgure must be original and of his own in v en tio n . 
This conclusion, however, only considers one tradition, that w h ich  
stems from the Panza de la muerte and other works that provide a 
skeletal description of Death. Quevedo does pay certain homage to  
that tradition when he mentions the "oçes" in the hand o f his D eath, 
but he clearly has another tradition in mind, a philosophical one th a t  
must be taken into account before addressing his originality.
At the beginning of Muerte. the narrator describes how h e  
suffers, anguished and imprisoned, thinking about death. He re a d s  
passages from Lucretius and Job that provide him with so m e  
consolation, and then he sleeps. He begins to dream and see f ig u re s  
from his society passing by him. Shortly a strange looking figure o f  
contrasting and opposing characteristics approaches his bed, a f ig u re  
who will speak to him about the nature of death and how m e n  
should view it, a figure who will provide him with ph ilo soph ica l 
consolation. Already this sounds much like the situation d e sc r ib e d  
by Boethius at the beginning of the Consolation, where the n a r r a to r  
lies in bed, imprisoned, anguished, distracted by the Muses, when th e  
figure of Lady Philosophy approaches to provide him the conso la tion  
he needs. These similarities, though significant, only p a r tia lly  
represent Quevedo's debt to Boethius.
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When reading Quevedo's description of Death, it is th e  
conflicting nature o f the figure that stands out. She has one ey e  
closed, and one open. She is both dressed and naked and of m a n y  
colors. On one side she is young, the other old. At times she m oves 
slowly, then very quickly, seeming both far away and very n ear. 
This nature, that encom passes opposite extrem es, has a c lea r 
precedent in Boethius' description o f Lady Philosophy (Boethius 2 8 ) '*  
who seems both young and old, "her colour fresh and cheerful, a n d  
yet discovering so many years," who sometimes had "the com m on 
height of m en " while at others she was so tall "she pierced the v e ry  
heavens." She wears clothes o f the finest threads, workm anship, a n d  
"ever-during stuffe," and yet they are faded and tom  in places. I n 
contrast to the many crowns, miters, tiaras, scepters and jew els on  
the person of Death as described by Q uevedo—indicating h e r  
ultimate power over even the most powerful of mortals—, L ady  
Philosophy carries only one scepter, but the royal and a u th o rita tiv e  
nature of each figure is clear. Each, within the limits of her n a tu re , 
and the realms over which she rules allegorically, may sp e a k  
infallibly, au thoritatively , and thus take on the role of the d iv in e  
messenger o f the oracular dream.
Of course, Boethius never explicitly presents or describes th e  
Consolation as a dream . N evertheless, the work established th e  
pattern for a great many of the dream -visions that followed in th e  
M iddle Ages. Lynch, when discussing the developm ent of th e  
philosophical dream -vision, refers to the Consolation as "the g en re 's
N o ltin g -H au ff (275) makes some o f these same c o m p a r a t i v e  
observations postu la ting  the  in fluence o f  B oethius.
4 8
prototype" (Lynch vii). For Quevedo, certainly, the influence o f 
Boethius must be understood within the context of the d ream -v is io n  
tradition that perpetuated  the practice of using personifications as 
instructor-guides. W hile the Suenos them selves can not be s tric tly  
called “philosophical” dream -visions, they clearly exhibit a 
trem endous am ount o f influence from that tradition. The o rig inality  
of Quevedo's work lies in his skillful adaptation of that tradition to 
his own message, and the way in which he so thoroughly assim ila te s  
it into his satire.
Quevedo extends the juxtaposition of realistic and allegorical 
even into his scenography. In Infierno. the narrator describes how, 
at the beginning of his dream, he found himself in a natural p a rad ise
from which flowed two separate paths:
Hallème en vn lugar faborezido de naturaleza por el 
sosiego amable, donde sin malizia la Hermossura entretenia la 
vista (muda Recreaçion), y sin respuesta humana platicauan las 
Puentes entre las guixas y los Arboles por las ojas; tal vez 
cantaua el Pajaro, ni sè de termino si en com petenzia suya, o si 
agradeçiendoles su harmonia; ved quàl es de peregrino n u es tro  
desseo, que no halle paz en nada de esto. Tend! los ojos 
cudiziossos de ver algun camino por donde buscar com pania, y 
veo (cosa digna de adm irazion) dos sendas que nazen de v n 
mismo lugar, y vna se yua apartando de la otra, como qu e
huiesen de acompaharse. (Suenos I, 160)
Initially, Quevedo m erely provides a conventional description of th e  
locus a m oenus ,  a peaceful place of trees, fountains and birdsong. 
This type of description appears in texts representing many d if fe re n t
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genres following both biblical and classical models. It figures 
perhaps most prom inently in pastoral works, but it also belongs to  
the series of conventions used by authors of literary visions w ho 
employ it to describe the otherw orld to which dreamers o ften  
t r a v e l . A l t h o u g h  exaggerated and idyllic in its peacefulness an d  
beauty, it does represent here a realistic setting that serves as th e  
starting point for what will turn into an allegorical journey.
After the conventional but unrem arkable description of place, 
Quevedo incorporates an oneiric innovation with his addition of th e  
two paths, oneiric because of the ease with which the dreamer m oves 
from a realistic to an allegorical landscape. As he continues th e  
narrative, it soon becomes apparent that the paths represent the tw o 
choices of human earthly existence: one path, narrow and d ifficu lt
with few people, leads to Heaven, the other, broad and easy w ith  
many travelers leads to Hell. The biblical model comes fro m  
Matthew 7:13 where Christ describes as narrow the way that leads to  
life, and broad the way that leads to destruction. Quevedo h ad  
earlier alluded to this biblical passage in Juicio when he d escrib ed  
the Ten Commandments standing as guards at the extremely n arro w  
gate entering Heaven. Notably, the narrator of Infierno finds no
20 "The locus am oenus  or 'beau tifu l p lace ', w hich becam e the h e a v e n l y  
landscape o f lite ra ry  visions and dream s, is basica lly  a M e d i t e r r a n e a n  
landscape, an ideal o rig in a tin g  in Greece, Italy , and Palestine . It is t y p i c a l l y  
set in b rig h t sou thern  sun ligh t (perhaps au g m en ted  by or transform ed  i n t o  
the jew elled  b rillia n c e  o f  the A pocalypse), but it also provides shade a g a i n s t  
the sun, and is therefore furnished with a tree or trees, often fru it-trees. T h e  
trees will be in a flow ery  meadow, w hich w ill p rov ide frag ran ce  as well a s  
b righ t colours, and there  will probably  be b irds s in g in g  in them  (though i n 
some cases the place o f birds is taken by human  or angelic  song). In t h e  
meadow there is a lm ost invariab ly  a sp ring  or brook, often  rising from a 
foun ta in , and there  w ill usually be a breeze, both featu res being n e c e s s i t i e s  
for com fort in a hot country" (Spearing 17-18).
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peace in the paradise that he initially observes, and he chooses to  
leave it in order to follow the paths. Quevedo may wish to d ra w  
some parallel between his Everyman narrator and Adam and Eve, 
who were not content w ith the life and rules given them in th e
Garden and had to leave it. Thereafter they had to choose b e tw e en  
good and evil, since they learned the difference with their first sin. 
The narrator's own discontent with paradise seems to lie with th e  
lack of human companionship, the solitude in which he finds him self. 
So, not surprisingly, he chooses the easy, crow ded path, and soon 
finds himself in Hell. With regard to Quevedo's use of d re a m
convention, the most notable feature is perhaps the progression fro m  
the realistic to the allegorical to the spiritual destination of th e
afterlife. The progression dem onstrates the ease with w hich
Quevedo adapts both the traditional conventions and the oneiric  
setting to his purpose, m aking plausible what would seem im possib le 
in any other context.
The first words in the first Sueno were of dream  theory, th e  
source and cause of dream s, the workings of the human mind. The 
last words of the last Sueno provide a reflective analysis of th e
narrato r’s experience;
Con esto me hallè en mi aposento, tan cansado y ta n
colerico como si la pendencia huuiera sido verdad y la
peregrinacion no huuiera sido sueno. Con todo esso me parecio  
no despreciar del todo esta vision, y darle algun credito ,
pareciendom e que los m uertos pocas vezes se burlan, y q u e
gente sin pretension y desenganada, mas atiende a ensehar q u e  
ha entretener. (Suenos I. 251)
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In his final comment, the narrator characterizes his dream  in a 
typically medieval fashion calling it a pilgrimage. Quevedo may h a v e  
taken this from Dante, who regularly  refers to himself as a p ilg rim  
during his journey to the otherw orld. The term frequently a p p e a rs  
in allegorical texts referring to the broader journey of human life, 
but here it connotes a journey of spiritual enlightenm ent, the d ream . 
In his prologues to the reader, Quevedo the author speaks of p o in tin g  
out social vices and opening the eyes of the reader; in the text itself, 
the narra to r remains consistent to the dream  convention, p re se n tin g  
him self as an individual in need of "desengano,” with whom th e  
reader is obviously meant to identify.
Had Quevedo lived and w ritten the Suenos two hundred y e a rs  
earlier, m edieval scholars would undoubtedly categorize them  as 
satirical dream -visions. Baroque scholars have been reluctant to do  
so, perhaps because the Suenos incorporate so many other im p o r ta n t 
traditions related to their satire and moral philosophy. P e rh a p s  
another reason for the avoidance of the term “dream -vision” has to  
do with the scant representation o f the genre in medieval S p an ish  
literature in com parison with the many literary visions belonging to  
the canon of medieval French and English literature. Because of th e  
lack of a strong medieval Spanish tradition, Quevedo naturally re lie d  
more heavily on classical sources and models, something he w ou ld  
have been likely to do anyw ay because of the R enaissance  
rediscovery of so many classical texts. In something of a c o n tra s t, 
although Chaucer’s dream -visions do contain many references to  
classical authors and stories, they also seem to have been g re a tly  
influenced by literary visions o f medieval France. Chaucer a n d
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Quevedo had some common influences, such as Boethius, but there is 
deflnitely a m edieval com ponent to the tradition which Q uevedo 
lacks. However, Quevedo did possess a vast general knowledge o f 
medieval texts w ritten in Latin, Spanish, and Italian. The m an y  
dream  conventions represen ted  in the Suenos clearly indicate som e 
familiarity with the characteristics that developed in the d re a m -  
vision genre during the Middle Ages. Quevedo utilizes th o se  
characteristics not only to make possible a journey to the o th e rw o rld , 
but also as a means to establish the serious context of his humor.
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Chapter Three:
The Neostoic and Sceptical Dynamic in the Suenos
The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy lists 
Francisco de Quevedo as “the most noteworthy exponent of Spanish 
Neostoicism” (Schmitt, Cambridge 372). Stoic doctrine, particularly as 
transm itted  through the writings of Seneca, had been influential in 
Spain since the late Middle Ages, but Neostoicism as a E uropean 
philosophical movement began in 1584, when Justus L ipsius 
published his De constantia in publicis malis (C am bridge 370). The 
m ovem ent sought to reconcile Stoic doctrines of moral ph ilosophy  
with those of the Christian faith. In particular, the book of Job, w ith  
its examples of fortitude and resignation, served as the m ost 
im portant source of biblical com patibility with S toicism .' Q uevedo
wrote a number of works that stand primarily as expositions of
Neostoicism, the most significant of them including: De los rem ed ies
de cualQuier fortuna. Nombre. origen. intento. recom endacion v
descendencia de la dotrina estoica (to which he appended th e
Defensa de Epicure). La cuna v la sepultura. La constancia v paciencia 
del Santo Job, y Providencia de Dios. Manuel Duran has referred to
 ^ In pursuit o f that co m p a tib ility , Quevedo even p erp e tu a ted  th e  
m edieval m isconception  that the Stoics derived their doctrine d irec tly  f ro m  
the book o f  Job: “No pudieron verdades tan desnudas del m undo, c o g e r s e
lim pias de la tierra y polvo de o tra  fuente  que de las sagradas letras. Y osé 
[Pedro Com estor] afirm ar que se derivan  del libro sagrado de Job, t r a s la d a d a s  
en precep to  de sus acciones y palab ras literalm ente. P robaré lo  c o n  
dem ostraciones y con la cronologia de los prim eros profesores” fO bras I. 1085).
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these works as “un necesario contrapeso a sus escritos satfricos” 
(157). He adm its that the satires and philosophical works co n ta in  
many of the same characteristics, but he refers to their "pesim ism o, 
nihilismo, y vision negativa de la vida humana" (157) as th e ir  
ideological com m onalities. The Neostoic ideas, which he describes as 
the "clave elevada" (157) of the philosophical works, he co n tra s ts  
with the "vision del hombre como fantoche" (157) in the satires. The 
characterization, although accurate in some respects, fails to  
sufficiently acknowledge the extent to which Quevedo's philosophical 
convictions perm eate his humor in a m anner wholly consistent w ith  
the ostensibly more serious works.
The tendency to view Quevedo’s satires separately from h is  
philosophical works unfortunately has am ple precedent in Q uevedo 
himself. In response to the attacks and accusations he suffered a f te r  
the publication o f the first edition of the Suenos (1627), he p re p a re d  
a new edition, w ith signiHcant revisions and a new title: Juguetes d e
la ninez v travesuras de ingenio f 16311. M any of the revisions w e re  
meant to remove any possibility of theological controversy and avo id  
problems with the Inquisition, but the new title clearly represents an  
attem pt to characterize the satires as nothing more than in n o cen t 
and youthful m ischievousness. Such a characterization  can only b e  
regarded as disingenuous, a capitulation to pressure and criticism, fo r 
while Quevedo did indeed begin to write the Suenos as a young m an  
in 1605, he did not finish the last one until 1621, some sixteen y e a rs  
later when he had already reached middle age. The composition o f 
the Suenos spanned a considerable part o f his adult life, and th e  
influence of Lipsius and the ideals o f  Neostoicism m an ife s t
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them selves from  the beginning. Quevedo’s other ph ilosoph ical 
interests, principally Epicureanism  and classical scepticism, a lso  
occupy his thought and his works to a considerable degree.
It runs som ew hat contrary to traditional criticism  on Q uevedo 
to suggest that his philosophical interests as expressed in his w o rk s  
rem ained consistent throughout his career. Américo Castro, K. A. 
Bluher, and George M ariscal, among others, have all com mented o n  
the contradictory nature o f Quevedo’s thought.- However, f re q u e n tly  
more apparent than real, many of Quevedo’s contradictions d isa p p e a r  
when read within the context of the larger body of his work.
For example, toward the beginning o f El sueno del Juicio final. 
Quevedo briefly, and in a very negative fashion, mentions th e  
appearance o f philosophers as a group, standing before the Throne o f
Judgement; “Fueron juzgados los Philosophos, y era de ver ocupadas
sus ciencias y entendim ientos en hacer silogismos contra s u 
saluacion” fSuehos I, 136). One could infer from this statem ent, a s  
well as from sim ilarly negative comments made elsewhere, th a t  
Quevedo had a general dislike for philosophers and thinkers. At th e  
same time, he continually expressed a deep adm iration for men like
Seneca, Zeno, Epictetus, Epicurus, and many others. There m ig h t
appear to exist a contradiction, but, when reading Quevedo, one m u s t
^ A ccording to  Castro, “Quevedo es un cam po de c o n tra d ic c io n e s .” H e 
makes this com m ent in h is artic le  “E scepticism o y co n tra d icc iô n  en Q uevedo" 
(43). in which he argues that Q uevedo’s p h ilo so p h ica l scep tic ism  is at odds 
with C hristian  doctrine . B luher’s com m ents on ap p a re n t c o n t r a d ic t io n s  
aris in g  out o f Q uevedo’s use o f both Stoic and C hristian  doctrine  will b e  
addressed at length  in the next chap ter. M ariscal com m ents that, “It s h o u ld  
not surprise us, therefore, tha t Q uevedo’s texts have co n sis te n tly  refused  to b e  
totalized into a h a rm o n io u s w hole and that since the end o f  the s e v e n te e n th  
cen tu ry  the im age o f Quevedo the man has been that o f  a co n trad ic to ry  a n d  
inso lub le  figure ” (101).
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always keep in mind that he often did not bother to qualify h is  
statem ents. As a result, many comments appear categorical w h en  
they are, indeed, not. In the passage above, he merely says, “los 
Philosophos,” appearing to denounce them all because no adjective o r  
relative clause follows to provide some qualification, to limit th e  
referent to a certain type or group of philosopher. He does, how ever, 
provide one clue with the word “silogismos.” A passage from th e  
Defensa de Epicuro provides some significant clarification;
Oigamos voz elegante, doctisima y sagrada. San Jeronimo, so b re  
la epfstola de San Pablo a Tito: “Los dialécticos, de q u ie n es
A ristoteles es principe, suelen tender redes de argum entes y 
concluir la vaga libertad de la Retôrica en las zarzas de los 
silogismos. Si esto hacen aquellos de quienes la contenciôn es 
arte propia, ^qué debe hacer el cristiano, sino huir la
contienda?” (Obras 1, 1094)
The anti-A risto telianism  reflected in the commentary from St.
Jerome would become an im portant current in R enaissance
scepticism, but more importantly, the passage describes an e n tire
class of philosophers, the dialecticians who, with their “redes d e
argumentos” and “silogismos,” claim to be able to arrive at c e rta in
knowledge regarding reality. These are the philosophers w h o m
Quevedo m entions with such disdain in Juicio. always to be
considered separately from the moral philosophers whom he so
greatly adm ired.
Quevedo’s predilection for moral philosophy derives as m u ch  
from the age in which he lived as from personal inclination. He w as
a humanist. The studia h u m a n ita tis  that formed the core o f
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Renaissance Humanism consisted of gram m atica l rhetorica, poetica , 
historia, and philosophia moralis. It stands to  reason, therefore, th a t  
when Quevedo wrote moral satires such as the Suenos. m o ra l 
philosophy would comprise a significant part of the works, a n d  
indeed such is the case. In addition, the Renaissance g en e ra lly  
preserved the tripartite division of moral philosophy into e th ics, 
economics, and politics, a division established  by Aristotle a n d  
continued by w riters throughout A ntiquity and the Middle A ges 
(Cambridge 303ff.). The three areas dealt w ith governance of self, o f 
one’s household, and of the state. R. M. Price has commented on th e  
lack of any real political satire in the Suenos (74). Clearly, th e  
primary philosophical concern of the Suenos is governance of self, 
the conduct of individuals and classified groups of individuals, n o t 
the state. For the latter, Quevedo wrote his famous two volume w o rk  
Politica de Dios, which concerns itself with the proper role a n d  
conduct of a king in light of Christ’s exam ple taken from bib lical 
passages. This is not to say that the Suenos reflect none of Q uevedo 's 
political concerns. As will be seen in C hapter Six, some im p o rta n t 
parallels exist between certain passages in the Suenos and id eas 
expressed in works such as Politica de Dios and Espana d e fe n d id a . 
However, these passages are few when com pared to the many th a t  
reflect Quevedo's moral philosophy.
Quevedo’s preoccupation with moral philosophy by no m ean s 
indicates ignorance of the other areas of philosophical study, such as  
m etaphysics.^  He merely possessed an intense distrust of conclusions
 ^ Quevedo ap p a re n tly  follows the teach in g  o f  Seneca on this m a tte r :  
"The lyric poets are avow edly frivolous; but the d ia le c tic ia n s  believe that t h e y  
are engaged upon serious business. I do not deny th a t one must cast a g l a n c e
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based solely on logic, hence his ridicule of the dialecticians in Juicio. 
an early indication of the sceptical stance that he declares m uch 
more directly  in the fourth Sueno. El mundo por de d e n tro . His 
scepticism, based primarily on classical doctrines, but also in fluenced  
by the sceptical revival that took place in the sixteenth century, has 
im portant im plications for his moral philosophy. Quevedo’s decision 
to introduce sceptical philosophy into his moral satires has yet to be 
discussed sufficiently among scholars. Once certain sceptical
elements in the Suenos have been established, how ever, the Neostoic 
elements, that focus on doctrines regarding the passage of time an d  
human m ortality, become more understandable w ithin the b ro a d e r  
philosophical scheme of the satires.
The Sceptical Sueno: El mundo por de dentro
In her 1982 study on scepticism in Cervantes, Maureen Ih rie  
devoted some brief comments to Quevedo, and observed at the tim e 
that his scepticism  had not “been subm itted to system atic critical 
analysis” (27). Little has changed in the in tervening years. T hat 
portion of Quevedo’s thought still presents significant problems in 
need of analysis if not resolution. Ihrie raises one o f those p rob lem s 
when she com m ents that Quevedo “does not at any time seek, 
espouse, or attem pt to m aintain a skeptical attitude (which seeks to 
balance all extrem es) and provoke ataraxia, his use o f sk ep tic ism -as- 
tool is an incom plete in terpretation of the philosophy...” (27-28). Of
at d ialectic; but it ought to be a mere glance, a sort o f  g ree tin g  from th e
th resho ld , m erely  that one may not be deceived, o r ju d g e  these pursu its  to
contain any hidden m atters o f great worth" (Epist. ad Luc. X LIX . 6).
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course, the last part of the com m ent applies to all of Q uevedo’s 
philosophy. He never fully accepts the doctrines of any of th e  
classical philosophers on whom he bases his own views, even th o se  
of his beloved Seneca; he takes only those views that he both n e e d s  
and considers reconcilable with Christian doctrine. Admittedly, he  
goes to considerable lengths to reconcile some ideas, but others, such  
as the Stoic notion o f noble suicide, he rejects out of hand. H ow ever, 
rather than regard his assim ilation of classical doctrine as 
“incomplete in terpretation ,” a more accurate description w ou ld  
acknowledge his lim ited application of the philosophy. The 
distinction betw een “limited” and “incom plete” may seem subtle in 
this context, but it is nonetheless im portant because the former te rm  
suggests a coherent plan on the part of Quevedo, while the latter m ay  
suggest that he had an incomplete understanding  of the concep ts 
with which he was working.
Ihrie raises another issue in her com m ent regarding Q uevedo’s 
failure to provoke a ta ra x ia , or imperturbability. With this, she re fe rs  
obliquely to the moral philosophy developed by Pyrrho of Elis 
(c. 360-270 B.C.), whose teachings form the basis of Pyrrhonism, one 
of two separate currents of scepticism  that arose in Antiquity, th e  
other being Academic scepticism, so called because it d ev e lo p ed  
among a number o f teachers in Plato’s academ y in Athens. A lthough  
Ihrie indicates some differences between Quevedo's thought and th a t  
of Pyrrho, she does not provide any defintitve answer as to h is  
sceptical influences. Did Quevedo assim ilate the scepticism of th e  
Pyrrhonists or the Academics, and to what extent? Did he e v e n  
know both philosophies? Were the ancient texts available to h im ?
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The answers to these questions become a necessary part to th e  
analysis and interpretation o f El mundo por de dentro.
Quevedo opens the dream  with a brief prologue containing a 
clear expression o f epistemological scepticism:
Es cossa aueriguada (asi lo siente Metrodoro Chyo, y o tros 
muchos) que no se saue nada y que todos son ynorantes; y au n  
esto no se saue de çierto, que a sauerse ya se supiera algo: 
sosphechase. Diçelo assi el doctissim o Françisco Sanchez, 
Medico y Philosopho, en su libro cuyo titulo es Nihil scitur: No 
se sabe nada. (Suenos I, 195)
Such a statem ent appears incongruous from one so devoted to Stoic 
and Epicurean philosophy. Neither school adm itted this type o f 
scepticism, both teaching that truth and certainty were a tta in ab le , 
particularly the latter group, who called Epicurus the father of t ru th  
because they believed that he had found it and shared it with th e  
rest of mankind. The Roman Epicurean Lucretius, although he 
specifically mentions neither M etrodorus nor any other sceptic, 
directly attacks the sceptical doctrine to which Quevedo refers , 
denying in almost the exact same terms that which Quevedo affirm s: 
“Moreover, if anyone thinks that nothing is known, he does not ev en  
know whether that can be known, since he declares that he know s 
nothing. I will therefore spare to plead cause against a man who has 
placed his own head in his footsteps” (De rerum  natura 4. 4 6 9 -4 7 3 ). 
Quevedo cites and refers to Lucretius as an authority on a number o f 
occasions dealing with moral issues, but he rejects Epicurean th eo ries  
of knowledge in favor of scepticism.
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No ambiguity exists concerning the Stoic and Epicurean so u rces 
of Quevedo’s moral philosophy. The same may not be said of h is 
scepticism, since he scrupulously avoids mentioning either th e  
Academics or the Pyrrhonists. His references to M etrodorus a n d  
Francisco Sanches (som etim es spelled Sanchez) provide little h e lp  
since neither thinker can easily be associated with either of th e  
classical schools.
All of the works of M etrodorus (d. 277 B.C.) have been lo st 
apparently since late Antiquity; only those fragments repeated  b y 
others remain. Quevedo probably cites the sceptical fragm ent fro m  
Diogenes Laertius's The Lives of Eminent Philosophers (IX. 58). T he 
name of M etrodorus has been associated with that of D em ocritus,^ 
whose atomic theory includes some sceptical aspects since he  
considered the human senses too weak to perceive reality (see  
Groarke 52-53). Even so, the nature and extent of M e tro d o ru s 's  
scepticism remains unclear. If his works were still extant, if h is 
sceptical fragment were placed in a context, a very d if fe re n t 
perception of his sceptical words might emerge. According to Cicero, 
M etrodorus made his famous rem ark at the beginning of his lost 
book On Nature (Academica II. 73). One can only speculate about th e  
contents of that book, but it appears that Metrodorus wrote scep tica l 
remarks at the beginning of a book on natural philosophy. A tru e  
sceptic, who believed that nothing could be known, probably w o u ld  
not have written such a work. Indeed, Quevedo attacks n a tu ra l
A lthough M etrodorus is genera lly  considered a follow er o f  D e m o c r i tu s .  
D iogenes L aertius leaves some room  fo r doubt on that issue: " . . .w h ile
M etrodorus was a pupil of Nessas o f  Chios, though some say that he was t a u g h t  
by Dem ocritus" (Lives IX. 58).
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philosophy in La cuna v la sepultura. associating it with th e  
dialecticians and their "silogismos. Barring the recovery of a 
manuscript, the difficulties in Metrodorus's philosophy may never b e 
resolved. The only certain thing is that he made a succinct a n d  
categorical statem ent about the im possibility of knowledge, a n d  
Quevedo apparently chose to quote him  for that very reason.
Quevedo probably chose to refer to Francisco Sanches (1 5 5 2 -  
1623) for the same reason. Nothing could be more succinct a n d  
categorical than the title of Sanches's 1581 book Quod nihil sc itu r . 
Because of that book, he holds a place as one of the most im p o rta n t 
figures in the sixteenth century revival of Greek scepticism, second  
perhaps only to Michel de Montaigne.® But unlike Montaigne, w ho  
openly espouses Pyrrhonism  in his essay. Apologie de R aim ond 
Sebond. Sanches never appeals directly to either of the two classical 
schools, leaving some doubt as to his philosophical influences. T he 
only clear trend in Quod nihil scitur is its an ti-A ris to te lian ism . 
However, as Richard H. Popkin has observed, the categorical n a tu re  
of Sanches's scepticism  much more closely resem bles that of th e  
Academics: "By and large, Sanchez's totally negative conclusion is n o t
the position of Pyrrhonian scepticism, the suspense of judgment as to
^ "Quien te ve fatigar en silogism os y dem ostraciones, no pudiendo, si n o 
eres m a tem itico  h ace r a lguna; fa tigar en lôgicas mal dispuestas y m e n o s  
im portan tes; y en filo so fia  natu ra l (asi la llam an ellos siendo fan tàstica  y 
sonada... " (Obras I. 1343).
6 R egard ing  S an ch es’s im portance, Otis H. G reen observes, “The o n e  
Spanish w rite r who holds a place o f esteem  in the h isto ry  o f E u ro p e a n  
skepticism  is the physician  F rancisco  Sénchez, long regarded  as a P o r tu g u e s e ,  
but now known to have been born  in Tuy, in the S pan ish  prov ince o f G a lic ia . 
His portrait hangs in the auditorium  o f the U niversity o f  Toulouse’’ (III, 303).
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whether anything can be known, but rather the full-fledged neg a tiv e  
dogmatism of the Academics" (39).
Since the two authors referred to at the beginning of M undo 
provide no definitive help in identifying Quevedo's sceptical 
formation, the question arises concerning his possible knowledge o f 
other classical and Renaissance sceptics. Greek scepticism  w as 
known in the Renaissance through three principle works: Cicero's
Academica. which, as the name implies, deals with the scepticism o f 
Arcesilas, Carneades and others of the Academy, Sextus Em piricus's 
Outlines of Pyrrhonism , and Diogenes Laertius's Life of Pvrrho . 
(actually Book DC, chapter 11 in the L ives) .^  Quevedo f re q u e n tly  
refers to and cites other parts of the Lives of Diogenes Laertius, an d  
on occasion, refers to Sextus concerning m atters other th a n  
scepticism, but he never mentions or apparently cites the A cadem ica. 
leaving open the question as to whether he knew it at all.
Because o f Quevedo's definite knowledge of Diogenes L aertiu s 
and Sextus Empiricus, one could infer that he must have been  
influenced by the Pyrrhonist brand of scepticism, but never once 
does he refer to Pyrrho or Pyrrhonism  any more than he does th e  
Academics. It could be that he did not bother to distinguish b e tw een  
the two groups, and simply developed an anti-A ristotelian scep tic ism  
much like Francisco Sanches. According to Charles B. Schmitt, such 
an approach was typical in the Renaissance:
Regardless o f whether the two ancient schools o f scepticism can 
be given a full doctrinal distinction, one thing is clear:
See The Cam bridge Encyclopedia o f R enaissance P h ilo sophy  (679). f o r  
m ore detailed inform ation on R enaissance editions and dates o f  p ub lica tion  f o r  
these  three w orks.
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Renaissance thinkers for the most part did not seem to  
distinguish the two any more clearly than they d is tin g u ish e d  
“Platonism” from “Neoplatonism.” (Schmitt, Cicero 8)
While this may have been true of most "Renaissance th in k e rs"  
as Schmitt says, it was not of most Renaissance Sceptics. M ontaigne, 
in the Apologie de Raimond Sebond. clearly distinguishes b e tw e e n  
the two groups in his summary of the philosophical theories o f 
knowledge inherited from the Greeks;
W hoever seeks anything comes to this point: he say s
either that he has found it, or that it cannot be found, or th a t  
he is still in quest of it. All philosophy is divided into th e se  
three types. Its purpose is to seek out truth, knowledge, a n d  
c e rta in ty .
The Peripatetics, Epicureans, and Stoics, and o th e rs  
thought they had found it. These established the sciences th a t  
we have, and treated them as certain knowledge.
Clitomachus, Carneades, and the Academics despaired o f 
their quest, and judged that truth could not be conceived b y 
our powers. The conclusion of these men was man's w ea k n ess  
and ignorance. This school had the greatest following and th e  
noblest adherents.
Pyrrho and other Skeptics or Epechists—whose d o ctrines, 
many o f the ancients m aintained, were derived from H om er, 
the Seven Sages, Archilochus, and Euripides, and were held b y  
Zeno, Democritus, Xenophanes—say that they are still in se a rch  
of the truth. These men judge that those who think they h a v e  
found it are infinitely mistaken; and that there is also an
65
overbold vanity in that second class that assures us that h u m a n  
powers are not capable of attaining it. (M ontaigne 371)
Quevedo knew the Essais of Montaigne and adm ired them;* h e  
therefore very likely knew these basic distinctions. Perhaps the k e y
part of this passage is the theme of hum an weakness a n d
insufficiency developed by the Academics according to M ontaigne; 
"truth could not be conceived by our powers" and "man's w eak n ess  
and ignorance." M any have com m ented on "the undertone o f 
misanthropy in Q uevedo’s character" (cf. R. O. Jones, Golden 190^. b u t  
it is im portant to acknow ledge that such ideas, at least in part, s te m  
from his philosophical and theological background which p erce iv es
man in a m iserable state, a theme he develops in La cuna y la
se p u ltu ra .
The scope and consistency of Quevedo's scepticism  cannot be  
understood w ithout reference to La cuna y la sepultura. In c h a p te r  
four of that work, he repeatedly states that "nadie sabe nada " (O bras 
I, 1343). Although he announces in the introduction his intention to  
spend four chapters elaborating "la dotrina estoica" (1327), C hap ter 
Four stands som ew hat apart from the first three ph ilosophically  
because of the in tensity  with which it attacks the possibility o f 
human knowledge and denounces "el estudio vano" (1343). H enry  
Ettinghausen rightly calls the fourth chapter "Quevedo's sceptical 
chap ter" (Ettinghasuen 82), but he focuses his brief comments on th e
^ The first m en tio n  o f  M ontaigne in S pan ish  lite ra tu re  occurs i n 
Quevedo. In the D efensa de Epicuro. he p ra ises M ontaigne as a m o ra l  
philosopher; "Darà fin a  esta defensa  la au to ridad  del senor de M ontana en su  
libro que en francés escrib iô , y se in titu la  Essais o D iscursos. libro tan g r a n d e ,  
que quien por verle d e ja ra  de leer a Séneca y a P lu ta rco . leerà a Plutarco y a 
Séneca" f Obras I. 1099). Also, see the article by Juan M aricha l: "M ontaigne e n
E s p a n a ."
6 6
miseria h o m in is  theme, in this context the insufficiency of man to  
know anything for certain; the extent to which the contents of Cuna 
may aid in the analysis of Mundo fails beyond the scope of h is  
discussion. Ettinghausen concludes that "It is probably im possible to  
determ ine exactly the sources of Quevedo's sceptical attitudes " (83), 
but it seems that a reasonable attem pt may be made with th e  
recognition o f a possible source for Cuna Chapter Four not m e n tio n e d  
by Ettinghausen, The Divine Institutes of Lactantius.
Lactantius lived during the late third and early fo u rth  
centuries A.D., just a century before St. Augustine. According to  
some traditions, he was bom  in Africa, and like St. Augustine, h e
converted to Christianity as an adult, having spent his y o u th  
studying classical rhetoric and philosophy and achieving co n s id e rab le  
fame as a rhetorician. As W illiam Fletcher observes,
Lactantius has always held a high place among the C hristian
Fathers, not only on account of the subject m atter o f h is
writings, but also on account of the varied erudition, th e
sw eetness of expression, and the grace of elegance and sty le , 
by which they are characterized. (Lactantius ix)
That elegance of style Lactantius developed in emulation of Cicero, 
and as a result, came to be known as Cicero christianus  (Schm itt, 
Cicero 25). Lactantius was also fascinated by Cicero's ph ilosoph ica l 
works, including the Academica. which figures heavily in Book T h ree  
of the Divine Institutes, entitled. De falsa sap ien tia . Quevedo k n e w  
the Divine Institutes, and refers to the third book by name in th e  
Defensa in order to clarify a point about Epicurus's theory o f 
pleasure. Although De falsa sapientia is considerably longer th a n
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Cuna Chapter Four—Lactantius develops his thesis over the course o f  
thirty chapters—, the two works still share a number of s ign ifican t 
parallels in both structure and content.
First, both men approach their subject as a denunciation o f  
false wisdom in order to arrive at an understanding of w h a t 
constitutes true wisdom and worthwhile study, Lactantius calling h is  
subject sap ien tia  and Quevedo calling it sabiduria .^  Their use of th e  
term "wisdom" allows them to set up an im portant d istin c tio n
between it and philosophy, or false wisdom. Lactantius recognizes 
the possibility for confusion, but does not hesitate to define the tw o 
terms in an exclusionary manner;
Philosophy is (as the name indicates, and they th em se lv es
define it) the love of wisdom. By what argument, then, can I
prove that philosophy is not wisdom, rather than by th a t  
derived from the meaning of the name itself? For he w ho 
devotes him self to wisdom is m anifestly not yet wise, b u t  
devotes him self to the subject that he may be wise. (L actan tius 
141)
And Quevedo, more concisely and caustically: "...pues filoso fo  no dice
otra cosa que am ante de la sabidurfa, que fué reprehension de los 
que antes se llam aban sophos, sabios (Obras I, 1344). This 
distinction allows them to attack all theories of human knowledge, a
method that must necessarily include some expression of scepticism.
9 Quevedo, p robab ly  because he detested neo log ism s and latinate w o rd s  
as signs o f co rru p tio n  in the language, utilizes the word sabidurta instead o f  
the more direct S pan ish  eq u iv a len t sapiencia:  "La m ayor h ipocresia y m is  
danosa y sin fundam ento , es la de la sabidurfa..." and, "Toda nuestra s a b id u r f a  
es presunciôn acreditada de la ignorancfa de otros" fO bras I. 1343).
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They both begin their attack on false wisdom with a 
repudiation o f natural philosophy. Lactantius develops his co m m en ts  
at length, mentioning all of the major schools of thought in A n tiq u ity  
as well as many o f the individual philosophers with exam ples o f 
their teachings. Quevedo keeps his comments brief and very g en era l, 
merely referring to natural philosophy as "fantastica y sonada" 
(1343). Interestingly, each cites a different passage from the s a tir is t  
Persius in ridicule o f these philosophers and their pursuits (L 176, Q 
1343). Each also briefly dism isses Logic in similar terms as n o th in g  
more than a method o f speech:
There rem ains that third part of philosophy [after natural a n d  
moral], which they call Logic, in which the whole subject o f 
dialectics and the whole method of speech are co n ta in ed . 
Divine learning does not stand in need of this, because the se a t 
of wisdom is not the tongue, but the heart; and it makes no 
difference what kind of language you employ, for the q u e s tio n  
is not about words, but facts. (L 166)
iQué ocupadas estàn las universidades en e n s e h a r  
retorica, dialéctica y lôgica, todas artes para decir bien! Y iq u é  
cosa tan culpable es que no haya catedras de saber hacer b ien , 
y donde se ensehe! (Q 1345)
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, after they re p u d ia te  
false wisdom, they establish a tripartite and fideistic unity to ex p la in  
the nature of true wisdom. First Quevedo: "...porque la sa b id u ria
verdadera esta en la verdad, y la verdad es una sola, y esa v e rd a d  
una es Dios solo, que por eso le llaman Dios verdadero; y fuera dél.
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todo es opiniôn y los mas cuerdos sospechan" (1344). Lactantius h a d  
elaborated on the idea a little more thoroughly;
Therefore no system, or science, or law of living well has b e e n  
established, except in this the only true and heavenly w isdom , 
which had been unknown to philosophers. For that e a r th ly  
wisdom, since it is false, becomes varied and manifold, a n d  
altogether opposed to itself. And as there is but one fo u n d e r  
and ruler of the world, God, and as truth is one; so w isdom  
must be one and simple, because if anything is true and good, i t  
cannot be perfect unless it is the only one o f its kind. (L 171) 
The Hdeist model provided by Lactantius would become ty p ica l 
of many Christian Sceptics of later centuries (see Schmitt, Cicero 26), 
but perhaps more im portant for understanding  Quevedo is the fac t 
that in the first section on natural philosophers, L ac tan tiu s 
repudiates them  with the argum ents o f the Academic Sceptics, 
frequently referring  to the Academy, its teachings, and those of its  
chief sceptical philosopher, Arcesilas. One passage should serve as an  
example: "But if, as I have shown, there can be no inner and p ecu lia r
knowledge in man on account of the frailty o f the human condition, 
the party of Arcesilas prevails" (Lactantius 145). Lactantius does n o t 
wholly endorse Academic scepticism. In fact, he takes issue with its  
conclusions m any times. As Schmitt has observed, however, "The 
Academic approach is a safeguard for Lactantius. It abolishes th e  
pretended know ledge of the philosopher and prepares the way fo r 
the infusion of genuine truth which comes only from God" (Cicero 
28). The im plications for Quevedo are clear. If he did not k now  
Cicero's Academica. he certainly knew a great deal about th e
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Academics and their teachings through Lactantius. M oreover, th e  
apparent parallels in Cuna would seem to indicate that Quevedo has 
appropriated  Lactantius's argum ent, including his brand of 
scepticism .'®
The one significant d ifference in message betw een L actan tius 
and Quevedo lies in their respective views on moral philosophy. 
Lactantius attacks moral philosophy on the grounds that the m en 
who taught such doctrine w ere them selves destitute o f virtue (172  
ff.), and arrives at a conclusion that rejects all forms of philosophy: 
"Therefore philosophy must altogether be laid aside, because we a re  
not to devote ourselves to the pursuit of wisdom, for this has no lim it 
or moderation; but we must be wise, and that indeed quickly" (175). 
For Lactantius, true wisdom may only be found in religion. Q uevedo 
agrees to a point. He will not call moral philosophy true w isdom .
'0  Q uevedo was ce rta in ly  not the first one to do so in the R e n a is s a n c e ,  
a lth o u g h  he was probably  the f irs t one to do so in Spanish . A s ig n i f i c a n t  
group  o f nouveaujc académic iens  arose in the 16 th -cen tu ry  w ho developed a 
C hristian  fideism  based on A cadem ic scep ticism . Popkin d esc rib e s  one o f t h e  
texts that dea lt with the m ovem ent:
Cardinal Jacopo Sadole to , B ishop of C arp en tras , a friend  o f  
R eginald  Pole, w rote an an sw er to Academ ic scep tic ism , Phaedrus s iv e  
de Laudibus p h ilo so p h ae . p ro b ab ly  as a result o f his c o r r e s p o n d e n c e
with Pole on the q u es tio n  o f  w h eth er any th in g  can be known b y 
rational means. The w ork was com posed in 1533, and firs t pub lished  i n 
1538. In the first part o f  the book, Phaedrus p resen ts  the views o f t h e  
A cadem ics, drawn m ainly  from  Cicero, and advocates the fideist th e s is .
He points out the fu tility  o f  na tu ra l ph ilosophy. God has hidden th e  
secrets o f nature, so that we can never know them . Those who t h i n k  
they have d iscovered so m eth in g  about nature con trad ic t them selves a n d  
each o ther in th e ir p r in c ip le s  and theories. We can only  know God b y 
R evela tion , and not by p h ilo so p h y . M oral ph ilosophy  is as hopeless a s  
na tu ra l ph ilosophy . O ur aim  is to act v irtuously , not to  d iscourse  a n d  
dispute about virtue and good. S im ilarily , dialectic is useless, ju s t a lot o f  
figu res and sy llogism s by w hich  one can prove a n y th in g  he w a n ts ,  
even absurd ities. So P h aed ru s  con tends, we can only  learn t r u t h  
through G od's R evelation , and  not th rough philosophy (P opkin  26).
T he argum ent sounds very fam ilia r , a lth o u g h  Popkin now here in his study o f  
R enaissance scepticism  m entions th e  in fluence o f  L actantius on these w riters.
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which a man may only receive after death; "...y que cuando m u e re  
empieza a aprender, y que solo entonces esta el alma capaz d e
doctrina, pues le desnuda en el cuerpo de la rudeza y de las tin ieb las
e ignorancia deste mundo" (1344). However, the impossibility o f 
true wisdom in this life does not lead Quevedo to completely re je c t 
the pursuit of it like Lactantius, rather he suggests that the on ly  
worthwhile area of study is moral philosophy: "Preguntarasm e que,
supuesto esto, cual es la cosa que un hombre ha de p ro c u ra r
aprender. No me parece que el trabajo y el estudio del h o m b re  
lograra en nada fuera de la consideracion y ejercicio de las v ir tu d es  " 
(1344-45). His im m ediate description clarities what he means b y  
"ejercicio de las virtudes":
^Qué cosa mas digna de estudio y de alabanza que el ejercicio 
del sufrim iento, armado de prudencia y modestia contra las 
insolencias de la fortuna? ^Que mayor riqueza que u n a
humildad atesorada de tal suerte, que ni desprecias a nadie n i 
sientas que te desprecien todos? Estas cosas sirven a tu alma y 
le son de interés. (1345)
With this, Quevedo returns to his expressed purpose in writing Cuna. 
the elaboration o f Stoic doctrine.
Throughout Cuna Chapter Four, Quevedo creates an im p o rta n t 
dynamic between his scepticism  and Neostoic moral philosophy. 
Nothing about Nature, the macrocosm, may be known for certain, b u t 
the microcosm, man himself, is another matter. A man should know  
himself, a common maxim to be sure; even Lactantius had said as 
much. For Quevedo, knowledge of self will include knowledge of th e  
governance of one's deeds and passions:
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Acaba de persuadirte a que dentro de ti mismo tie n e s  
que hacer tanto, que aun, por larga que sea tu vida, te fa lta rà  
tiempo; y que no puedes saber nada bueno para ti, si no fu e re  
lo que aprendieres del desengaho y de la verdad; y q u e  
entonces empezaràs a ser sabio, cuando no tem ieres las 
miserias, no codiciares las honras, ni te admirares de nada, y tu  
mismo estudiares en ti; que leyéndote estâ tu n a tu ra le z a  
introducciones de la verdad. (1346)
Here, Quevedo mentions the importance of learning “del desengaho y 
de la verdad,” the central theme necessary to understanding H  
mundo por de dentro. but equally im portant is the context: “d en tro
de ti mismo” and “tu naturaleza.” Knowledge of oneself m ust in c lu d e  
knowledge of human nature in general. The Suehos as a w ho le  
concern them selves with human nature, especially man’s vices a n d  
hypocrisy, hence the satirical presentation. Mundo in p a r tic u la r  
deals with recognizing man’s deceptions and learning to see th e  
truth. For this reason Quevedo gave the name “Desengaho” to th e  
allegorical teacher-guide of the fourth dream, a figure w ho  
encom passes both the sceptical and the Neostoic elem ents o f  
Q uevedo’s philosophy.
After the sceptical prologue, Mundo begins with a paragraph i n 
which the narrator describes him self as a young man lost in his ow n  
desires for pleasure and variety. He chases after appearances: “...ya
corria donde tras la hermosura me lleuauan los ojos ” (Suehos I, 196), 
and he actively gives himself over to the deceptions of the w orld: 
“...procuraua que se me alargase el engaho” (196-7). At this ju n c tu re , 
he hears a voice call to him and turns to see an old man, his clo th ing
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torn due to the m istreatm ent of o th e rs—som ew hat rem iniscent o f 
Boethius’s description of Lady Philosophy in this regard—, but still a 
venerable figure. A t first, the narrator accuses the old man o f 
envying his youth and the pleasures he enjoys. The old man ex p la in s  
that rather than envy, he feels pity for the narrator whose notion o f 
youth does not reflect a true understanding  o f the passage of tim e, 
that the days are like links in a chain, each one leading toward d ea th , 
and that death should not be feared. Im pressed  by this teach ing , 
taken from the Stoics, the narrator asks the old man his name, w ho 
responds, “Yo soy el Desengaho” (197). Desengaho then makes an  
im portant offer;
Si tù quieres, hijo, ver el mundo, ven conmigo, que yo te lle u a rè  
a su calle mayor, que es adonde salen esas otras, y alii v e rà s  
juntos los que por aqui van diuididos, sin cansarte, y yo te  
enseharè el m undo como es, que tù no alcanças a ver sino lo 
que pareze. (198)
This passage provides a much clearer indication of Q uevedo’s 
sceptical influences, because it creates a distinction between w h a t 
seems and what is, betw een appearance and reality, deception a n d  
tru th . ' '
With regard to appearances and the reliability of sen se  
information, the Pyrrhonists and Academics held quite d iffe rin g
'  ^ W am ke devotes an  entire chapter to the appearance vs. reality  t h e m e  
in Baroque lite ra tu re  (21-51), and m entions the  scep tic ism  o f M ontaigne i n  
passing  (40), bu t o th e rw ise  has little to say about the p h i lo s o p h ic a l  
backg rounds o f  th is im p o rtan t literary  them e. A bout Spanish  lite ra tu re  h e 
com m ents, “Illu sion  and d is illu sionm en t, engano  and desengano,  are the g r e a t  
them es o f these m asters, as they are o f the w hole S panish  B aroque” (4 4 ) . 
Ihrie, in her book on scep tic ism  in C ervan tes, devotes the bulk o f  h e r  
d iscussion  to the appearance vs. reality  them e.
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views. The Pyrrhonists developed the more com plicated d o c trin e  
based on their central tenet, the suspension of judgem ent reg a rd in g  
knowledge rather than the denial of the possibility of know ledge 
argued by the Academics. As a result, some confusion has ex is ted  
concerning the Pyrrhonist doctrine on appearances, a problem  n o ted  
by Sextus Empiricus in the second century: “Those who say that th e
[Pyrrhonist] Sceptics reject what is apparent have not, I th ink , 
listened to what we say’’ (8). The confusion seems to lie in the fact 
that the Pyrrhonists will not go so far as to equate appearance w ith  
reality—since they suspend judgem ent on such a question—, but th e y  
nevertheless consider appearances the only basis for knowledge, as 
Sextus explains:
That we attend to what is apparent is clear from what we say  
about the standard of the Sceptical persuasion. [...] We say, 
then, that the standard of Sceptical persuasion is what is 
apparent, implicitly meaning by this the appearances. .. [...]
Thus, attending to what is apparent, we live in accordance w ith  
everyday observances, without holding opinions— for we a re  
not able to be utterly inactive. (9)
Diogenes Laertius provides the same information in The Life o f 
Pyrrho: “...but with regard to the things about which our o p p o n en ts
argue so positively, claiming to have definitely apprehended them , 
we suspend our judgem ent because they are not certain, and confine 
knowledge to our im pressions” (Lives DC. 103). In contrast, Cicero 
notes the denial of sense inform ation on the part of the A cadem ics: 
“Arcesilas used to attack Zeno because, whereas he himself said th a t
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all sense-presentations are false, Zeno said that some were false, b u t  
not all” (De natura deorum I. 70).'-
That Quevedo's sceptical thought more closely follows that o f 
the Academics should be apparent. The title of the dream itself, S  
mundo por de dentro. refers to the discrepancy between the world o f 
exterior appearances and the reality beneath, or inside, c learly  
adding to the overall d istrust of sense information expressed b y 
Desengano to the narrator of Mundo. Desengano's statement, "yo te  
enseharè el mundo como es, que tù no alcanças a ver sino lo q u e  
pareze," cannot be interpreted as an expression of the doctrine of th e  
Pyrrhonists which confines knowledge to impressions. W hen
Desengaho creates a distinction between appearance and reality, h e  
rejects and denies the former; he does not embrace it as the on ly  
basis of knowledge. However, he also implies that reality may be  
known when he tells the narrator that he will show him the world as
it really is. In this he seems to be at odds with a true sceptical
position that denies the possibility of knowing reality, until th e  
context of his statem ent becomes clear; he refers to knowledge o f 
human conduct, not the natural world, and gives examples of h u m an  
deception as he guides the narrator along the principle street of th e  
world called Hypocrisy.
They observe and discuss many sights along the s tre e t,
including a funeral procession in which a widower appears to m o u rn  
the loss of his wife. The narrator comments on how fortunate th e
A lthough any d irect know ledge Quevedo may have had of C ic e ro ’s 
rem ains u n certa in , he did know the De n a t u r a . That text o n l y  
refers to the A cadem ics and the ir doctrines in passing, but it still adds 
significantly  to the inform ation availab le  to Quevedo from other sources, s u c h  
as M ontaigne and Lactantius.
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woman had been to have such a devoted husband. Desengaho, in 
response, shakes his head and smiles, saying, "...esso todo es por de  
fuera, y pareze assi; pero aora lo veràs por de dentro, y veràs con 
quànta verdad el ser desm iente a las apariençias " (Suehos I, 200). 
The old man attributes the w idow er's sadness to the cost of th e  
funeral, and explains that the man already plans to m arry an o th e r  
woman who has been his "amiga” for some time. Surprised upon  
learning the truth, the narrator exclaims, ”Què d iferen tes son las 
cosas del mundo de como las vemos!" (201).
The examples in M undo are almost all of this type, dep icting  
human deception and hypocrisy. In doing this, Quevedo com bines 
the sceptical and the moral in a som ewhat non-trad itional m anner, 
speaking of deceptive appearances in the context of m oral 
discernm ent. Traditionally, Sceptics have discussed the nature of 
appearances in a more physical, or medical sense. For exam ple, 
Francisco Sanches, in Quod nihil scitur. provides a lengthy d iscussion  
of the ways in which hum an perception changes as a result of such 
things as distance or the am ount of light available, and, as a resu lt, 
may provide faulty know ledge (24 Iff.). Quevedo knew th e  
traditional argument, ultim ately  stemming from  the A cadem ic 
Sceptics, and incorporates it into one passage of M undo in w hich 
Desengano exclaims to his new pupil in exasperation,
Hasta aora te juzgaua por çiego, y aora veo que tambien e re s  
loco; y hecho de ver que hasta aora no saues para lo que Dios te  
dio los ojos, ni quàl es su offîçio. Ellos han de ver y la razon h a  
de juzgar y elegir: al rebes lo hazes, o nada hazes que es peor.
Si te andas a creerlos, padeceràs mil com fusiones; tendràs las
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sierras por açules y lo grande por pequeno, que la longitud y la 
proximidad enganan la vista (207).'^
However, this type of physical argum ent represents a divergence fo r 
Quevedo. Elsewhere he m aintains the peculiar dynamic b e tw e en  
epistem ological scepticism  and moral philosophy where nothing m ay  
be known truly except for human nature and even that only w ith  
great difficulty because o f man's willful deceptions.
Quevedo does not qualify his statem ents at the beginning of 
Mundo and in Cuna when he says that nothing is known. The con tex t 
does, however. He wishes to make categorically sceptical s ta te m e n ts  
primarily about natural philosophy and Logic; his scepticism does n o t 
extend to m atters involving divine revelation or human conduct. 
Scepticism, then, forms a central part of Quevedo's ideological 
makeup, denying value to all forms of study outside the realms of 
theology and moral philosophy. It may seem odd, considering th e
'3 Quevedo included  a sim ilar, but m ore ex tensive , scep tica l passage i n 
his P rov idencia  de Dios (1641), w ritten  tw en ty -n in e  years a fte r M undo . 
show ing the consistency  o f  his thought on the matter;
Ves desde muy lejos una torre o ed ific io , que p e rfe c ta m e n te  es c u a d ra d o , 
redondo; y no puedes decir ni a firm ar otra cosa, c reyendo  a los ojos, a 
quien se le tom eô  la d istancia , donde llegô su fuerza lim itada. L as
m ontanas y cerros de penascos tienen  el co lor pardo o blanco de la
tierra, y el verde de su yerba y àrboles; y siendo asî, desde lejos tus o jo s 
te lo m uestran de azul u ltram arino , porque jun tândose la oscuridad  de tu  
v ista (que tiene esfera de activ idad lim itada y desfallece fuera délia), c o n  
la claridad y luz del m edio y del objeto, résu lta aquel co lor que consta d e  
oscuro y claro . M iras m uchos hom bres de un mism o tam ano e n 
d ife ren tes  d istancias: ju ra ra s  por lo que ves, que unos son m u e  ho
m enores que otros y desigualîsim os, siendo iguales; y la p e rsp ec tiv a  c o n  
la razôn y con la d em ostrac iôn  te ensena que la desigualdad  es de la s  
d istancias, y no de los cuerpos. Pudiera c o n v en c e r a los ojos de o t r a s  
muchas hurlas que hacen; mas estas bastan por todas. Pues si la razôn te  
ensena la verdad de la m en tira  de tus ojos, y te d esen g an a  del e n g a n o  
que ves, no puedes negar que se ve m ejor lo que se cree a persuasiôn  d e  
la razôn, que lo que se m ira con los ojos. Pues si la razôn del h o m b r e
asegura mâs lo que por ella se cree que lo que se m ira, ô^on c u â n t o
m ayores ven ta jas y p rendas se asegura  lo que se cree  de Dios por la fe  
con él, que toso lo que se ve sin ella? (Obras 1547-48).
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importance of scepticism  in Quevedo's thought, that he makes only a 
few openly sceptical remarks in his works and avoids referring to  
the Academic Sceptics with whom he seems to have the m o st 
affinity. Perhaps Quevedo’s personal situation accounts for that to  
some degree. In contrast with Montaigne and Francisco Sanches, w ho 
lived in France and could freely and extensively express th e ir  
sceptical views, Quevedo lived in Spain and had to contend with th e  
Inquisition. He could make a few general rem arks about m an 's  
ignorance because such ideas are easily found in the Bible a n d  
Church Fathers (see I Cor. 3:19). He could not afford to be id en tified  
as an Academic or a Pyrrhonist.'** Nevertheless, he does make h is 
scepticism evident, and he does so by incorporating it into texts th a t  
deal with moral satire and moral philosophy, making it an in teg ra l 
part of those works.
Scepticism , when applied  in its en tire ty . leads to moral a n d  
theological u n c e rta in ty , and is th e re fo re  incom patib le  with the teachings o f  
the Church reg a rd in g  d ivine rev e la tio n . Saint A ugustine  addresses t h e s e  
issues, p a rticu la rly  the moral one, in the Contra A cadem icos. his e a r l y  
philosophical w ork in w hich he denounces A cadem ic scepticism .
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Chapter Four:
The Doctrine of Death in the Suenos
In each of the last four Suenos. Quevedo presents d idactic
passages that deal with the nature o f death and the manner in w hich
individuals should confront its inevitability. The doctrine of d e a th  
presented in the Suenos closely follows that which Quevedo o u tlin es  
in La cuna v la sepultura. but it ultim ately derives from th e
teachings of the Stoics, particularly  those found in the E p istu lae 
morales of Seneca. Among the many philosophical and moral issues 
discussed in Quevedo's satires, the subject of death should p e rh a p s  
be considered the most im portant simply because of the fre q u en cy
with which he introduces it into his texts. And he does not do so 
purely out of morbid fascination or single-m inded fixation, a lth o u g h  
his fascination with the subject is well known. Rather, the p assag es  
on death play a crucial role in the satire; the whole message of th e  
Suenos cannot be properly understood without a clear u n d e rs ta n d in g  
of their doctrine of death.
The extent to which Quevedo assim ilates Stoic philosophy, as 
well as the true nature of his own Christian beliefs, are q u es tio n s  
that continue to confound critics. According to Felicidad B uendia, 
"Quevedo es uno de los senequistas mâs convencidos y el m âs 
ferviente de todos ellos en el siglo XVII" (Obras I, 1065). The 
statem ent certainly represents what has been the majority opinion.
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However, Américo Castro has sta ted  the opposite view: "Suele
alegarse a Quevedo como ejemplo de senequism o espanol, aun  qu e  
basta leerlo para convencerse de no ser eso cierto" (Castro, R ealidad  
148). He bases his position on the fact that Quevedo is unwilling to  
accept Stoic teaching on noble suicide and em otiona l 
im perturbability: "Pero sin apatia y sin suicidio, i,qué queda de la
moral de Seneca?" (148). Castro im plies that nothing remains w h en  
quite the opposite is true, especially in light of the fact that Q uevedo 
does not wholly reject the Stoic notion o f "apatia." Quevedo's position  
on the subject merits a brief review.
In Nombre, origen. intento. recom endacion v descendencia de la 
dotrina estoica. Quevedo sum m arizes the Stoic doctrine of "apatia," 
which he prefers to term "la insensibilidad":
El intento de los estoicos fue despreciar todas las cosas 
que estàn en ajeno poder, y esto  sin despreciar sus p e rso n a s  
con el desaliho y vileza; seguir la virtud, y gozarla por virtud y 
por premio; poner el espfritu mas alia de las p e rtu rb ac io n es ; 
poner al hombre encima de las adversidades, ya que no p u e d e  
estar fuera, por ser hombre, estab lecer por la insensibilidad la 
paz del alma, independiente de socorros forasteros y d e  
sediciones interiores; vivir con el cuerpo, mas no para el 
cuerpo; contar por vida la buena, no la larga; no por m uchos 
anos sino por inculpables. (Obras I, 1088)
After a discussion of suicide, which he calls "el escandalo de e s ta  
secta" (1088), he attem pts to reconcile Stoic im perturbability  w ith  
Christian doctrine, first having to adm it that this part o f the Stoa w as 
condemned by the Church Fathers, especially Aquinas:
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Santo Tomas, doctor angélico, y con él todos, co n d en an  
esta insensibilidad catolicam ente, sin que pueda ser licita 
alguna respuesta. Yo, para mostrar que no se me ha cansado la 
aficidn con los estoicos, confesando ser hoy herejia afirmarlo, y 
error en la antigiiedad, como lo prueban todos, me esforzaré a 
in te rp re ta r lo s .
Ellos dicen que no se han de sentir algunos afectos. y esto  
ensehan y esto m andan. Persuadom e que algunos, por la 
palabra sentir, en tendieron dejar veneer de los afectos, p u es to  
que de sentirlos nacen las virtudes, como la clemencia, piedad y 
conm iseracion, y de vencerse dellos procédé de la 
pusilanim idad para poder producir las virtudes. No es co rte sia  
descam inada entender bien lo que dijeron algunos de aquellos 
que encaminaron todas sus acciones al bien; m uchas cosas los 
debemos; débanos una. (1092)
So, rather than reach a point where one has no em otions, w hich  
Quevedo admits is heresy, he prefers to think that some Stoics 
intended by this that one should not allow himself to be ruled b y  
em otions while he remains aware o f them for the sake of virtue: "de 
sentirlos nacen las virtudes." The distinction may seem slight, but it 
allows Quevedo to reconcile apathy with Christian fortitude, which h e  
calls "la paciencia," almost always in connection with the name of Job. 
Thus, while Quevedo does indeed reject Stoic teaching on suicide, h e  
easily transform s apathy, making acceptable those teachings th a t  
deal with confronting death, poverty, sickness, persecution, loss, an d  
the other hardships of human life.
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Stoicism, therefore, plays a far greater role in Q uevedo 's 
thought than Américo Castro admits when he says that Q uevedo 
excludes part of the philosophy when, in reality, he m e re ly  
reinterprets it, leaving it essentially intact. Castro's position im p lies  
that Quevedo must blindly assimilate all o f the philosophy in order to  
be accurately considered a "senequista."* Even Seneca did n o t 
receive unquestioningly the teachings of his Stoic p red ecesso rs , 
sometimes taking issue with Zeno and ridiculing him over the n a tu re  
of his syllogisms.- If one Stoic can selectively interpret another Stoic, 
why should it be a cause for surprise that a seventeenth c e n tu ry  
Christian author should do so? Quevedo clearly states that he d o es  
not consider himself a Stoic, but rather an adm irer of the Stoics; "Yo 
no tengo suficiencia de estoico, mas tengo aficion a los estoicos " 
(1093). Castro interprets the self-characterization  on the part o f  
Quevedo as further indication that he is not a "senequista" (1 4 8 ).
The statem ent actually serves to show that Quevedo co n s id e red  
Stoicism an im portant adjunct to his ideological makeup, not th e  
basis of it, the basis being Christian doctrine. As Julian Ju d e ria s
 ^ Castro's position, in and of itself, may not seem deserving o f  t h e  
attention given it here, but his problem atic  eva lua tion  has influenced o t h e r s ,  
perhaps most notably Charles Marcilly who repeats  the same m is c o n c e p t io n :  
"En resumen. como A m érico Castro ha senalado. ^^ue queda de la f i l o s o f i a  
estoica si de ella se suprim e la insensibilidad al mundo exterior y el derecho  a 
eleg ir  la propia m uerte?" (76). Marcilly, like Castro, also questions Q u ev ed o 's  
orthodoxy, attributing to him an "angustia" s im ila r  to "la agonia  u n a m u n i a n a "  
(84 ) .
-  Epist. ad Luc. LXXXQ. 9: "For I take pleasure , excellent Lucilius, i n 
poking fun at the absurd it ies  o f  the Greeks, o f  which, to my c o n t i n u a l  
surprise , I have not yet succeeded in ridding myself. Our master Zeno uses a 
syllogism like this: "No evil is glorious; but death is glorious; therefore death is 
no evil." A cure Zeno! I have been freed from fear; hence fo rth  I shall n o t  
hesitate to bare my neck on the scaffold. Will you not utter sterner w o r d s  
instead of rousing a dying man to laughter?"  Seneca clearly  states that h e
prefers plain reason to the sophistry found in these types o f  syllogisms.
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observed in 1917, "El estoicism o de Quevedo esta mitigado, influido, 
por el espfritu cristiano" (Juderias 178). Quevedo's love for Stoicism  
lies in the fact that he considered its doctrine so similar to that of 
C hristian ity .3 Both sets o f beliefs must be considered when trying to 
understand and in terpret the difficult passages on death in th e  
S uenos.
Without a doubt, the influence of Seneca and the Stoics on 
Quevedo finds its greatest expression in his concept o f death. In El 
alguacil endemoniado. Quevedo begins to describe death in Stoic 
terms during a conversation that takes place betw een Quevedo th e  
dream er and a demon that has possessed a constable. The dem on, 
who speaks authoritatively from his perspective as a spiritual being, 
declares that mortals do not properly understand the passage of tim e 
and the nature of death; "Quàl de bosotros saue estim ar el tiempo, y 
poner preçio al dia, sauiendo que todo lo que passé lo tiene la m u e rte  
en su poder, y gouierna lo presente a agoarda lo por benir,..." (Suenos 
I, 154). The statem ent redefines death as a process that d ev e lo p s 
continually with the passage of time, rather than an event th a t  
occurs at the end o f one's life.
 ^ Although Quevedo does not go so far as to assert that Seneca h a d  
secretly  been a C hristian , an idea com m only held in the Middle Ages, h e 
repea ted ly  suggests that the Stoics had knowledge o f the Bible, and that th o s e  
from Seneca's period in the first century A.D. may have had the opportun ity  to  
observe and learn from the Apostles or earliest Christian  m arty rs , hence t h e  
s im ilarity  in doctrine:
...porque Seneca y Epicteto, que vivieron en tiempo de los apostoles, y 
veian las hazanas de la fe de los cris tianos y la p e rfecc iô n  de la vida, y 
que le daban al fuego y al cuchillo , no solo con valen tia , sino con gozo  
enamorado, c o n fe c c io n a ro n  con lo que veian lo que esc r ib ie ro n ;  de ta l  
manera, que su doctrina, con resabios de aquel la atenciôn, es en m u c h a s  
cosas bien parecida a  nues tra  verdad: tuv ieron  por maestros en la
prim itiva Iglesia a los m ârtires , y oyeron la doc trina  de sus t r i u n f o s .  
(QbEa5_I, 1394)
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The dem on mentions the doctrine only in passing here, b u t  
another dem on develops the idea much further in a passage in H  
sueno del Infiem o. in which the dream er, on his excursion th ro u g h  
Hell, comes upon a group of the dam ned who cry out lam enting th e ir  
bad fortune. When the dream er inquires about the group, one o f
their num ber explains that they are those who died su d d e n ly , 
implying quite clearly that had they lived longer, or had som e 
warning o f impending death, they would have had time to turn aw a y  
from their sins and vices in order to live a virtuous life and av o id  
damnation. In response to the rationalization, a demon explains th a t  
the damned soul lies, and corrects him  with Stoic doctrine:
M entis, dixo vn diablo, que ningun honbre muere de re p e n te ;
descuydado y diuertido, si. Como puede morir de r e p e n te
quien desde que naze ve que va corriendo por la vida, q u e  
lleua consigo la muerte? Que otra cossa veis en el mundo sino  
entierros, muertes y sepolturas? Que otra cossa ois en los 
pulpitos y leeis en los Libros? A que volueis los ojos que no os 
acuerda de la muerte? V uestro vestido que se gasta, la ca ssa  
que se cae, el muro que se enuejeze, y hasta el sueno cada d ia  
os acuerda de la muerte, re tra tando la  en si. Pues como p u e d e  
hauer honbre que se muera de repente en el mundo, si s ie m p re  
le andan hauisando tantas cossas? (174)
The ideas in this passage ultim ately derive from Seneca who, in Ep. 
ad Luc. XXIV. 19-20, sets forth the im portant theme of Cotidie  
m o rim u r, no one dies suddenly because we, in fact, die daily.^
"I re m e m b e r  one day you were handling  the w e l l - k n o w n  
commonplace,— that we do not suddenly fall on death, but advance tow ards it b y 
slight degrees; we die everyday. For every day a little o f  our life is taken f r o m
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However, Quevedo does not directly adapt Seneca here. As U se 
Noiting-Hauff has shown, the dem on's discourse comes a lm o st 
directly from Erasm us's De praeparatione ad m o rtem .  ^ A lthough  
Erasmus may have exerted a somewhat lesser influence on Q uevedo 
than Justus Lipsius, he nonetheless provided another im p o rta n t 
model for Quevedo in the Christianization of Seneca and Stoic
doctrine.^ In this particular passage, Quevedo has adapted Stoic 
doctrine on death to a Christian message on repentance.
When the demon in hell reproaches the dam ned soul by te lling
him that he did not die suddenly, but rather "descuydado y 
diuertido, " he implies several things that lead to a moral conclusion. 
First, with the word "diuertido," he implies that when death* occurred , 
the man was living a life of diversion, i.e., com pletely involved in h is 
vices. Second, with "descuydado, " he implies that the man w as
careless with regard to the bigger questions in life, especially th e  
state of his soul. More im portantly, when he says that no one d ies  
suddenly, he indicates that those who understand death, those w ho 
possess an aw areness of the continual proxim ity of death, and live  
their lives accordingly, will not die "descuydado y diuertido," a n d  
they will not see them selves damned. Thinking on death, a n d  
properly understanding  it, can result in producing virtue. As
us; even when we are growing, our life is on the wane. We lose our c h i l d h o o d ,  
then our boyhood, and then our youth. C ounting  even yesterday, all past t i m e  
is lost time; the very day which we are now spend ing  is shared b e t w e e n  
ourselves and death. "
5 See N olting-H auff  (175-76).
6 Marcel Bataillon discusses how Erasm us and his followers prepared t h e  
way for Lipsius and the Neostoics (II, 395 f f  ), but he observes that t h e  
influence o f  Erasm us had s ign if ican tly  d im in ished  by the early s e v e n t e e n t h  
century. O f Quevedo, Bataillon says, "...no parece que Erasmo lo haya se d u c id o "  
(II, 397).
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Quevedo says in Virtud m ilitante: "Bueno es temer la m uerte por la
mala vida, si aquel miedo atiende a enm endar la vida, por quien se 
te me la muerte" (Obras 1425). Death, then, becomes a ph ilosophical 
tool for eradicating the vice that Quevedo satirizes in the Suenos. an d  
therefore plays an intrinsic part in the moral message of the works.
However, a philosophical problem  arises when one re a d s  
"Bueno es temer la muerte. .." This passage, and others like it, 
represent what K. A. Bluher calls a "Desintegracion del estoicismo d e  
Quevedo" in the works belonging to the latter years of Quevedo's life, 
from 1635 onward (472). Referring to the Virtud m ilitante (1 6 3 5 - 
36) and Providencia de Dios (1641-42), Bluher sees Q uevedo 
distancing himself from Stoic teaching on the foolishness of fearing  
death and the need to face it calmly and gladly as an inevitable p a r t  
of life.7 In his earlier works, such as Cuna. Quevedo clearly re flec ts  
the Stoic position: "De donde viene este miedo de la muerte, que h a
crecido tanto arrimado a la ignorancia..." (Obras I, 1338). When he 
describes the fear of death as "bueno" in the later works, his position  
seems inconsistent, causing Bluher to refer to "las in te rn a s  
contradicciones de la concepcion quevediana de la muerte" (476). 
Fortunately, Bluher recognizes that Quevedo makes his positive  
statem ents about fear of death in a context distinct from that of th e  
traditional "desprecio de la muerte." Bluher offers the follow ing 
explanation for the seeming contradiction: "Esta form ulaciôn
^ As in Ep. ad Luc. XXX.1Q-LI: "He [Bassus] says that it is foolish to f e a r
death as it is to fear old age; for death  follows old age precisely  as old a g e  
follows youth. He who does not wish to die cannot have wished to live. For l i f e  
is gran ted  to us with the rese rva tion  that we shall die; to this end our p a t h
leads. Therefore ,  how foolish it is to fear it, since men simply aw ait what is 
sure, but fear only that which is uncertain! Death has its fixed ru le .— e q u i ta b le  
and unavo idab le ."
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paradôjica no quiere decir sino que Quevedo distingue ahora, algo  
que antes no habia hecho al tratar de la muerte, entre un m ied o  
natural y otro escatalogico " (474). He attributes the d is tin c tio n
between the foolish fear of natural death and the good fear o f  
eschatological death to a change in Q uevedo's thinking late in life, a 
change in which he began to subordinate Stoic doctrine to that o f  
Christianity (472).
It is important to note that Bluher says Quevedo had not m a d e  
this distinction regarding fear of death in his earlier works; "algo 
que antes no habia hecho." E ttinghausen takes issue with B lu h er 's  
thesis, saying that "Quevedo subordinated  Stoicism to C h ris tian ity  
before as well as after 1635" (123), but he does not directly a d d re s s  
the seeming contradiction pointed out by Bluher. It is fitting th e n ,
that the matter be resolved by examining a passage from the Suenos.
In El mundo por de dentro (1612), written more than tw e n ty
years before the change in Quevedo's thought postulated by B luher, 
the allegorical character Desengaho m akes a number of s ig n ifican t 
statem ents about death. In a long passage at the beginning of th e  
work, Desengaho addresses the narrator in terms similar to those o f  
the demon in Alguacil regarding the link between time and d e a th :
"TÙ por ventura saues lo que vale vn dia? entiendes de quanto p reç io
es vna hora" (Suenos I, 197). He goes on to explain that death a n d
the passing of days are linked together like a chain: "...estàn
eslabonados y en una cadena, y quanto mas caminan los Dias que v a n  
delante de ti, tiran hàzia ti y te açercan la muerte" (197). Then h e  
addresses the subject o f fearing death:
88
Por nezio tengo al qua toda la vida se muere de miedo de q u e
se ha de morir, y por malo ai que viue tan sin miedo de e lla
como si ni la hubiese; que este la viene a tem er quando la
padeze, y emaraçado con el temor, ni halla rem edio a la vida ni 
consuelo a su fin. Cuerdo es el que viue cada dia como qu ien  
cada dia y cada ora puede morir. fSuenos I, 197)
His words, if not read carefully, may seem contradictory. On the one 
hand, he says that only a fool spends his life fearing death, on th e  
other, only an evil man lives without fearing it. Clearly, "fear o f 
death" connotes d ifferent things in each instance, creating a 
distinction between two different types of fear, as Bluher po in ted  
o u t.
The connotation in the first instance poses no difficulty in
in terpretation  because it directly corresponds to the wretched m an 
described in Stoic doctrine who makes his life miserable fearing w hat 
he cannot change: "Most men ebb and flow in w retchedness b e tw een
fear of death and the hardships of life; they are unwilling to live and  
yet they do not know how to die" (Ep. ad Luc. IV. 5). Such a man is a 
fool because he robs his own mind of peace and tranquility , filling it 
with fear when he should learn to despise death. This part of th e  
Stoa serves to teach one how to attain happiness in this life by  
dispelling fear and the misery that accompanies it.
The second instance described by Desengaho takes on a m oral 
component not present in the first because the old man designates as 
evil, "malo," one who lives w ithout fear of death, as if there were no 
such thing: "...como si ni la hubiese...." The evil man here b eh av es
much as the damned soul in Infiemo who complains of sudden d e a th
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as a miscarriage of fortune. To live as if death will never come is to  
live carelessly, "descuydado," and to live absorbed in one's vices, 
"diuertido," is to be evil. The passage contains a su g g es ted
exhortation to fear death, and necessarily implies a recognition o f 
divine justice, a recognition that death will bring about an
accountability for the manner in which one has lived. In this con tex t, 
fear of death is good because it produces virtue, whereas fear o f  
mere physical death is not because it only serves to p ro d u ce  
w retchedness. In a sense, Quevedo's position here parallels h is
resolution of the problem of Stoic im perturbability. Just as on e  
should not be ruled by emotions but be aware of them for the sa k e  
of virtue, one should not live in terror of death but be aware of th e  
fact that it could come at any m om ent and live accordingly, as  
Desengano says: "Cuerdo es el que viue cada dia como quien cada d ia
y cada ora puede morir. "
The teaching provided by Desengano on death d e m o n s tra te s
how Quevedo blends and reconciles Stoic and Christian d o c trin e , 
rem aining faithful to both. It also dem onstrates the consistency o f 
Quevedo's position on the matter. Long before Virtud m ilitante a n d  
Providencia de Dios, he clearly had formulated the d is tin c tio n  
between Stoic and Christian views on fearing death, the one seeing it  
as negative because of its implications for this life, the other p o sitiv e  
because of its implication for the next. With the recognition of th is  
distinction, the seeming contradictions in Quevedo's position  
disappear. The distinction between good and bad fear may a p p e a r  
labored. The union forged by Quevedo between Stoic and C hristian  
doctrine may not appear seamless, but it makes sense, with one
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proviso: it hinges on Quevedo’s belief in an afterlife. W hen h e
writes, "Bueno es temer la muerte por la mala vida, si aquel m ied o  
atiende a enm endar la vida, por quien se teme la muerte," th e  
statem ent presupposes an afterlife that will entail either a rew ard o r 
a punishm ent com m ensurate with the state of the soul at th e  
moment of physical death. Fear of punishm ent meted out by God 
may induce one to live virtuously; fear of oblivion has no su ch  
power. W ithout a Christian belief in the imm ortality of the soul, 
Quevedo’s views on death make no sense. And yet, his works co n ta in  
a number of passages that, if not read carefully, seem to indicate th a t  
he did not believe in an afterlife, that he was in fact a nihilist. One 
such passage occurs in the Suenos. again, in the words spoken b y
D esengaho.
Shortly after Desengaho delivers his instruction on death, h e
and the narrator begin their walk along the street called H ypocrisy . 
They soon come upon a funeral procession and during th e i r  
conversation about the event, Desengaho indicates the corpse of th e  
woman in the casket and makes the following comment: "Pues s a u e
que lo que alii va no es nada, porque aun en la vida lo era, y en
muerte dexo ya de ser..." (Suehos I, 200). James Crosby views th e
passage as an expression of Epicurean philosophy:
Finalmente, redobla la afirmacion diciendo que al morir, lo q u e
no era nada ha dejado de existir. Esto va mucho mas alia d e  
algunos de sus predecesores: el satfrico griego Luciano (siglo 11 
d.C.) se habia limitado a impugnar la idea de la vida despues d e
la muerte, diciendo que la m uerte reduce todo a la nada, y su s
im itadores del siglo XVI criticaron solamente el a p a ra to
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exterior de los entierros, propagando asf un culto mâs d ep u ra d o  
e interior. Aqui Quevedo recuerda la filosofia epicurea de la  
muerte. (Crosby, Intro 69)
Epicurus unam biguously taught that nonexistence fo llow ed 
death. He addresses the subject in the Letter to M enoeceus. 
preserved by Diogenes Laertius: "Death, therefore, the most awful o f
evils, is nothing to us, seeing that, when we are, death is not com e, 
and, when death is come, we are not. It is nothing, then, either to th e  
living or the dead, for w ith the living it is not and the dead exist no  
longer" (Lives X. 125). In the Letter to H erodo tus, he describes th e  
nature of the soul as corporeal, made of atoms, the body serving as 
the frame, or housing, for those atoms. With the death of the b o d y  
comes the dissolution o f the soul; the atoms dissipate. All s e n tie n t 
function provided by the soul ceases, and the person ceases to exist. 
Regarding the notion that an incorporeal soul will continue, he says, 
"But it is im possible to conceive anything that is incorporeal as se lf-  
existent except empty space" (Lives X. 67). Lucretius discusses th e
same issues in the De rerum  natura. He devotes Book III especia lly
to the exposition of Epicurean doctrine on death. Quevedo c ites  
Lucretius at the beginning of El sueno de la m uerte on the v e ry  
subject of death fSuenos I, 217), a fact that might tend to su p p o rt 
Crosby's attribution of Epicurean philosophy to Desengano's words on  
n onex istence.
However, if Crosby is correct, the true nature of Q uevedo's
Christianity comes into question. If Quevedo did not believe in an
afterlife, if he did not believe in the im m ortality o f the soul, then h e  
was not a Christian in any orthodox sense, not the devout Catholic he
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pretended to be. If nonexistence was his credo, then he was a 
nihilist. Indeed, several critics, including Américo Castro, M anuel 
Duran, and Raquel Sajon de Cuello, have referred to Quevedo as a 
n ih ilist.8 Castro and Duran use the term  in passing w ithout en o u g h  
supporting analysis to indicate clearly what they mean by their u se  
of a word that came into existence in the late eighteenth century a n d  
has been used in a variety of contexts since then, most fam ously b y  
Nietzsche. In the case of these critics, they appear to em ploy th e  
term very generally, almost equating it with the words "pesim ista" o r  
"negativista, " to refer to the attitude towards life displayed in 
Quevedo’s works. Sajon de Cuello, in contrast, indicates very c lea rly  
what she means when she terms Quevedo a nihilist.
Sajon de Cuello begins presenting the word "nihilist" within a 
string of ad jectives meant to indicate Quevedo's m u ltifa c e te d  
personality: "Humanista, conceptista, nihilista, estoico, escéptico...
(223). She soon becomes more specific, however. After ex am in in g  
some of the many passages that deal w ith death in Quevedo's w orks, 
including some o f his poems that reduce human life to nothing b u t 
death and dust, she reaches a conclusion in which she c o n tra s ts
8 D uràn apparen tly  regards Q uevedo's in terest in suffering and death a s  
sufficient ju s t i f ica t io n  to characterize him as a  nihilist;
"En e l fondo estos tratados estoicos y ascéticos, con su c o n s t a n t e  
in s is ten c ia  en el su fr im ien to  y en la m uerte ,  expuesta en fo rm a m u c h o  
mâs de ta l lada  y re ite rada  que los p ârra fo s  dedicados a la sa lvac iôn  y la  
vida e te rna , senalan una vez mâs las ca rac te r îs t icas  de p e s i  m ism o .  
n ih ilism o  y visiôn negativa  de la vida humana que ha llam os en e l  
Quevedo satîrico ...  " (159)
One can't help bu t notice how casually  D urân dismisses as less t h a n  
convincing all o f  Q uevedo 's  ascetic passages and works that discuss e te rna l  l i f e  
and salvation. C as tro  refers to Quevedo's "desengano  nihilista " ( " E s c e p t ic is m o  "
42) in the context o f  Quevedo's sceptic ism  and fascina tion  with the subject o f  
death. Dâmaso A lonso has also described Quevedo's "cinismo pesim ista  " as "Una 
especie de nihilismo que lleva a la reduccion. a la atracciôn a piano in fe r io r  d e  
todas las bellas alturas de la vida (531).
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Quevedo with the Spanish mystics, paraphrasing  Américo Castro 
("Escépticismo" 43):
La diferencia de concepciôn de la m uerte entre el mistico y 
nuestro poeta reside en que para el prim ero la muerte significa 
apertura a la vida etem a; en tante, para el segundo la m u e rte  
solo sirve para paternizar que la realidad mas segura del s e r  
humano es su no  ser. (243)
Sajôn de Cuello places the last three words in boldface to em phasize  
her conclusion that for Quevedo, the most certain  reality of h u m an  
existence is nonexistence. She recognizes that such a charac te riza tio n  
places Quevedo at odds with the Church doctrinally  and has to ask, 
"^Compartio la ortodoxfa de la Iglesia o es un renegado y descreîdo?" 
(243). In order to be consistent with her thesis in declaring Quevedo 
a nihilist, she must opt for the latter choice in her question an d  
declare Quevedos Christianity to be disingenuous: "...su esperanza en
la Salvacion del alma y de la vida eterna mas se asemeja a un a  
retôrica que una convicciôn" (248). Then she advances nihilism as 
the most salient theme in his works: "...porque nada adivmase m as
alia de su desgarrado nihilismo que todo lo envuelve y arrastra hacia 
el confm de la nada " (248).
In perhaps the most telling part of her com m entary, Sajôn d e  
Cuello cites a passage from La cuna v la sepultura that d irec tly  
addresses the subject of eternal life. Quevedo wrote the passage in 
the form of a debate between "el Demonio y el Hombre: "
Y el demonio, falto de razones, dice:
D. -ôQué sabes tu de lo que sera tu alma ni a donde iras?
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H. -Yo no sé ddnde iré. Por mis pecados merezco ir contigo; p o r
mi dolor y por la sangre de Cristo y intercesiôn de la Virgen...
espero que no iré donde tû fuiste porque desesperaste.
D. -Mira que con la vida se acaba todo; que no hay otra vida.
H. -Mientes en eso como en todo, pero con m ay o r 
desvergüenza. Yo creo la inm ortalidad del aim a y la v ida 
perdurable, que nunca se acaba para la pena o para la gloria. 
(Obras I, 1357)
According to Sajôn de Cuello, "Esto le vema de perlas para q u e d a r  
bien con la Iglesia" (270). O f course, it would be extrem ely naïve to 
suggest that Quevedo did not write with some aw areness and  
concern for the Church censors. In fact, he often made slight changes 
in successive editions of his works in order to "quedar bien con la 
Iglesia." But Sajôn de Cuello’s position goes far beyond th is 
recognition to portray Quevedo's Christianity as a fraud, to d ism iss 
large and integral parts of his ideology in order to resolve the 
contradiction inherent in asserting that a man who claim ed to be a 
Christian did not actually believe in the immortality o f the soul.
Once again, these critics have made an issue o f an a p p a re n t 
contradiction in Quevedo's thought where none actually exists, a 
contradiction that can easily be resolved with a simple d istinc tion  
that does not involve accusations of heresy; when Quevedo m akes 
statem ents regarding nonexistence and describes an ending of 
nothing but death and dust, he refers only to corporeal existence, th e  
fragile and fleeting nature o f mortal life. The seem ingly n ihilistic 
passages never refer to the im m ortal soul made in the image of God.
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This distinction can easily be seen in Desengaho's comment about th e  
corpse in the funeral procession, if his words are read carefully a n d  
in context.
First, it is im portant to recognize his subject in the p assag e . 
When he says "lo que va alii no es nada," he refers to the corpse, n o t 
the person. W hen he says "en m uerte dexo ya de ser," he r e p e a ts  
again, in the following lines of the same passage, that he refers to th e  
corpse: "Alii no va sino tierra de menos fruto y mas espantosa que la
que pissas..."(200). Quevedo substitues "tierra" here for the "polvo" 
that he often uses in his poems, but the message is clear; the body , 
upon death, ceases to exist and will return to the earth from w h e n c e  
it came. The content of the passage is perfectly com patible with th e  
Biblical tradition as expressed in Genesis 3:19: "...til thou return u n to
the ground; for out of it wast thou taken; for dust thou art, and u n to  
dust thou shalt return ."^  Also, Ecclesiastes 12:7 describes th e  
cessation o f physical life and the continuation of the spirit, succinc tly  
providing the model to look for in Quevedo's works: "Then shall th e
dust return to the earth as it was: and the spirit shall return u n to  
God who gave it."
The central theme of the Book of Ecclesiastes is the vanity o f  
man. Quevedo addresses that vanity in another seemingly n ih ilis tic  
passage in Cuna that resembles the words of Desengaho in M u n d o : 
"Mira que eres el que ha poco que no fuiste, y el que siendo e re s  
poco, y el que de aqui a poco no seras: veras como tu vandidad se
^ Crosby also notes the biblical source o f  the re fe ren ces  to “tie rra ,”  b u t  
he does so as if  it were merely poetic im agery  for Quevedo, unconnec ted  to a 
larger ideology regarding the im mortality o f  the soul.
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castiga y se da por vencida" (Obras I, 1 3 2 9 )‘° . Once again, th e se  
words, if not read in context, could be taken as further proof o f 
Quevedo's supposed nihilism. However, the topic o f the im m edia te ly  
following paragraph in the text should dispel any such notion; 
"iGrandes cosas caben en el entendim iento del hombre! ;Gran 
dignidad es la suya, pues tiene alma semejante a Dios, inspirada del, 
y eternal " (1329). And he continues:
Alma etem a sem ejante a Dios tiene: mas no la tiene ni la t r a ta  
como a semejanza de Dios ni como a etem a, m ientras la hace 
seguir al cuerpo y la olvida por cualquier apetito. Todo lo haces 
al rêvés, hombre: al cuerpo sombra de m uerte, tratas como a 
imagen de vida; y al alma etema dejas como sombra de m uerte . 
(1 3 2 9 )
All of these affirm ations on the im m ortality o f the soul can 
hardly be dism issed as disingenuous. In addition, it should b e  
apparent that the passages that purportedly dem onstrate Q uevedo's 
nihilism actually concern themselves with inspiring hum ility . 
Quevedo refers to human life as "nothing" in order to indicate th e  
brevity and frailty of it. In the Virtud militante, he makes this la s t 
point perhaps more clearly than in any other place in his works: 
"Todos los dias, dice el gran Seneca, muestran cuan nada somos, y con 
algun nuevo argum ento am onestan a los olvidados de la fragilidad, 
cuando atendiendo a las cosas eternas, nos fuerzan a mirar la
A ccording to B luher (444), Quevedo adapts this passage from S e n eca .  
LXXVn. 11: "Would you not think him an u tte r  fool who w e p t
because he was not alive a thousand years ago? And is he not ju s t  as much of a 
fool who weeps because he will not be alive a thousand years from now? It is  
all the same; you will not be, and you were not. N either  o f  these periods o f  
time belongs to you."
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muerte" (Obras I, 1426). The passage comes directly from Seneca,
Ep. ad Luc. Cl. 1: "Every day and every hour reveal to us what a
nothing we are, and remind us with some fresh evidence that w e 
have forgotten our weakness; then as we plan for eternity, th ey
compel us to look over our shoulders at Death." Both Quevedo an d  
Seneca speak of human life as "nothing," but in a relative, o r
comparative manner. Compared to the lives of the gods, or co m pared  
with the scope o f Eternity, human life seems as if it were nothing. 
Neither Quevedo nor Seneca use the word "nothing" in a tru ly  
nihilistic sense here. With these issues in mind, a definitive a n sw er 
may be attem pted with regard to the supposed influence of Epicurus 
on Quevedo's theology.
Quevedo does indeed cite Lucretius at the beginning of M uerte. 
but, in the passage from Book III. 931-39, of the De rerum. L ucretius 
merely imagines what a personified Nature might say in reproach of 
a foolish mortal who laments and mourns the prospect of death . ' ' 
Far from invoking that part of Epicurean doctrine that deals w ith  
nonexistence, this passage only serves to indicate how closely 
Epicurean moral philosophy parallels that of the Stoics. Q uevedo's 
admiration for Epicurus stems precisely from that sim ilarity. In th e  
Defensa de Epicuro. he goes so far as to call Stoic the Epicurean
11 Quevedo cites the text in Latin:
Denique si vocem rerum natura repente 
Mittat, et hoc alicui nostrum sic increpet ipsa:
Quid tibi tan to operest. mortalis quod nimis egris 
Luctibus indulges? quid mortem congemis ac fles? 
Nam si gra ta  fuit tibi vita anteacta priorique 
Et non hom nia (sic) pertusum congesta quasi in uas 
C om oda perfluxere  atque ingrata interiere:
Cur non vt pienus vitae conuiuia recedis 
Aequo an im oque capis /  securam, stulte. quietem?
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doctrine on pleasure; "Epicuro puso la felicidad en el deleite, y el 
deleite en la virtud; doctrina tan estoica, que el carecer deste n o m b re  
no la desconoce" (Obras I. 1094). Quevedo also admired Epicurus fo r  
his condem nation of dialectics, and he explains how o th e r  
philosophers, out o f envy, intentionally m isrepresen ted  the d o c tr in e  
on pleasure in order to slander Epicurus. Many passages f ro m
Seneca provide Quevedo with support regarding the virtuous n a tu re  
of Epicurus's life and teachings. However, just as Quevedo took is su e  
with his favorite philosopher, Seneca, on the subject of suicide, h is  
adm iration for Epicurus also has defin ite limits, particularly as
regards the nature o f the soul.
Quevedo mentions and discusses the im m ortality of the soul in  
many of his works, but he does so most extensively in th e  
Providencia de Dios. The entire first section of the work is d e v o te d
to an apologetic proof of the im m ortality of the soul that includes a
repudiation of Epicurean doctrine on the matter. Quevedo begins b y 
stating that he considers it somewhat ridiculous that it should e v e n  
be necessary for him  to write in defense of the propositions th a t
there is a God, that He concerns himself w ith the affairs of h u m a n ity , 
and that the soul is immortal (Obras I, 1543). Throughout h is  
argument, he links divine providence and the immortality of the sou l 
as necessarily related subjects; the one im plies the other, co n s is te n t 
with the biblical teaching that God made man in His image. T he
eternal soul that makes man like God is the only thing th a t
differentiates man from  the beasts:
^Como puede ser que un hombre, que solo en el alma rac io n a l 
inmortal se diferencia de las bestias, quiera, negandose e s ta
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razôn y inmortalidad, no solo ser igual a los brutos, sino in fe rio r 
en el conocim iento a las moscas y aranas, como en su lugar 
probaré? (1543)
Early on in his discussion, he mentions Epicurus and Lucretius, 
making clear distinctions that indicate how thoroughly he knew an d  
understood their doctrine:
Los que no creen la inm ortalidad del alma dicen que ni hay  
Dios, ni Providencia; y son muy pocos los que la niegan, q u e  
confiesen hay Dios. Mas éstos negaron su providencia, como 
fueron Epicuro y Lucrecio, Democrito y Heraclito, que afirm aro n  
habia Dios; mas no que cuidase de algo, atribuyéndolo  todo a la 
fuerza de naturaleza. (1543)
As Quevedo states, the Epicureans believed that the gods existed, b u t 
only they were immortal, and they never took in terest in h u m an ity 's  
affairs, neither to rew ard nor punish in any afterlife. Hence the gods 
were not to be feared. Virtue was to be sought for its own rew ard , 
as the path to happiness, not to avoid divine wrath. The Epicurean 
denial of divine providence stands in direct opposition to Q uevedo's 
Christian formulation o f fear that produces virtue.
On the Epicurean doctrine of the soul, he refers to th e  
exposition of the m atter given by Lucretius in the De rerum, an d  
succinctly dism isses it with something of a contem ptuous tone: "No 
gastaré tinta en responder a los argum entes con que Lucrecio 
porfiadamente osé probar que era mortal el alma del hombre; po rque 
ni el responderlos sera ingenio, ni el confundirlos diffcil " (1544). 
After the general repudiation, he makes one more comment on 
Lucretius in which he declares the notion of the corporality of th e
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soul to be erroneous: "Escribio Tertuliano un iibro de Anima, d o n d e
su eiocuencia centello mas vivas luces; empero m ancilladas con 
algunos errores, y principalm ente con afirmar que el alma tiene un  
género de cuerpo, mal persuadido de un verso de Lucrecio " (1544).
Quevedo had obviously read all of the texts carefully; he k n ew  
their doctrines, and he knew what he himself believed. He writes a 
long and im passioned attack against the "atheistas " (sic) who w ou ld  
deny the im m ortality of the soul. And yet those who would c lassify  
him as a nihilist, those who would group him with the atheists he 
attacks, justify  their reading by saying that his religious works se em  
lacking in conviction. A reading that finds itself forced to e lim in a te  
such a vast percentage of Quevedo’s works must be questioned. Once 
again, the passages that some would read as nihilistic merely dea l 
with the brevity  and frailty of hum an life, a fact that Q uevedo 
emphasizes more clearly in El sueno de la muerte.
After he cites Lucretius at the beginning of M uerte on th e  
foolishness of fearing death, he presents a passage from the book o f 
Job that he has translated and in terp reted  in verse: "Al fin h o m b re
naçido / de muger flaca, de miserias lleno, / a brebe vida como flor 
traido, / de todo bien y de descanso ajeno, / que como sombra vana / 
huie a la tarde y naçe a la manana" (217-18). Man's life is short an d  
full of misery. For Quevedo this was a certainty derived d irec tly  
from sacred scripture, and the m anner in which Job confronted it 
gives further reason to affirm the immortality of the soul, as 
Quevedo explains in Providencia:
^Por que piensas que Job en trabajos nunca vistos y en  
persecuciôn tan cruelm ente dilatada tuvo paciencia s iem p re
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victoriosa y triunfante, y alma, no solo capaz de muerte, sino d e  
calamidades que se la hacian desear? Porque creyo y su p o
creer la inm ortalidad de I'alma, cap. XDC, verso 25: Scio e n i m
quod Redemptor meus vivit, et sin novissimo die de te r ra
surrecturus sum: Et rursum circumdabor pelle mea, et in c a r  ne
mea videbo Deum. Afirmando misterios tan grandes, como q u e  
hay Dios, resurrecion de la carne, alma eterna, que a g u a rd a b a  
Redentor, y su resurrecciôn con la suya: no dice creo, sino sé ,
para ensenar que solo con infalible certeza se sabe lo que d e
Dios y por Dios se cree. (Obras I, 1554)
According to Quevedo, it was Job's belief in the next life that g a v e  
him the strength and fortitude to face the misery of this one.
Inherent in this affirm ation is the belief that Job would b e  
rewarded for his patience and fortitude in the next life. For Q uevedo, 
it was inconceivable that there would be no reward for the good n o r  
punishment for the wicked: "En esta vida hay buenos y malos, v icios 
y virtudes, delitos y méritos. Si no hay otra vida, ni las v ir tu d e s  
tienen premio, ni los vicios castigo, ni los malos pena, ni los b u e n o s  
gloria. Este absurdo no se puede concéder..." (1559). The S uenos
themselves, set as they are among those souls at the Last Ju d g e m en t 
or among the damned in Hell, rely on the notion of divine justice to  
give their satire meaning. Admittedly, Quevedo's comic p re se n ta tio n  
of the afterlife might call into question how seriously he takes th e  
theological assumptions in the structure of the works, but, as a lre a d y  
seen, the satires contain many serious theological and ph ilosoph ical 
passages consistent with Quevedo's ascetic works. For example, in  
Muerte. Quevedo once again satirizes those who live carelessly, as i f
102
they were never going to die, this time explicitly mentioning the ro le  
of divine justice and mercy. The dream er stands in the court o f  
Death, and observes those who die of laughter: "La Muerte de Risa
era postrera, y tenia vn gran çerco de confiados y tarde a rre p e n tid o s , 
gente que viue como si no hubiera justiçia  y mueren como si no 
hubiera m isericordia" (226). He goes on to explain that these " ta rd e  
arrepentidos" are those who, each time they were urged to go to
confession, m erely laughed saying that they never felt better, as if  
death were far away. It is prim arily on account of these lost sou ls 
that Quevedo repeatedly gives the Stoic message on the proxim ity o f
death, death as process, as in the words of the allegorical M uerte to
the dream er: "... lo que llamais morir es acabar de morir, y lo q u e
llamais naçer es em peçar a morir, y lo que llamais viuir es m o r ir
viuiendo" (223).
Quevedo does indeed display a trem endous fascination a n d  
concern with the subject of death, but that concern belongs to a long 
philosophical tradition, not a nihilistic tendency. For example, one o f 
the Essais of M ontaigne bears the title That to Philosophize is to
Leam to Die. M ontaigne begins by citing Cicero as one of m a n y  
classical authorities who support the proposition, and in a moment o f 
personal revelation in the essay, he reveals that he thinks a b o u t 
death continually in order to prepare for it (60). Seneca also ta u g h t 
that "it is a w onderful thing to learn how to die," and he c ite s
Epicurus for support: "Think on death" (Ep. ad Luc. XXVI. 8).
Quevedo’s interest in preparing for physical death differs little w h e n  
compared to that seen in the works o f his predecessors. H ow ever, 
the Biblical tradition plays an equally important role. To deny it is to
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misread the works and their message. The moral ex h o rta tio n  
contained in the Suenos consists of both Stoic doctrine on th e  
proximity of death and Christian doctrine on the im m ortality of th e  
soul. Awareness o f both doctrines leads Quevedo repeatedly to  
include passages on the need for timely repentence and v irtu o u s  
living. Of course, he does so in a negative manner, caustically  
condemning those who repented too late, but such is the nature o f 
sa tire .
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Chapter Five:
Dystopian and Otherworldly Constructs in the Suenos
When Hrst published in 1627, Quevedo's Hve satirical v isions 
bore the title Suenos y discursos de verdades dcscubridores d e  
abusos. vicios v enpanos en todos los oficios v estados. The co n ten ts  
of the works, then, purportedly consist o f "verdades " In most cases, 
such an assertion could be dismissed as mere pretense and ty p ica l 
literary convention, but in the Suenos. Quevedo has actually gone to  
considerable lengths to create an elaborate structure that makes th e  
revelation of truth possible in the scheme of his fiction. The
principal device he utilizes in this structure is the notion of th e
otherworld, a place where the truth may be known, a n ecessary
recourse, since, in the world-view established in the satires, th is  
world contains only lies and false ap p ea ran ces  ' However, once th e  
revelation of truth becomes possible, it must have a subject to
address. Referring once again to the title, the subject is concisely 
stated as "abusos, vicios, y engahos," the vices and deceptions o f 
mankind. And while Quevedo may at times refer to mankind in  
general, his prim ary concern is naturally with his own society, h is 
own age. In revealing the truth about his society, he portrays it as
 ^ See the discussion in Chapter Three with respect to Quevedo's moral 
and sceptical ph ilosophies .
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an evil place, a dystopia. Throughout all five of the Suenos. Q uevedo 
in terw eaves som etim es complex constructions of otherw orldly an d  
dystopian presentations. These presentations may seem to be  
com pletely cynical and pessimistic denunciations, but an occasional 
suggestion does appear to indicate that Quevedo denounces w ith  
some hope of reform, thus turning the dystopian into the utopian.
Quevedo had a variety of otherworldly models available to h im  
in the literary tradition, and, at one time or other in his career, h e  
made use of most of them, including the afterlife of C hristian  
tradition, the allegorical realms so popular in the Middle Ages, as 
well as mythological realms, whether located in the halls and co u rts  
o f Mount Olympus, or the depths of Tartarus. To this list should be  
added imaginary lands ostensibly set in this world but set apart fro m  
it by the author as another place that may be used to reveal tru th  
about a society, either by comparison or contrast. Of course, th e  
im aginary lands set in this world do not usually evoke the sp iritu a l 
and divine aspects frequently  associated with the realms to w hich 
one travels in literary dream s and visions. Quevedo, therefore, does 
not draw directly on this last tradition for the Suenos. since sp iritua l 
authority plays such an im portant role in the works, but he w as 
influenced by the tradition, and admired the work that es tab lish ed  
the pattern for the genre, Thomas More’s Utopia (1516).
It remains unclear just exactly when Quevedo becam e 
acquainted with the Utopia. It is known that he possessed a copy o f 
the 1548 Louvain edition which he annotated somewhat, p rim arily  
criticizing the Erasmian passages. That copy still exists in th e
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Biblioteca Nacional in M adrid ." In spite of the reservations he m ay  
have had about Erasmus, Quevedo urged his friend, Jeronim o d e  
M edinilla y Porres, to prepare a Spanish translation o f M ore’s w o rk  
which, when published in 1637, contained a letter o f 
recom m endation by Quevedo. In the recom m endation, Q uevedo 
describes More as a learned and saintly man. He sees the U topia 
primarily as an attack by More on a repressive English government: 
Vivio en tiempo y reino que le fue forzoso para reprender el 
gobierno que padecfa, fingir el conveniente.
Yo me persuado que fabrico aquella politica contra la 
tiranfa de Inglaterra, y por eso hizo isla su idea, y ju n ta m e n te  
reprehendio  los desordenes de los mas principes de su edad . 
(Obras I, 537)
Quevedo recognizes the subject and context of the work as 
early Renaissance England, but he also notes its broader ap p lica tio n  
and universal appeal. In his own works, he seems to have ad o p ted  
the model of the Utopia at least to some degree in the ep isode  
entitled "la isla de los Monopantos" included in his last satire. La h o ra  
de todos. A brief passage will indicate the nature of his adaptation:
...los Monopantos, gente en republica habitadora de unas islas 
que entre el mar Negro y la Moscovia, confines de la T arta ria , 
se defienden sagaces de tan feroces vecindades, mas con el 
ingenio que con las armas y fortificaciones. Son hom bres de  
cuadruplicada malicia, de perfecta hipocresi'a, de e x tre m a d a  
disim ulacion, de tan equivoca apariencia que todas las leyes y 
naciones los tienen por suyos. La negociacion les m ultip lica
2 See R. O. Jones. "Some Notes on More's Utopia in Spain."
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caras y los manda los sem blantes, y el interés los remuda las 
aimas. (Obras I, 298)
The imaginary island republic o f the M onopantos is clearly a 
dystopia, and indeed, it seems that even the thought of depicting an  
ideal society populated by men of virtue and frugal customs w ould  
have run com pletely counter to the spirit o f Quevedo, a man fam ous 
for his cynicism.
One of the traditional criticisms leveled against the lite ra ry  
depictions of ideal societies is that they reflect overly op tim istic  
assum ptions about hum an nature .^  In his analysis of "Dystopian 
Demurrers," Peyton E. Richter notes how Aristotle, in his criticism o f 
Plato's Republic, "attributes the cause of many social ills to th e  
wickedness o f  human nature  which, he thinks, is often overlooked b y  
utopian planners in their enthusiasm  for social panaceas" (5). 11
should be no cause for surprise that Quevedo, a man consumed w ith  
the study of moral philosophy, who spent much of his literary c a re e r  
either discussing or depicting exactly that "wickedness of h u m an  
nature," would succumb even less readily than Aristotle to th e  
idealism  of the Utopians, that the dystopian side of the eq u a tio n  
would appeal to him more.
However, the gulf between utopian and dystopian is not as 
great as it might appear. As Alistair Fox has observed:
Utopia may also be viewed as the prototype o f the o b v erse  
genre, the dystopia. The paradigm  More created lends itse lf
 ^ "It was impossible for the U topians to obtain a correc t view of h u m a n  
nature . Hence f requen t ly  they went astray. In the first place they a s s u m e d  
that men were o r ig ina lly  perfect,  b o m  angels, as Rousseau said, t h e n  
corrupted  by the social environm ent..."  (H ertz le r  302).
108
ideally to satire, because the distance between his im ag in a ry  
society and the society in which he lived enabled him  to
contrast the two. N evertheless, this paradigm allows satire to  
work in either direction, depending on whether the c o n tra s t 
between the imaginary and actual societies is favorable o r  
unfavorable. Many w riters after More have seized th e
possibility of creating an im aginary society in which d is tu rb in g  
tendencies in actual society are brought to a f r ig h ten in g
culmination. When satire works against an imaginary society , 
the utopia turns into its opposite, the dystopia. (12)
Fox places some emphasis on the fact that utopian and d y s to p ia n
satire norm ally finds its expression in an imaginary world, but th is  
need not always be the case. Joyce Herztler has described as u to p ia n
the message of the prophets o f the Old Testament who decry th e
w ickedness of the nation of Israel because of their implicit desire to  
see social im provem ent (12 ff ). Elias Rivers has likened Quevedo to  
the same prophets, and has described the type of world Q uevedo 
hoped to achieve through denunciation. The description so u n d s 
decidedly utopian:
... like a Hebrew prophet, he considered it his religious duty to
denounce the idolatry of his people, now whoring after s tra n g e  
gods; he yearned for a prim itive virtue which had been lost, a 
simple society of brave warriors and good women, w ith o u t
lawyers and bankers, w ithout spices and fancy foods, w ith o u t 
perfum es and frilly laces, without aristocratic vanity a n d  
indolence, without frivolous entertainments of all sorts. (18)
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So, although Quevedo satirizes the m em bers of his society directly in  
the Suenos. without employing the device of a surrogate and fic tio n a l 
kingdom or island as he would later in La hora de todos. his s a t ir e  
still may be referred to as dystopian, especially in light of th e  
unilateral and seemingly categorical portrayal of his society as a n  
evil place.
Quevedo's choices of otherw orlds play a crucial role in th e  
categorical nature of his denunciation. In the first three Suenos. h e  
utilizes some part of the afterlife of Christian tradition to place la rg e  
segm ents of his society in Hell, a place that, by deOnition, co n ta in s  
only the wicked. In El sueno del Juicio final, the dreamer o b se rv e s  
the judgem ent of the resurrected inhabitants of the earth, and at th e  
end of the dream, the mouth of Hell opens to receive the c o n d e m n e d  
souls whom Quevedo has described and satirized as they p a s s e d  
before the Throne of Judgem ent. In El alguacil endemoniado. th e  
dream er converses with a demon who describes the nature of H ell 
and its inhabitants. In El sueno del infierno. the dream er travels to  
Hell to observe for him self those souls who populate the in fe rn a l 
regions. As a devout Catholic living during the C ounter-R eform ation , 
Quevedo naturally has an occasional com m ent about the enemies o f  
the faith such as Luther, Calvin and M ohammed, and he places th e m  
among the damned. He also has much to say about those souls w h o  
belong to any age of man such as lovers, poets and adulterers. B u t 
his chief concern seems to be with those readily identifiable a s  
members of his own society; he addresses the avarice am o n g  
craftsm en of the middle class such as tailors and piemakers, th e  
ineptitude and corruption among doctors, constables and law y ers .
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and the pretentiousness o f everyone from the nobleman to th e  
stableboy. All of these people can be revealed for what they a re  
beyond a shadow of a doubt, because Quevedo transports them to  
another world where all lies and pretenses are stripped away and o f 
no use. As Quevedo observes at the end of Infierno. "...pues dezir d e  
los que estàn en el infierno no puede tocar a los buenos" fSuenos I, 
189).
Quevedo had apparently  been thinking of his society in te rm s  
of the infernal for some years before he began to write the Suenos. 
Antonio Papell suggests that the satires may have had their g es ta tio n  
during Quevedo's early years as a student at Alcala (438). While th is  
may be the case, the five years he spent at Valladolid seem to h a v e  
played a much greater role. In 1601, Philip III relocated his court, 
moving it from M adrid to Valladolid. Quevedo followed, a p p a re n tly  
with great reluctance, but his years there would have g re a t 
significance. It was at Valladolid that he began to enjoy renown as a 
poet, attracting the adm iration o f men such as Lope de Vega, as w ell 
as the enmity of Gongora. He took courses in theology at V alladolid  
that would lead to his taking minor orders in the Church. He also 
began his correspondence with Justus Lipsius whose Neostoic w o rk s 
so profoundly influenced his own life and works. He also wrote th e  
first of the Suenos. In January 1606, it was announced that the co u rt 
o f Philip III would return  to Madrid. Quevedo rem ained a few  
months after the royal exodus to finish his theological studies, a n d  
then left for Madrid in June, 1606. As a farewell, he wrote a p o em  
about Valladolid that contains the following lines: "En cuanto a
m udar tus armas, / juzgo que acertado fuera, /  porque solos los
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demonios /  traen llamas en sus tarjetas. /  La primer (sic) vez que las 
vi / te tuve en las apariencias /  por arrabal del Infierno, /  y en todo  
muy su parienta ' (Obra poética II, 481-482). At first sight, Q uevedo 
says, he thought of the city as a suburb of Hell. Astrana, in h is 
biography, indicates that Quevedo never liked the city, which was so 
frequently  either muddy or dusty. He certainly disliked leav in g  
M adrid and Alcala to study instead at Valladolid (see Astrana 6 5 -  
123). Even more significant than these biographical factors are th e  
events occurring in the larger society. Doris L. Baum suggests th a t  
Quevedo, who had grown up in the pious court of Philip II (d. 1598), 
was becoming increasingly d isenchanted with the decadence a n d  
corruption o f the court of Philip III (20)."* What seems certain is th a t  
something during this period of Quevedo's life caused him to begin to  
characterize his society in terms of the infernal.
O f course, Quevedo, in some sense, had been trained to think in  
these terms from a very young age by the religious literature a n d  
iconography of the period. He says at the beginning of Juicio that h is 
reading of the book of Blessed Hypolitus on the second coming o f 
Christ caused him to have his dream, but he certainly had k n o w n  
som ething about apocalyptic literature even before beginning h is 
theological studies, and he had seen the many images both in  
churches and on canvas depicting the end of the world. P h ilippe 
Aries has noted that beginning in the twelfth and continuing to th e  
sixteenth centuries, church walls and portals commonly in c lu d ed
The historian, J. H. Eliot, indicates that it was the disparity betw een th e  
d isappo in ting  reality  o f  Spain under Philip  III and the dream  of Spain d u r i n g  
the g ra n d u e r  o f the s ix te e n th -c e n tu ry  that "prom pted the b itte r satires o f  
Q uevedo" (316).
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representations of Christ's return (99 ff.). As the Middle Ages 
progressed, these works increasingly focused on aspects o f 
judgem ent and the punishm ent of the damned. Even during th e  
Renaissance, these images continued to appear in the paintings o f 
Van Eyck and Hieronymous Bosch. Bosch especially was popular in  
Spain. Philip II liked him because of "his obvious moralizing," a n d  
owned a num ber of his works (Kamen Philip 192).^ Quevedo re fe rs  
to Bosch comically in Alguacil. or rather the demon does, com plaining 
that he does not appreciate the manner in which artists tend to  
render his kind (Suenos I, 150-51), indicating that Quevedo had a t  
least some familiarity with the artist's works.
However, the iconographie tradition appears to have had only a 
very general influence on Quevedo, and it should not weigh h eav ily  
in the consideration and analysis of the Suenos. By the e a rly  
seventeenth century, ecclesiastical use of images showing ju d g em en t 
and damnation had diminished substantially  in favor of m ore  
positive images of resurrection (see Aries 106), and after the d e a th  
of Philip II, the works of Bosch became increasingly unpopular to th e  
point that he was considered by many in Spain to be a heretic (see  
Iffland 43, n. 27). Most commentators on the Suenos have a rg u ed  
against the notion of any direct influence by Bosch on Quevedo, an d  
rightly so. James Iffland has provided an overview of the critic ism  
on this matter as well as a summary of the few similarities and m an y  
differences between the creations of the two men. Perhaps the m ost 
significant of Iffland's comments addresses the different manner in
5 "By 1574 he [Philip] possessed th ir ty - th re e  p a in tings by H i e r o n y m u s  
Bosch" (G. Parker 46).
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which Bosch and Quevedo portray  m ankind in their respective Hells. 
In the paintings of the former, "Represented seems to be a generic  
Man, an abstraction, rather than d ifferentiated  individuals" (45). I n 
Quevedo, "It is not so much M an that is depicted as m en ,  and m e n  
who are shoem akers, doctors, law yers, poets, and all the rest w ho  
belong to his galena humana"  (46).^ In other words, it is the social 
aspect that differentiates Quevedo from Bosch as well as from th e  
medieval iconography. Rather than describe naked masses o f 
indistinguishable humans descending into the underw orld, Q uevedo 
focuses on characters, professions, types from his society. His Hell, 
then, serves as a m etaphor for the undesirable elem ents in his ow n  
society. To some degree, the Hell of the Suenos takes the place of th e  
im aginary kingdom normally expected in u top ian /dystop ian  sa tire . 
Just as M ores ideal Utopia does not contain any lawyers, Q uevedo’s 
naturally dystopian Hell does. In this manner, the otherw orldly a n d  
the dystopian become part of the same satirical scheme.
One passage in the Suenos. perhaps better than any o th e r, 
serves to indicate just how Quevedo utilizes the notion of Hell
^ "The in te re s tin g  th ing  to note is that desp ite  these f a n t a s t i c
d e fo rm a tio n s  found in Bosch's w orld , th e re  is re la tive ly  little d isto rtion  o r 
defo rm atio n  of the hum an figure itse lf. His Hell, for exam ple, is m a i n l y  
popula ted  by virtually  in d istin g u ish ab le  naked figures w ho vary  little even i n 
size. R ep resen ted  seems to be a g e n e ric  M an, an ab s trac tio n , ra ther t h a n  
d iffe re n tia te d  ind iv iduals. In Q uevedo, to the con trary , th e re  is much m o r e
d isto rtion  o f  the human figure, m uch m ore d istinction betw een physical ty p e s .  
Part o f his tendency  is rooted in the em p h asis  placed on the  d iffe ren t c la s s e s  
and p ro fess io n s  who are shown su ffe r in g  the tortures o f  Hell. It is not so
much M an that is depicted as m en ,  and  m en  who are shoem akers, d o c to rs ,
law yers, poets, and all the rest who b e lo n g  to his galena h u m a n a .  They a r e  
clo thed  in the garm ents w hich c h a ra c te r iz e  the ir group ra th e r  than b e i n g  
un ive rsa lly  and anonym ously  naked as  they  are in Bosch. One o f the o b v i o u s  
sources o f  th is crucial difference is Q uevedo 's  openly satiric  in ten t, one w h i c h  
seems to be all but absent in the dream -w orlds o f Bosch. Q uevedo needs to d e a l  
in specific types ra ther than in a b s tra c t hum anity , and hence the g r e a t  
co llection  o f  d istinctively  draw n fig u res  in the Suenos" (Iffland  45-46).
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m etaphorically  for the purposes of social criticism and satire. I t  
occurs in El sueno de la muerte as the dream er stands with a 
personified Death, observing a parade of characters pass in front o f  
them. At one point Death asks the dream er what he sees, and th e  
dreamer responds that he sees Hell:
Miro (respond!) al Infîemo con atençion, y me pareçe que le h e  
visto muchas veçes. Donde? (preguntô). Dônde? (dixe): en la
cudiçia de los Juezes, en el odio de los poderosos, en las len g u as  
de los m aldiçientes, en las malas intenciones, en las venganças, 
en el apetito de los lujuriosos, en la vanidad de los Prinçipes; y 
donde caue el infîem o todo entero, sin que se pierda gota, es e n  
la Hipocresia de los M oatreros de virtudes, que haçen logro d e l 
aiuno y del oîr Misas. fSuenos I, 224)
Quevedo defines Hell, here, as existing in the deeds of the w ick ed  
rather than as a place that exists to receive the wicked upon death.
The passage makes clear Quevedo's metaphorical use of Hell, 
but it may at first seem  like som ething of a departure from the f ir s t  
three Suenos that do portray Hell as a place with all of th e  
concom itant expectations of demons, pits, and the tortures of th e  
damned. However, one must always keep in mind that Q uevedo 
portrays a comic Hell whose rules and characteristics follow th e  
dictates of the author's satirical purpose first and foremost, b e fo re  
incorporating any o f the received tradition about the "true " nature o f  
the underworld.^ As discussed in Chapter Four, Quevedo believed in
^ Q uevedo ap p a re n tly  knew, m any w orks that did pretend to discuss t h e  
true natu re  o f dem ons and the underw orld . He m en tions in the pro logue to  
A lguacil the w ork by the B yzantine w rite r M ichael Psellus, De o p e r a t i o n e  
dem onium . but he d ism isses it as su p e rs titio n  ( S u e n o s  I, 145). Later i n 
A lguacil. the dem on rid icu le s  those who a rriv e  in Hell expecting  to f i n d
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divine judgem ent and an afterlife that would entail reward for th e  
just and punishm ent for the wicked. And he does indeed use his 
comic Hell to relate both moral and theological truths. None of th is 
should be taken to infer, however, that he ever believed he w as 
giving a true represen tation  of Hell as a place. The truth to w hich 
Quevedo makes claim  is a moral one; he does not claim to be an  
otherworldly cosmologist or cartographer. The elaborate structure of 
Dante's Inferno serves no purpose in Quevedo's Hell, which ev e n  
when described as a place, really only functions as a social m etaphor, 
an otherworld Quevedo has constructed and given a fam iliar nam e 
and features.
In addition to indicating something of the m etaphorical n a tu re  
of Hell in the Suenos. the dream er’s statem ent that he sees Hell also 
serves to encapsulate most of the moral concerns expressed by  
Quevedo in the satires. The dreamer mentions religious hypocrisy as 
the worst of the infernal behaviors. Hypocrisy in general b o th e re d  
Quevedo greatly and had been the principal subject of the p rev io u s 
dream, El mundo por de dentro. whose content addresses th e  
difficulty of discerning moral reality in a world of d ecep tiv e  
appearances (see Chapter Three). The dreamer also mentions aspec ts  
of personal morality that could be classified under the seven d ead ly  
sins. For example, "las venganças" would fall under Wrath, and "el 
apetito de los lujuriosos " would fall under Lust. Quevedo n e v e r  
forgets the broader questions of personal morality in the serm onizing  
of the Suenos. but he always focuses on some m atter that he c learly
R hadam anthus or some o the r figure from G reco-R om an m ythology (149 ). 
C learly, Quevedo w ishes to d istance  him self from  the rece ived  trad itions o n 
Hell in favor o f  the o therw orld  he has constructed fo r his satire.
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regards as related to the structure and function of his own society. 
When the dreamer says that he sees Hell in "la cudiçia de los Juezes" 
and in "la vanidad de los Prinçipes," he indicates two problem s fro m  
which Spanish society suffered throughout the reign of Philip I II :
inept and indifferent leadership coupled with the corruption o f
government officials. Quevedo could only refer to the king ob liquely , 
but he openly attacks bad ofAcials.
The second Sueno in particular deals with the corruption o f 
constables and other officers of the law. The demon of the d re a m  
mentions many different characters as inhabitants of Hell in h is  
general satire, but he focuses on the "alguacil" whom he h as  
possessed as well as others who have been charged with th e
adm inistration of justice. Quevedo had announced in the p ro logue 
"Al pio lector" that such a focus had been his intention: "Solo e
querido aduertirte en la prim era oja que este papel es solo v n a
rreprehension  de malos ministros de justiçia..." (146). The p ro logue 
to Infierno. addressed to the "endemoniado y infernal Lector," 
contains a similar statement: "...solo reprehendo los viçios, m u rm u ro
los descuydos y demasias de malos offîçiales" (160). Both d re a m s  
contain numerous comments on judges, constables, and o th e r  
ofHcials, but one passage from Alguacil sums up their general tone. 
The demon refers to "los jueçes que viueron mal en la tierra" (152), 
and the dream er responds, apparently  surprised, "Luego Jueçces ay  
algunos alia?" The demon explains the role played by c o rru p t 
officials in swelling the ranks of the damned:
Juezes son nuestros faysanes, nuestros platos regalados, y la  
simiente que mas prouecho y fruto nos da a los diablos; p o rq u e
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de cada Juez que sembramos cogemos seys Procuradores, dos 
Relatores, quatre Escriuanos, çinco Letrados y çinco m ill 
negoçiantes, y esto cada dia. De cada Escriuano cogemos v e y n te  
offiçiales; de cada offîçial, treynta Alguaçiles; de cada Alguaçil, 
diez Corchetes; y si el ano es fertil de trampas, no ay troxe en el 
ynffiem o donde recoger el ffruto de vn mal ministre. (152) 
From one bad minister, the judge, corruption multiplies ex p o n en tia lly  
dow nw ard on the scale of officials, Ailing Hell in the satire, b u t  
destroying any hope for justice in society when read through th e  
metaphor. Quevedo’s use of the word "reprehension" seem s
notew orthy with regard to his expressed intent to focus on official 
corruption. As already seen, he would years later use the v e rb a l 
form of the same word when describing the nature of More's U topia. 
which he did not see as the description of an ideal society but r a th e r  
as som ething More wrote in order to reprove, "reprender," th e
governm ent of England. Quevedo clearly preferred  to think of M ore 
and him self as having engaged in the same type of enterprise, th e  
difference being that More chose to write utopian satire, "fingir e l 
conveniente," while Quevedo had chosen the more direct d y s to p ian  
brand he adapted for the Suenos.
The exchange between the dreamer and the demon with re g a rd  
to bad offîcials hints at one of the peculiarities in Quevedo's sa tire  
that has caused considerable consternation am ong critics. In b o th  
Alguacil and In fie rn o . demons act as au thoritative m essengers o f  
truth, delivering sermons based on Christian and Stoic m oral
doctrines and generally serving as the m outhpiece of Quevedo th e
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author.*  The demon in Alguacil in particular, acts as Q uevedo’s 
satirical agent, giving voice to the author's expressed intention in th e  
prologue to chastise evil ministers of justice:
Quièn podrà negar que Demonios y Alguaçiles no tenemos v n  
mismo officio? pues bien mirado nosotros p ro cu ram o s
condenar, los Alguaçiles tanuien; nosotros, que aya uicios en el 
mundo y pecados, y los alguaçiles los dessean con mas aynco
porque ellos lo an m enester para su sustento, y nosotros p a ra  
nuestra compania. (147)
The demon compares the activities of constables to those of his ow n  
kind and declares them to be the same. Once again, Q uevedo
characterizes members of his society in terms of the infernal, to  
reveal the truth of their corruption, but he does so through th e  
agency of a demon, an evil and deceptive creature by deünition.
W hen Quevedo the dreamer hears these comments, he d e c la re s  
his am azement at the keen observances o f the demon, "A d m iraro n m e 
las sutilezas del diablo " (148), and he wants to hear more. D uring 
most of the conversation the dem on describes those who p o p u la te  
Hell, a satirical description of Quevedo's own society for the m o s t 
part. At the end of the discourse, the demon adds a statem ent ta k e n  
from Stoic doctrine regarding the passage of time and the p ro x im ity  
of death (see Chapter Four), which finally provokes the q u e s tio n
within the dream  as to how the father of lies can provide sermons o f 
such benefit. The demon explains that he has an evil purpose in  
speaking as he does, so that no one can say they have not b e e n
^ "Uno de los extranos in g re d ie n te s  de la sàtira de Quevedo, desde su s  
obras de juven tud . es la prédica por boca de personajes infames, y entre ellos e l  
d iablo  m ism o y sus servidores" (Lida 184).
1 19
forewarned: "...que no podays deçir que faltô quien os lo
aduirtiesse..." (154). Finally the demon adds a comment a b o u t 
repentance, an im portant subject for Quevedo and the Suehos as  
discussed in Chapter Four: "...que en vuestros ojos conozco m uchas
lagrimas de tristeça y pocas de arrepentimiento" (154).
The explanation given at the end of the dream is c lea rly  
inadequate to rectify the discrepancy between the demon's ev il 
nature and the beneOcial nature of his words. In the com parison  
with the constable, the demon states his purpose as seeking th e  
damnation of mankind: "procuramos condenar." And yet, his actions
work contrary to his goal. Rather than deceive his hearers into sin, 
he enlightens them  about sin and its punishm ent. The inconsistency  
lies not so much in the fact that the demon speaks the t r u th - - a f te r  
all, the Bible depicts Satan quoting sacred scripture during th e  
temptation of Christ in Matthew, Chapter 4--; it lies in the fact th a t  
Quevedo’s demon does not twist the truth to evil purposes, b u t
rather uses it to inspire virtue. There appears to exist a 
contradiction in the form ulation of the character, one of w hich  
Quevedo is aware and tries to dismiss with a rather h a lf-h e a r te d
explanation. However, the contradiction arises because Q uevedo
combines elem ents of the received tradition regarding the ev il 
nature of demons with the otherworldly scheme of his satires. In th e  
second dream, the dreamer does not go to the other world to o b se rv e  
the truth for himself; the demon, an agent of the otherworld, com es 
to this one so that the dream er may listen to revealed truth. I n
providing a beneficial sermon, the dem on's actions may co n trad ic t 
his nature, but they remain consistent with Quevedo's sa tirica l
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purpose and belong to a consistent pattern in the structure of th e  
w orks.
Quevedo refers to part of the pattern at the beginning of 
Infierno: "lo que en el Sueho del Juyçcio vi tantas cossas, y en el
Alguazil Endemoniado oy parte de los que no hauia visto..." (160). 
Quevedo draws a distinction as to the different m ethods of lea rn in g  
in the first two dreams. In Juicio. the dreamer had seen the truth; i n 
Alguacil. he had heard the truth as it was explained to him by a 
demon. Both dreams involve the notion of another world for th e  
revelation of truth, but the first one takes the dream er to that w orld  
while the second brings an agent of the otherw orld to this one. All 
five dreams follow the same basic pattern. In Infierno. the d re a m e r  
returns to the otherw orld in his travels through Hell. In Mundo. he 
rem ains in this world and must have the truth explained to him by  
Desengaho. In Muerte. he again leaves this world and travels to th e  
courts of Death. The dream s alternate, then, between f irs th a n d  
experience in the otherworld and explanations given in this world by  
otherw orldly agents, although it should be noted that in the th ird  
and fifth dreams, the dream er learns from both observation an d  
conversation. Quevedo's allusion to the initial form ation of th e  
pattern at the beginning of Infierno indicates his aw areness of th e  
structure he was creating. It also likely indicates that the final 
alternating pattern for all Ave dreams was a conscious act on h is 
p a rt.
However, one m atter that deserves some clarification an d  
com m ent is the suggestion that the character Desengaho acts as an  
agent of the otherworld. Certainly, he acts as an agent of truth; h is
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name alone indicates that. He also declares that such is indeed th e  
case when he presents himself to the young narrator who has lived a 
life caught up in the deceptions o f this world: "Mi hauito y traje diçe
que soy hombre de bien y amigo de dezir verdades, en lo roto y poco 
medrado, y lo peor que tu vida tiene es no hauerme visto la cara  
hasta aora" (197). Desengaho m entions his dedication to te lling  
"verdades," but his comment also indicates something of his dual 
nature, acting as both a literal and allegorical character. In th e
literal, he appears to be merely an old man whose wisdom an d
insight come as a result of his age and experience. However, w hen  
he says to the protagonist "lo peor que tu vida tiene es no h a u e rm e  
visto la cara hasta aora," he implies that he would have been able to 
impart the same wisdom at any point earlier in the young n a r ra to r 's  
life, thus giving a tim eless quality to his wisdom and indicating th e  
eternal and allegorical part of his nature. Desengaho's p a rtic ip a tio n  
in the eternal suggests an otherworldly origin, something to which he 
alludes in the next passage:
Yo soy el Desengaho; estos rasgones de la ropa son de los
tirones que dan de mi los que diçen en el mundo que m e
quieren; estos cardenales del rostro, estos golpes y coçes m e 
dan en llegando, porque vine y porque me baya; que en el 
mundo todos dezis que quereys Desengaho, y tiniendole, vnos 
os desesperays, otros maldezis a quien os le dio, y los m as 
Corteses no le creeys. (197-98)
Twice he uses the phrase "en el mundo," and describes the abuse an d  
ill treatment he receives from those "en el mundo." He also uses th e  
words "llegando " and "vine," suggesting that he came to this w orld
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from some other place. He does not say what other place exactly, b u t  
Quevedo provides the answer with a parallel passage that appears in  
A lguacil.
As part of the general commentary on bad ministers of ju stice , 
the demon of Alguacil relates an allegorical tale of the tre a tm e n t
given Truth and Justice by mankind when the two came to earth:
La Verdad y la Justiçia vinieron a la tierra; la vna no hallo
comodidad por desnuda, y la otra por rigurossa: an d u u ie ro n
mucho tiem po assi, asta que la Verdad de puro n eçesitad a  
assento con vn mudo. La Justiçia, desacomodada, anduuo por la 
tierra rogando a todos, y uiendo que no haçian casso de ella y 
que la hussurpauan su nonbre para honrar tiranias, d e te rm in e
de boluerse huyendo al çielo. (152)
Immediately apparent is the common experience shared b y
Desengaho with Truth and Justice of rejection and ill treatm ent b y  
the inhabitants of the world. This passage, however, states m ore
directly that Truth and Justice came to earth from some other place, 
that place being identified at the end of the passage as "el çielo." 
That Quevedo would give Heaven as the place of origin for th e se  
beneficial allegorical characters makes perfect sense, Hrst because o f 
the eternal and im m utable aspect of their natures, but also b ecau se  
he had described many allegorical characters within the ce lestia l 
panorama w itnessed in the first dream, Juicio (see Chapter Two). 
Desengaho, therefore, appears to act as an otherw orldly agent o f
celestial origin, especially in light of the fact that he can do w h a t
mortal man cannot: see "el mundo por de dentro," read men's h e a r ts
and know their hypocrisy rather than be deceived by o u tw a rd
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ap p ea ran ces .’ Desengano, in Mundo. plays essentially the same ro le 
as the demon in Alguacil. both being otherworldly agents w ho 
explain the truth to the protagonist since he may not observe it fo r 
himself in the two dreams set in this world.
Quevedo's construction of an otherworld that makes possib le  
the revelation of truth relies on the notion of inversion, the idea th a t  
a place exists where things are not as they are in the mundane w orld  
which seems to contain nothing but lies and false appearances. I n 
the Heaven and Hell of the Suehos. no deception is possible; 
everything stands revealed plainly for what it is. In order to h av e  
access to the truth and insight inherent in those eternal places, one 
must either go there or receive instruction from one who hails fro m  
there. Quevedo develops both possibilities ingeniously in the Suehos. 
However, the notion of inversion should also be recognized as one o f 
the primary characteristics o f utopian/dystopian satire.
Marina Leslie, with reference to the work of Darko Suvin, no tes 
how utopia makes use of the "ancient topos of mundus in v ersu s” (3). 
She then observes that the inversion occurs in both utopian an d  
dystopian texts, since both take a critical stance with respect to th e  
original world they satirize: "Even texts that divide much m ore
clearly between earnest utopian reform  and cynical dystopian sa tire  
not only share a critical posture with respect to the old world, b u t
^ D esengano 's ability to penetrate any form of hypocrisy  and d e c e p t i o n  
and explain  it to his pupil, the n a rra to r , para lle ls  a passage in In fie rn o  t h a t  
deals with religious hypocrisy. Q uevedo notes that mortal eyes that cannot s e e  
the hypocrites as they truly are, but before the eternal eyes o f God. they h a v e  
no masks: “Al fin alii conozi que van èstos arreuozados para nosotros, mas p a r a  
los ojos aetem os que hau iertos sobre todo Juzgan el secreto màs esqu ino  de los 
re tiram ien to s  del alma, no tienen  m ascara" (162). The sim ila rity  serves to  
fu rth e r suggest that D esengaho p a rtic ip a te s  in the eternal and the divine i n 
his ab ilities .
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also employ the same formal patterns, framing devices and th e m e s  
as well” (4). Once again, although there exist significant d iffe re n ce s  
between Q uevedo’s otherw orld and the utopian kingdom or is land , 
there also exist significant parallels such as this inversion th a t  
achieves the same satirical goal.
The them e of mundus in versu s  actually became one o f th e  
great themes of the Spanish Baroque, although in this context, th e  
theme is usually referred to as "the world upside down," o r in  
Spanish, "el m undo al rêvés." Curtius lists "the world upside dow n" 
as one of the im portant topoi  of the Middle Ages (94-98). José 
Antonio M aravall has observed that "The Spanish Baroque r e tr ie v e d  
the topos...," and he discusses it as one o f the elements of the B aroque 
world v ie w .’® Naturally, when one speaks of the world as b e in g  
upside down, the suggestion is that things are not what they sh o u ld  
be. For Quevedo, the problem frequently  manifests itself in  
mankind's unw illingness or inability to call things by their p ro p e r
"It is p ossib le  to assum e that the im age o f the world upside down w as  
the product o f a  m arg ina l cu lture  o f the d ispossessed , that is as a p o p u l a r  
counter-cu lture . T his is how M. B akhtin  has suggested  it should be c o n c e i v e d  
for the M iddle A ges and the R enaissance. I see it. ra th e r, above all when t h e  
topos acqu ires such  a force in the baroque, as a product o f the cu ltu re  o f  a 
changing society  in w hich the d isturbances th a t ce rta in  groups u n d erw en t i n
the ir position  and  fu n c tio n  created a fee ling  o f in stab ility , w hich t r a n s l a t e d  
into a view o f  a  s ta g g e rin g  disorder. C onsidered  in this way. it would be t h e  
result o f a c o n se rv a tiv e  o r-p e rh ap s  be tte r sa id - tra d itio n a l va lo riza tion . T h e r e  
is no doubt that the them e rev ea led -an d  th is Rousset has made ev iden t w i t h
respect to the F ren ch  b a ro q u e -a  feeling  o f in s ta b ility  and m utab ility . But i f  
with regard  to the assertion  that e v e ry th in g  changes, one judges t h a t
ev e ry th in g  in th e  w orld is found to be d is to rted , it is because an u n d e r l y i n g  
rational s truc tu re  ex ists  whose a lte ra tion  allow s for co n sid erin g  the e x i s t e n c e
of disorder: if one can speak o f the w orld upside  dow n it is because it can  b e
rig h t-sid e  up. Q uevedo 's satirica l Discursos  and  Suenos  played on the basis o f  
that structure" (M aravall C ulture 152).
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names, i.e., tell the tru th ." In Mundo. Desengano gives a speech o v e r  
the hypocritical and inappropriate use of names and titles (1 9 8 -9 9 ),
but a passage in Infierno. spoken by a demon, states the p ro b le m
more clearly:
Assi los honbres que todo lo entendeis al reues: vouo llamais al
que no es sediçiosso, aluorotador, m aldiziente; sauio, al m al 
acondizionado, pertu rbador y escandalosso; valiente al q u e  
perturba el sosiego; y couarde al que con bien co m p u esta s
costunbres, escondido a las occasiones, no da lugar a que le 
pierdan el respecto estos taies en quien ningun viçio tie n e  
lizençia. O pesia tal, dixe yo: Màs estimo hauer oydo e s te
diablo que quanto tengo! (171)
Again, the dreamer validates the teaching of a demon, one who s ta te s  
that man's understanding is the reverse of what it should be. In th is  
case, speech itself is the culprit, too often used to fabricate a world o f 
false appearances, an inverted  world where the "perturbador y 
escandalosso" receives the appellation of "sauio."
The comments of the demon dem onstrate Q uevedo's p rin c ip a l 
didactic method in the Suenos. which is to expose falsehood a n d  
hypocrisy, reprove vice, generally  "reprender el mal." Rather th a n  
portray the ideal society, rather than present how things should be, 
he merely suggests this by showing how things should not be. W hen  
he discusses the actions o f corrupt judges and constables, he does n o t 
bother to create a contrasting depiction of good and honest officials;
'  ^ See the essay by R. M. P rice. "Quevedo's Satire on the Use o f W ords i n 
the Suenos,"  which deals with " ...the moral nature o f Q uevedo 's sa tirica l a t t a c k s  
on the use o f  words w hich concea l the truth, on lies or m is lead in g  s t a t e m e n t s  
in words, phrases, and larger g roups, and on those who use such words " (170).
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he simply denounces the bad ones. The most significant instance in  
which he does create a contrast to reveal a utopian ideal occurs w h en  
he discusses the issue o f material wealth.
At the beginning of Infierno. the dream er describes two ro ad s  
stretching before him, one narrow and difHcult on which few p eo p le  
travel, the other broad and easy, crow ded with many people. He 
first describes the narrow road leading to Heaven:
Era de la mano derecha tan angosta que no a d m ite  
encareçim iento, y estaua (de la poca gente que por ella y u a )  
llena de abrojos, asperezas y malos passos: con todo, vi a lgunos
que trauajauan en passarla, pero con ir descalzos y d esn u d o s, 
se yuan dejando en el camino vnos el pellejo, otros los brazos o 
las cauezas, otros los pies, y todos yuan amarillos y flacos. 
(160).
Those on the road to Heaven travel naked, on bare feet, e x tre m e ly  
thin and pale. A few lines ahead, the dream er notes the lack o f 
horses and coaches on the road: "...es cossa de admirar que no h au ia
senal de rueda de coche...." In contrast, the road to Hell has m a n y  
horses and coaches, people wearing fine clothing and jewels:
Volvime a la mano izquierda, vi vn acom paham iento ta n  
reuerendo, tanto coche, tan ta carroza cargados de co m p eten z ias  
del Sol en humanas herm ossuras, y gran cantidad de galas y 
libreas, lindos cauallos, mucha gente de capa negra, m uchos 
Caualleros. [...] ...aqui todo era vayles, fiestas, juegos y saraos, y 
no el otro camino, que por falta de Sastres yuan en èl d e sn u d o s  
y rotos, y aqui nos sobrauan M ercaders, Joyeros y todos 
offizios. (161)
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Although Quevedo mentions parties and games, and the g en era lly  
frivolous nature o f those on the road to Hell as opposed to th e  
seriousness of those on the road to Heaven, the most s tr ik in g  
difference lies in the difference of material possessions. Those on th e  
road to Heaven have none, not even clothing. Quevedo sa tirica lly  
explains that all of the tailors travel on the road to Hell, making it  
impossible for anyone not on that road to have clothing. The passage  
nevertheless com municates the traditional message of c o n tem p tu s  
m undi .
Indeed, the demon in Alguacil goes so far as to declare that th e  
poor do not enter Hell, and claims to not even know what "poor" is 
when asked about it by the dreamer;
En todo esso estoy bien (le dixe); solo querria sauer si ay  
en el ynffierno muchos pobres. Que es pobres? (replicô). Es 
honbres que no tienen nada de quanto tiene el mundo. H ab lara  
yo para manana! (dixo el diablo): si lo que condena a los
honbres es lo que tienen del mundo, y èssos no tienen nada , 
como se an de condenar? (153)
Naturally, Quevedo would not suggest that the poor cannot sin a n d  
therefore cannot be damned. What he does here is to focus 
satirically on the corrupting power of worldly goods and suggest th a t  
the poor cannot be damned by what they do not have.
Quevedo characterizes money as one of the principle evils o f  
the world, and he addresses the subject repeatedly  in his sa tirica l 
poems and in the Suenos. His attitude was by no means unique w ith  
regard to the subject. Maravall in his analysis of the Quixote and th e  
"continuous utopian construction that runs through the entire novel"
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(Utopia and Counterutopia 186), notes disdain for money as one o f 
the im portant utopian themes o f C ervantes's m asterpiece, tracing th e  
subject as one o f the characteristics of Renaissance H um anism  fro m  
More's Utopia, through Vives's treatise De subventione p a u p e ru m . u p  
to the Baroque (37ff.). Quevedo seems to have had p a r t ic u la r ly  
strong feelings on the matter, possibly as a result of th e  
extravagance, outright waste, and corruption he observed in th e  
frequent parties and frivolous lifestyles of the m inisters a n d  
privados  o f Philip III. And yet, Quevedo's anger over the c o rru p tio n  
caused by m oney in his society does not extend to a notion o f social 
injustice perpetrated against the poor in these passages. He p o r tra y s  
poverty as the ideal state, a utopian goal, at least from the s ta n d p o in t 
of personal m orality; for the rich do not so much hurt the poor w ith  
their greed and extravagance as they hurt and damn them selves.
The discussion of those who do not enter and are not bound fo r 
Hell represents a digression for Quevedo. The purpose of satire is to  
reprove bad conduct, and Quevedo does so almost exclusively. T his 
not w ithstanding, the occasional hint at a utopian ideal, h o w e v e r  
unrealistic it may be in the real world, indicates that Q uevedo  
believed in the possibility of change. The cynicism he expresses fo r 
his society is not, for example, the com plete and utter despair la te r  
seen in some of the Romantic authors. Underlying Q uevedo 's 
dystopian denunciation, there exists a utopian optimism, h o w e v e r  
faint. O therwise, why include all the passages on the need fo r 
re p e n ta n c e ?
Quevedo may or may not have yet known More's Utopia w h en  
he began to write the Suenos in his mid twenties. His social c ritic ism
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nevertheless partic ipates in the Renaissance tradition begun b y 
More. According to Karl Mannheim, "An state of mind is u to p ia n  
when it is incongruous with the state o f reality within which i t  
occurs" (173). Q uevedo’s incongruity w ith his own state of re a lity  
leads him to create another one, another world from which he can  
make sense of this one. Of course, visionary access to another w o rld  
properly belongs to the dream -vision genre, but, as seen in p re v io u s  
chapters, Quevedo incorporates many traditions and ph ilo soph ies 
into the construction  of these works to achieve different p u rp o ses. 
The otherworld o f the dream-vision allows him  to show his society a s  
it is. The elem ents o f u topian/dystopian  satire allow him to su g g est 
how it should be. Both traditions come together to serve Q uevedo’s 
moral purpose.
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Chapter Six:
The Satirical Tradition, Politics, and the Suenos
Many of the them es and literary devices developed b y 
Quevedo in the Suenos have ample precedent in classical satire. For 
example, the inclusion of sceptical and Stoic doctrines in the Suenos 
may be modeled after Persius, whose satires are distinguished by  
their Cynic-Stoic content and whom Quevedo cites num erous times in  
his works. Two satirists in particular merit some extended com m ent 
as possible models for Quevedo, Lucian and Juvenal. Lucian seem s 
the most obvious influence of the two. His M enippean satires w ere  
widely read during the Renaissance, including his Dialogues of th e  
Dead which, set as they are in the underworld of Greek m yth , 
provide a clear precedent for the comic afterlife of the Suenos. A t 
first glance, there would appear to exist significant parallels b e tw een  
the works of Lucian and Quevedo, but the differences are m ore 
significant. In contrast, the satires of Juvenal seem to have little in  
common with those of Quevedo, set as they are in Rome rather th a n  
some otherworld, com posed as poetry rather than prose. And yet, 
Quevedo learned a great deal from the “poeta severo,” p a rtic u la r ly  
with regard to the political dimension of satire.
The works of Lucian were reintroduced to W estern Europe in 
1397 when the Byzantine scholar, Manuel Chrysolorus arrived in  
Florence at the invitation of that city’s governm ent to teach a
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seminar on ancient Greek (see Marsh 13). As an in tro d u c to ry  
grammar, Chrysolorus used a text he had prepared himself, but as a 
reader, he used the works of Lucian. The practice of using Lucian as 
a prim er continued throughout the Renaissance, and Quevedo w o u ld  
have become fam iliar with him as a student at Alcala. In addition to  
the simple eloquence of his Greek, Lucian was also adm ired for th e  
moral content of his texts as well as their form. Thomas M ore 
translated several of Lucian’s works, and a num ber of h u m a n is ts  
produced satirical dialogues in im itation of Lucian, in c lu d in g  
Erasmus, who published his Charon in 1523. In Spain, Alfonso d e  
Valdes published his Dialogo de Mercurio y Caron (1528), in which h e  
explicitly acknow ledges the influence of Lucian and Erasmus: “Si la
inuencion y doctrina es buena, dénse las gratias a Luçiano, Pontano y 
Erasmo cuyas obras en esto hauemos ymitado . (71).  C onsidering  
the wide diffusion of Lucian’s texts, his popularity, and the fame o f
some of his im itators, his possible influence on Quevedo seems a
legitimate line o f inquiry.
The apparent sim ilarities between Lucian and Quevedo h a v e  
attracted the attention of numerous critics. The most ex te n s iv e  
comments appear in an essay by M argarita Morreale e n t i t le d  
“Luciano y Quevedo: La humanidad condenada.’’ Rather than ad d u c e
any direct influence, her analysis consists chiefly of a g e n e ra l 
comparison and contrast of themes. She acknowledges as much in  
her introduction:
[Quevedo es] demasiado original en el sello creador de su
espiritu, para que nos acerquemos a el en busca de “fu en tes . ”
Nuestra intencion no es tampoco la de exam inar su arriago e n
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la tradiciôn clâsica, y ni siquiera la de définir su relaciôn con el 
corpus lucianesco. Preferim os la tarea mucho mas humilde de  
escoger algunas temas de entre los preferidos de Luciano y 
buscar el eco que bay an podido tener en los Suenos. (214) 
N otw ithstanding this disclaim er, the possibility that Quevedo m ay  
have been influenced by Lucian runs throughout the essay as an  
im plied suggestion. For example, M orreale sees Quevedo's hostile  
attitude toward philosophers as sim ilar to that of Lucian: "[Quevedo]
com parte con el sam osatense cierto desprecio por la dialéctica y u n a  
actitud utilitaria y moralfstica... " (214). However, as seen in C hap ter 
Three, Quevedo's dislike for dialectic and natural philosophy d e riv e s  
from the influence of the Academic Sceptics as filtered through th e  
fideistic views of Lactantius. The sim ilarity with Lucian seems m ore 
coincidental than anything else. M orreale even mentions th a t 
Quevedo does not partic ipate in Lucian's attacks on Stoicism, 
indicating that their satires on philosophers are not as sim ilar as th e y  
would at Hrst seem. This does not mean that there could not h av e  
been any influence; Quevedo knew Lucian's works and M orreale
points out some intriguing parallels, but its is unlikely that Q uevedo 
modeled the Suenos on the Dialogues of the D ead for one reason: 
Quevedo detested Lucian as an impious man and an enemy to
C hristian ity .
Quevedo's attitude tow ard Lucian probably derives from
Lactantius, who characterizes Lucian's satire as irreveren t in th a t 
they "spared neither the men nor the gods " The judgem ent o f
1 "In his D ivine In s titu tio n s  1.9.8, L actan tius, the  C h ris tian  C icero ,
condem ned  Lucian in a  p h rase  that was to resonate  w ith nearly  S c r i p t u r a l
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Lactantius was widely known in the Renaissance, and by the 1 4 4 0 ’s 
had "placed the name of Lucian in a context of su sp ic ious 
heterodoxy" (M arsh 7), Admirers of Lucian, such as Erasmus, w e re  
denounced as atheists simply by association.* The attacks on  
Erasmus initially came from Protestant Reformers, but E rasm u s 
increasingly fell into disfavor with Roman Catholics, as did Lucian, 
especially in Spain. During the Counter-Reform ation, it seem s 
somewhat ironic that Quevedo utilizes the name of Lucian to  
denounce the Reformers, referring in the Providencia de Dios to John 
Calvin: "Calvino, cuyo nombre es anagram a de Luciano, s ien d o
abominable hereje" (Obras I, 1546). Earlier in the same w ork , 
Quevedo had referred to Lucian as an atheist, giving a p a ra p h ra s e d  
translation o f Lactantius: "Crece este numéro [de ateistas] Luciano,
cuya em inencia fué reirse y escarnecer de un Dios y de alguno y d e  
todos, enemigo jurado de cristianos" (1543). In addition to re p e a tin g  
Lactantius’s evaluation of irreverence toward God and everyone else, 
Quevedo does two things: first, he places Lucian's name among a lis t
of atheists, and second, he adds his own denunciation of Lucian as an  
enemy of Christians. It is precisely the distinction between p ag a n  
and Christian that separates the Suenos from Lucian's satires.
When com pared to the works of Lucian, or those o f h is  
imitators like Erasmus and Alfonso de Valdés, Quevedo's Suenos a re  
conspicuous for their avoidance of setting and characters taken fro m
au thority  d u rin g  the R enaissance, Lucianus. qui neque dlls pepercit n e q u e  
hominibus..."  (M arsh  6).
-  "The fe rv e n t R eform ers likew ise adopted Lucian 's name as a
catchw ord fo r heterodoxy and disbelief. Thus, in a 1526 letter addressed to t h e  
elector John o f  Saxony, Erasmus com plains that L uther has branded him  a n 
atheistic L ucian  " (M arsh 7).
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Greek myth. Rather than continue the incongruous s ix teen th  cen tu ry  
practice of presenting Hermes and Charon involved in discussions o f 
contem porary politics and religion, and even having pagan gods c ite  
the words of Christ from the Gospels, as in the Dialogo de M ercurio  
and Caron. Quevedo rejected Classical mythology for his early sa tire s  
in favor of models taken from the Christian afterlife and m ed iev a l 
allegory. Considering the religious fervor of the C ounter- 
Reformation, and Quevedo's own zealousness as a defender of Rom an 
Catholicism, it is not surprising that he would choose to separate h is 
works from those of Lucian and his tradition, in spite of the fact th a t  
the tradition provided him with the otherworldly model he wished to  
employ in his satires.
Although Quevedo's dislike for Lucian remained strong, h e  
appears to have later regretted having placed his satires in th e  
Christian afterlife rather than that of myth. The evolution of h is  
thought on the m atter can be seen even in the different se ttin g s  
utilized in the Suenos. Quevedo wrote the first three satires as a 
group from 1605-1608. Only these three involve settings d irec tly  
related to Heaven and Hell, divine judgem ent and demons. The la s t 
two Suenos. written in 1612 and 1621, utilize allegorical ch a rac te rs  
and settings. As seen in the discussion of the previous chapters, th e  
satirical and philosophical tone and content of the five works is 
relatively consistent, but the difference in setting is significant. 
Between the time of the composition of the third and fourth Suenos. 
in 1610, Quevedo attem pted to publish at least El sueno del Juicio 
final, perhaps all of the fîrst three. While he did eventually obtain a 
license,-w hich he did not use at that tim e—the first censor to w hom
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the work was submitted criticized the work harshly, calling i t  
“chabacano e im p ru d en te .”  ^ Q uevedo’s decision to turn the L ast 
Judgem ent into a satirical scene of comedy exposed him  to th e  
accusation o f irreverence for divine m atters. The sim ilarity with th e  
traditional accusation against Lucian could not have escaped h im . 
Criticism from the Church may, then, account for the transition to th e  
allegorical. Even more significant than this transition, is the fact th a t  
Quevedo later embraced the Classical mythology he had earlier gone 
out of his way to avoid. When he published the second edition of th e  
Suenos in 1631, he made num erous changes in order to paganize th e  
first three texts, changing, for exam ple, the title of El sueno del Juicio 
fijxal to El sueno de las calaveras. El alguacil endem o n iad o  becam e B  
alguacil alguaciliado. and most significantly, El sueno del In f ie rn o  
became Las zahurdas de Pluton. The changes came about a p p a re n tly  
as the result of the criticism provoked by the first edition. In sp ite  
of this, Q uevedo’s desire, at least early in his career, to s e p a ra te  
him self from Lucian and the model o f Menippean satire seems clear.
In contrast with Quevedo's dislike o f Lucian, he held Juvenal in 
high esteem. In the Providencia de Dios, he refers to Ju v e n a l's  
teaching on poverty as worthy of a Christian: ";Oh palabras a le n ta d a s
con esfuerzo generoso! jLastima es que mereciendo oidos catolicos, 
no fuesedes pronunciadas por lengua cristiana!” (Obras I, 1610). He
 ^ “ [Quevedo] quiso dar a la im p ren ta  El Sueno del Juicio  Final, y s o l ic i tô  
la licencia correspondiente del C onsejo  de C astilla . Encom endada la c e n su ra  a l  
padre m aestro fray  Antonio M ontojo, de  la O rden de P redicadores, este c o n t e s t é  
el p rim ero  de Julio  de 1610, que, ex am in an d o  con atenciôn el lib ro , d e b î a  
negarse  al au to r la licencia para im p rim irle . La censura del padre M o n to jo , 
por la cual vem os que don F rancisco era  ‘se rv id o r del rey,’ hallaba el estilo  d e  
la obra c h ab a can o  e im p ru d en te ,’ sin o tras graves ap rec iac io n es” ( A s t r a n a  
181-82).
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had earlier cited Juvenal as an au thoritative "maestro" on th e  
question of the existence and divine nature o f the soul (1558). In La 
constancia y paciencia de Santo Job, he even describes Juvenal as 
knowledgeable about ancient Hebrew scripture and custom; "Este 
poeta tuvo mas noticia de los rites de los judios que otro alguno d e  
los latinos..." (1483). Quevedo's attitude toward Juvenal resem bles 
that which he had tow ard Seneca. He adm its that both men w ere  
pagan, but he sees so many parallels betw een their teachings an d  
those found in the Bible that he confidently asserts that they e i th e r  
had knowledge of the Scriptures or contact with Jews and Christians, 
or both.^ Quevedo learned a great many things from Juvenal, as h e  
did from Seneca, but the most important subject seems to have b e e n  
the political nature of poverty.
In the Defen sa de Epicuro. Quevedo declares his admiration a n d  
affinity for Juvenal with the possessive "mi," ju st as he does so m an y  
times with Seneca: "Mi Juvenal, que a mi juicio escribio la politica e n
versos con nombre de sâtiras..." (Obras I, 1095). A passage from La 
virtud militante indicates more clearly what Quevedo means w h en  
he refers to Juvenal's satires as political. He translates a passage 
from Satire VI, adding his own comments:
Para nuestra confusion traeré unos versos de Juvenal e n 
recom endacion de la pobreza, que son estos (sat. 6): "La
fortuna hum ilde en otros tiempos producfa castas m atronas
Although Q uevedo may engage som ew hat in h y p e rb o le  with regard to  
Juvenal's  know ledge o f  Judaism , his assessm ent is not en tire ly  w ithout m e r i t .  
Juvenal refers to Jews d irec tly  in a couple o f the S atires, describ ing  them a s  
one would from  first-hand  observation. However, his descrip tion  o f the Je w e ss  
in Sat. VI, for exam ple, p resen ts  a p icture more akin to  gypsy f o r t u n e  t e l l i n g  
than  anything b ib lic a l.
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latinas. Malos y humildes y pequenos techos consentfan el 
trabajo que llegasen los vicios el breve sueno, y con la lana 
tosca las manos duras y fatigadas, y cerca de la ciudad A nibal, 
y de guam iciôn los maridos en la torre Colina. A gora 
padecemos largam ente los danos de la paz; màs cruel que las 
armas nos acometiô la lujuria, y vengé el mundo vencido. 
Nîngün delito ni maldad de la desorden falta desde que pereciô  
la pobreza romana." ;Oh grandes y prudentes p a lab ras , 
acreditadas, no solo con la ruina de Roma, sino también de o tra s  
monarqufas! ;Sumo misterio politico! En pereciendo la p o b reza  
romana, pereciô su virtud; y esto porque con ella acabô la 
humildad, y con las riquezas empezô sus tragedias la soberb ia . 
(Qbras I, 1406)"
Quevedo considers this teaching on poverty som ething of a 
paradoxical mystery, because of the proposition that a civ ilization 's 
success and prosperity could result in its downfall, but he also 
considers it a political truth, associating poverty with virtue an d
^ Quevedo w ould later use this same passage again in the P rov idencia  d e  
Dios, p rov id ing  a  new tran s la tio n  and this time focusing  his com m en tary  o n 
Juvenal's o the r po in t regard ing  the insid ious and d eb ilita tin g  n a tu re  o f p e a c e  
on a civilization:
La fortuna humilde hacfa castas a las rom anas an tig u am e n te , y e l  
trabajo cerraba en las cabanas el paso a los vicios; el sueno  breve, y la s  
manos àsperas y duras con los vellones de Toscana, y arrim ado  a la  
ciudad A nibal, y asistiendo  a su defensa  los m aridos en la torre C o lina . 
A hora padecem os la rg am en te  los malos de la paz: màs crue les  que la s
arm as, se ap o dera ron  de Roma las delicias; y dan v enganza  della a l  
mundo, que e lla  venciô. N ingun crim en ni maldad de la c o n c u p i s c e n c i a  
falta desde que pereciô  la pobreza Humana." Hacen au tén tico  este g r i t o  
los sucesos todos de las edades que ha vivido el m undo; y no hay q u e  
te mer que en lo p o rv en ir p ierda la fuerza de sen ten c ia  d e f i n i t i v a ,  
e jecu to riada  en Juicio c o n tra d ic to rio  con tantas rep û b licas , reinos y 
m onarqufas. La paz hace soldados contra si mismos a los que se f i a n  
délia: olvfdalos de que son hom bres y acuerda a los enem igos de que y a
no lo son. (1610)
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humility, wealth with vice and pride. He applies this truth not just to  
Rome but also to other monarchies and civilizations, including h is  
own. Therefore, the description of the poor on the road to Heaven a t  
the beginning of El sueno de Infierno not only evokes the C h ris tian  
concept of contemptus m u n d i  and personal morality, but it h a s  
broader political implications as well that help to further suggest th e  
utopian ideal underlying the cynical denunciations o f the Suenos.
Gilbert Highet, in The Anatomy o f Satire, refers to th e  
"underlying idealism  of satire" (151), w ithout which it would m e re ly  
be invective and lampoon (151-52). The passage above, tr a n s la te d  
by Quevedo, indicates something of the ideal underlying Ju v e n a l s 
satires. He mentions the humble homes and hands hardened f ro m  
working with Tuscan wool, suggesting a rural, pastoral life. H e 
mentions the approach of Hannibal that kept men vigilant, su g g estin g  
an idealized past during the period of the Roman Republic. T h e  
setting and target of Juvenal's satire is the city,® the imperial city o f  
Rome contem poraneous to the author; the contrasting ideal exists in  
the rural p a s t.’ The surroundings, then, the environm ent in w h ich  
one lives and works have at least as much to do with instilling v i r tu e  
as does inner strength of character or adherence to moral p h ilo so p h y  
such as that taught by the Stoics. Relating virtue to socia l
^ "It is in the city that the satirist finds the m aterial which he wishes t o
attack, and there  can be no doubt about the h istorical reality of J u v e n a l ' s
picture of the actual Urbs, with its fires, traffic, tow ering  a p a r t m e n t  b l o c k s ,  
and of many features o f  Roman life, the hum ilia t ions  o f  clients, the a r r o g a n c e  
o f  the nouveaux riches, the nobles and women fighting in the a m p h i t h e a t r e . . . ” 
(Courtney 19).
’  "It is natura l that if vice is associated with the im perial city, v i r t u e
should be linked with the republican country..."  (Courtney 19).
139
environm ent necessarily relates virtue to politics, a concept Q uevedo 
understood well.
The moral and political ideal presented by Juvenal in som e 
ways recalls the myth o f the Golden Age when men lived v irtuously , 
in harm ony with nature and the gods. The myth is probably b e s t 
known from Ovid's descrip tion  in the M etam orphosis, but Juvenal 
also describes it at the beginning of Satire VI;
In the days of Saturn, I believe. Chastity still lingered on  
the earth, and was to be seen for a tim e—days when men w ere  
poorly housed in chilly caves, which under one common sh e lte r  
enclosed hearth and household gods, herds and their ow ners; 
when the hill-bred wife spread her silvan bed with leaves an d  
straw and the skins o f her neighbours the wild beasts—a w ife 
not like thee, O Cynthia, nor to thee Lesbia, whose bright eyes 
were clouded by a sparrow 's death, but one whose breasts gave 
suck to lusty babes, often more unkem pt herself than h e r  
acorn-belching husband. For in those days, when the w orld  
was young, and the skies were new, men bom  of riven oak, o r  
formed of dust, lived differently from now, and had no p a ren ts  
of their own. Under Jupiter, perchance, some few traces o f 
ancient modesty may have survived; but that was before he 
had grown his beard, before the Greeks had learned to sw ear 
by someone else's head, when men feared not thieves for th e ir  
cabbages or fruits, and lived with unwalled gardens. After th a t  
Astraea withdrew by degrees to heaven, w ith Chastity as h e r  
comrade, the two sisters taking flight together. (VI. 1-20)
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The flight o f  Chastity from the earth as described by Juvenal in som e 
way resembles the tale told by the demon in El alguacil en d em o n iad o  
about Truth and Justice. Such virtues appear to be gone from th e  
world of men forever, belonging to a bygone age. However, Ju v en al 
does indicate, in the passage translated by Quevedo, that th e  
situation under which virtue had once thrived could be recreated in 
his own time by returning to the simpler, humbler lives, not of th e  
mythical golden age, but of their very real, albeit idealized, an cesto rs  
during the Republic.
Although idealized presentations of rural life appear in m an y  
eclogues and pastoral works in Antiquity and the R enaissance, 
Juvenal presents that life not simply as the poetic notion of bea tu s  
ille, but as the underlying ideal of his satire, as a serious political a n d  
moral statem ent. Such ideas have not been uncommon th ro u g h o u t 
the centuries. In the Spanish Renaissance, Antonio de G uevara 
published his book Menosprecio de corte v alabanza de aldea (1 5 3 9 ) 
in which he confidently and very seriously states that men who live 
in villages are more virtuous than those who live at court: "Es
privilegio de aldea que allf sean los hombres mas virtuosos y me nos 
viciosos, lo qual no es assi por cierto en la corte y en las g ran d es  
repûblicas, à do ay mil que os estorben el bien y cien mil que os 
inciten al mal" (135). However, this popular dichotomy between th e  
virtuous village and the vice-ridden city cannot easily be seen in  
Quevedo's satires. While his denunciations do focus on life in th e  
city, and he does not attack rural characters such as shepherds an d  
farmers, neither does he, like Juvenal, include passages in which h e  
openly extols the virtues of rural life. Not surprisingly, there ex ists
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some question as to whether Quevedo's satires contain an u n d erly in g  
ideal at all.
In contrast with the argum ent presented in the last chap ter, 
that Quevedo's dystopian denunciations contain the u top ian  
suggestion o f reform, M orreale, in her com parision of Lucian an d  
Quevedo, denies the possibility o f seeing any such message of reform: 
Ni uno ni otro autor cobijaron ideas de reform a, Luciano p o r 
dem asiado cmico e indiferente, Quevedo por dem asiado
pesim ista. Por esto se diferencia—en los Suenos—de los 
erasmistas que, aun levantando el latigo de la satira lucianesca, 
sabian sonar con un cristianism o utopico. Los Suenos. en
cambio, no nos dejan ningun resquicio de esperanza y parecen  
excluir la posibilidad de un reino de Dios sobre la tierra. (224) 
M orreale places em phasis on Quevedo's pessimism, an d  
understandably  so, since she focuses her study on the Suenos to th e  
exclusion of his other works. Quevedo's idealism, like Juvenal's, can 
best be identified in political statem ents, but Quevedo put few of 
those into his satires, preferring to write separate political works.^
One of those works in particular provides inform ation helpful to th e  
explication o f the Suenos, Espana defendida.
Quevedo wrote Espana defendida in 1609, not long after he had  
finished the third Sueho. The work provides im portant insight in to  
his C ounter-Reform ation views, because in it, he positions Spain 
against the rest of the world morally and culturally, having been
^ B. Sânchez Alonso, in his essay, "Los satiricos latinos y la satira de  
Quevedo," has also noted the d isc rep a n cy  between the political con ten t in t h e  
satire o f  Juvenal and that of Quevedo. as for example when he observes, “ No 
siguio Quevedo el ejemplo de Juvenal,  que en pleno reinado de Trajano, d i r i g i a  
sus dardos contra Domiciano y sus ministros" (143).
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aroused to this defense of his hom eland by the slander of fo re ig n e rs . 
He mentions some specific attacks that have aroused his patrio tic ire, 
including that of Joseph Scaliger who referred to Quintilian, Lucan, 
and Seneca as "Pingues isti cordubenses" (Obras I, 550), and that of 
Jeronimo Bezon, who wrote a work about the New World in which he  
perpetuated the Black Legend of Spain, but he sees these attacks as 
part of a pervasive European hatred of everything Spanish a n d
accordingly gives a general response, portraying Spain as a land o f 
great leaders and men o f good customs.
In order to argue the moral superiority  of Spaniards, Q uevedo  
develops the thesis that the custom s of Spain's inhabitants derive in 
large part from the country's tem perate climate:
Como sea verdad asegurada por los filosofos que de la
buena o mala tem planza de los humores resu ltan  las
com plexiones en los cuerpos, y de ellas las costum bres; las 
cuales aunque suele corregir la razon, por la mayor p a r te  
m uestran, o en las obras o en la intencion, im periosam ente su  
malicia, es sin duda que Espana, teniendo tierra tem plada y 
cielo sereno, causara sem ejantes efetos en hum ores y 
condiciones; como se ve, pues ni la frialdad nos hace flem â tico s  
y perezosos como a los alem anes, ni el mucho calor in u tile s  
para el trabajo como a los negros y a los indios; pues, te m p la d a
la una calidad con la otra, produce bien castigadas c o s tu m b re s .
(Obras I, 585)
Quevedo's comments, on one level, are full of sad irony. He c o m p a re s  
Spaniards to other races and nationalities, terming Germans lazy a n d  
Indians and blacks useless when it comes to work, when he k n ew
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very well that Spain suffered from a blight of arrogant nobles a n d  
hidalgos who considered work beneath them. However, his p u rp o se  
is to put Spain in a positive light here, and one can expect h y p e rb o le  
in this context, ju s t as in many of the grotesque exaggerations of h is  
satires. At the end of his general comments on the subject, Q uevedo 
reaffîrms his thesis: "As: que concluimos que las costum bres p ro p ias
y primeras de Espana fueron en todo hijas de la tem planza de su  
cielo y de la naturaleza del lugar, y por eso modestas, moderadas y 
segün justa ley y disciplina" (586). So, Quevedo does accept th e  
notion that "naturaleza del lugar" to a considerable d eg ree  
determ ines the moral character and customs of a people. What h e  
does not do is present that place as simply a village or rural se tting , 
rather the ideal moral environment is all o f  Spain.
The ideal depiction in Espana defendida would appear to be  
completely at odds with the contents of the Suenos. After all, th e  
people satirized and condem ned to Hell in the Suenos belong to  
Quevedos own society, his own country. How can the ideal m oral 
environm ent be full of vice, corruption, and sin? For Quevedo, th e  
answer is simple: Spain has been corrupted by contact with o th e r
nations.*
""^Quién nos llam a barbaros? ^Quién nos dice que somos locos 
ignorantes y soberbios, no teniendo nosotros vicio que no le 
debamos a su com unicaciôn de ellos? Supieran en Espana q u e
^ "Quevedo conocia ,  sin duda, las razones per las que les espanoles n o 
eran bien vistos mds allà de les Pirineos, pero su nac iona lism o  no le p e r m i t i a  
refle jar ù n icam en te  la actitud ex tran je ra ,  sino que ten fa que c o n t r a a t a c a r ,  
descubriendo  los flancos débiles del enem igo, hac iendo  ver asf cômo n u e s t r o s  
vicios eran debidos a la in f lu en c ia  exterior. Para re fo rza r  m is  su p o s ic iô n
enumera algunos, inc luyendo  las herejfas, que habfan con tam inado  la p r i s t i n a  
pureza espanola: la homosexualidad, el alcoholismo, etc." (Roncero Lôpez 83).
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ley habfa para el que, lascivo, ofendfa las ley es de la 
Naturaleza, si Italia no se le hubiera ensenado?" (550).
Quevedo's attribution of hom osexuality in Spain to contact w ith  
Italians may help to explain an enigmatic passage in the Suenos in 
which the demon of Alguacil com ments that demons wish nothing to 
do with Italians and will not accept them; "Days al diablo v n 
Ytaliano, y no le toma el diablo, porque ay ytaliano que tomarà al 
diablo. Y aduertid que las màs veçes days al diablo lo que èl se tiene, 
digo, nos tenemos " (151). The passage does not specify what m akes 
Italians so repugnant even to demons, serving rather as a genera l 
denunciation of that nation’s people. However, Quevedo wrote th e  
com ment in Espana defendida just two years after that of Alguacil. 
and he very likely had in mind the same offense for both passages, a 
sin that he characterizes as one not even the demons of Hell will 
condone, hom osexuality.
The subject of hom osexuality appears explicitly in the Suenos. 
in a passage in El sueno del Infierno. There, Italians are not
mentioned, but there is a sim ilarity in that the demons in Hell
declare that they want nothing to do with "putos: " "...no so lam en te
no sauemos de ellos, pero no querriam os que ellos supiessen de 
nosotros, que en ellos peligrarian nuestros traseros; y los diablos po r
esso tenemos colas, porque como estàn acà los putos, hauem os
m enester moqueador de rauos" (Suenos I, 174). The exp lanation , 
that demons have tails for the sole purpose of protecting them from  
homosexuals, is amusing, but Quevedo took very seriously what he 
would describe as offenses to Nature, and mentions the subject again
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toward the end of Esoana defendida to indicate what a problem  it 
had become in Spain;
Y lo que màs es de sentir es de la manera que los hombres las 
i mi tan [a las mujeres] en las galas y lo afeminado, pues es d e  
suerte, que no es un hombre ahora màs apetecible a una m u je r  
que una mujer a otro. Y esto de suerte, que las galas en  
algunos parecen arrepentim iento de haber nacido hombres, y 
otros pretenden ensehar a la Naturaleza cômo sepa hacer de un  
hom bre mujer.
Al fin hace dudoso el sexo, lo cual ha dado ocasiôn a 
nuevas premàticas, por haber introducido vicios desconocidos 
de naturaleza. (588)
Ail of this he would attribute to the taint of foreign contact.
Q uevedos apparent xenophobia is characteristic of th e  
isolationism  that became offîcial policy during the latter s ix tee n th  
century. Almost fifty years before the composition of the first Sueno. 
Spain, which had been "wide open to European h u m an istic  
influences," began to transform itself into "the semi-closed Spain o f 
the Counter-Reformation" (Elliot 221). A number of steps were ta k e n  
to protect the nation from the "foreign contagion," beginning in 155 8 
with a pragm atic forbidding the import of foreign books a n d  
requiring that books printed in Spain should be licensed by th e  
Council of Castile. The following year another pragmatic fo rb ad e  
Spanish students from going abroad to study (see Elliot 222). A fte r  
the decrees that came out of the Council of Trent in 1564, th e  
Inquisition increasingly played a role in the enforcement of such  
legislation. Henry Kamen has observed, that "a good part of th e
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Inquisition's zeal for religion was little more than active xenophobia" 
(Inquisition 276). However, he has also observed that the reach an d  
effectiveness of the Inquisition has often been exaggerated. M any 
Spaniards simply ignored the restrictions on publishing and trave l, 
taking advantage o f the many loopholes in the laws (see In q u is itio n  
103 ff.). The possibility that Spain might truly manage to isolate 
itself never really existed, but it did exist as a political ideal, one 
which Quevedo endorsed.
The political and religious climate in Spain in the decades ju s t  
before Q uevedos birth does not provide the only precedent for th e  
isolationism  expressed in Espana defendida: Juvenal ex p resses
sim ilar sentim ents in Satire VI with regard to the decadence o f 
Rome: "Filthy lucre first brought in amongst us foreign ways; w ea lth
enervated and corrupted the ages with foul indulgences" (107). Once 
again, Juvenal draws attention to the corrupting power of money, th e  
contrasting ideal having been explicitly stated as the humble life an d  
the blessings of poverty. It is im portant to note, however, th a t 
wealth is but one o f the culprits responsible for the moral decline o f 
Rome, the other being peace. In the passage translated by Quevedo, 
Juvenal had said, "...padecemos largam ente los danos de la paz," and  
had m entioned the conflict with Hannibal, or more generally th e  
state of war, as the contrasting ideal. Quevedo makes the sam e 
observation in Espana defendida without reference to Juvenal:
M ientras tuvo Roma a quien tem er y enemigos, ;que 
diferentes costum bres tuvo! jComo se ejercito en las arm as!
iQué pechos tan valerosos ostento al m undo! Mas luego que
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honraron sus deseos perezosos al ocio bestial con nom bre d e
paz santa, ;que vicio no se apoderô de ella! (585)
Quevedo saw clear parallels between the rise and fall of Rome a n d  
that of his own country. He considers times of war to be times o f 
moral greatness, and times of peace to be times of decadence.
Spain at the beginning of the seven teen th -cen tu ry  had m a d e  
peace with many o f its enemies, but at great cost. J. H. Elliot refers to  
the "heroic im perialism " of Charles V in the previous century, a n d
the "hum iliating pacifism of Philip III" (244). Quevedo felt th a t
hum iliation keenly, and lamented the peace of his day, hoping i t  
would m erely be a pause in Spain's sacred duty to continue its  
struggle against the Turks and all other heretics:
...y asf, en esta época de paz que alcanzamos en parte m aliciosa, 
el largo hàbito a las santas costumbres de la guerra las s u s te n ta  
en ellas, aunque a mi opinion Espaha nunca goza de paz: solo
descansa, como ahora, del peso de las armas, para tornar a e llas  
con m ayor fuerza y nuevo aliento. Y son a todos, como a e lla  
im portantes las armas suyas; pues, a no haberlas, corriera s in  
limites la soberbia de los turcos y la insolencia de los herejes.... 
(5 8 5 -8 6 )
Quevedo rhetorically  states that Spain will return to its arms w ith  
renewed vigor, not in the surety, but in the hope that it will, 
suggesting that it do so as a necessary part of its national identity  as 
defender o f the true faith.
The Suenos only contain a brief, but signiOcant, hint a t 
Quevedo s idealization of war as necessary for the moral structure o f 
the society. It appears in Infiem o. in the description of the tw o
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roads of life: "No faltaron . en el camino Eclesiasticos, m uchos
Theologos vi, y algunos Soldados^ pero pocos, que por la otra senda a
fuerza de absoluziones y gracias yuan en yleras o rd en ad as  
honrossamente, triunphando de su sangre" (163). The first ro a d  
mentioned is the road to Hell, which in contrast with the m a n y  
theologians on it, contains very few soldiers. The vast majority o f 
the soldiers march along the road to Heaven in orderly ran k s , 
triumphant in having shed their own blood, presum ably in ju s t
causes. Quevedo m entions the "absoluziones y gracias" that make it  
possible for the soldiers to be on the road to Heaven, ind icating  
perhaps his acknow ledgem ent of what he would consider th e  
necessary evils of war and the need for divine forgiveness. It also  
reflects something o f the warm ongering decried by Erasmus in so 
many of his works, including the colloquy Charon, in which h e  
satirizes the members o f the clergy who urge war assuring d iv in e ly  
guided victory, and also promise that if any should fall on th e
battlefield, they will fly directly to Heaven.
Wealth and peace, then, bring about moral and social decline  
according to both Juvenal and Quevedo, wealth being the m o re  
serious of the two. Quevedo consistently addresses the co rru p tin g  
power of money, and even in Espana defendida. where he a tte m p ts
'0 "Certain c rea tu res  in black and white cloaks and ash-gray  tu n i c s ,  
adorned with plum age o f  various kinds. They never leave the courts o f  
princes. They instill into the ir  ears a love o f  war; they incite rulers a n d
populace alike; they p ro c la im  in their  evange lica l serm ons  that war is j u s t ,
holy, and right. And—to  make you marvel more at the audacity o f  the f e l lo w s  - 
they proclaim the very sam e th ing  on both sides. To the F rench  they p r e a c h  
that God is on the F rench  side: he who has God to p ro tec t him cannot b e
conquered! To the E ng lish  and Spanish they declare  this war is not t h e
Emperor's but God's: only let them show themselves valiant men and victory is
certain! But if  anyone does get killed, he doesn 't pe r ish  utterly but f l i e s  
straight up to heaven, a rm ed  jus t  as he was. " fColloquies 391-92)
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to paint a positive portrait of Spain, he has to admit that money has 
opened the door for vice to replace many of the good customs of his 
people: "A que vicio no ha abierto la puerta con Have de oro la
avaricia?” (587). Rather than despair of this situation and d escen d  
into the purely negative, pessimistic, and nihilistic attitude of w hich  
he has so often been accused, he consistently offers suggestions for 
reform. He believed that a remedy did exist for the moral decline of 
his country. However, he does not suggest that a mere return to th e
simple rural life would be suffîcient. To be effective, the re m e d y
would have to include all of society, both those who lived at co u rt
and those who lived in villages, and even those who lived in o th e r
countries who might look to Spain for moral example. The type o f 
sweeping change Quevedo envisioned could only be realized one way, 
through strong political leadership.
Quevedo viewed order in society as necessarily beginning a t 
the top, with the king, whose diligence and example should e n su re  
that justice and virtue would travel downward, through his 
ministers, reaching into every level of society. Likewise, just as good 
leadership could cause justice to pervade society, corrupt le ad e rsh ip  
bred corruption that flowed downward. The description in A lguacil 
o f the judges who lived badly illustrates this last point perfectly (see  
Chapter Five). Throughout the reign of Philip III, Quevedo held o u t 
hope that the pious, but weak and ineffectual king would provide th e  
remedy to Spain's moral ills: "Llegaron estas cosas a desesperar d e
remedio a Espaha, si la modestfa y virtud y cristiandad de don Felipe 
111, nuestro sehor, no diera freno a estas cosas con su ejemplo” (587). 
Only a strong Christian king can put a halt to Spain's decline.
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Quevedo re itera tes the same idea in a later passage of E spana 
defendida. expanding it to include the need for ministers who will ac t 
in accordance w ith the king's good will:
Al fin se ve en estado Espana, por nuestros pecados, que a no  
in tervenir rey santo y tan justo y honesto, y m inistros ta n  
conform es a  su virtud y tan celosos de su opinion del se rv ie io
de Dios y del aum ento del reino desesperard a las vueltas del
tiempo de poderla traer peor estado.
Esto dice de Espana un hijo suyo, ingrato, con verdad, d e  
mi propia tierra, con tener el referido nombre de madré la 
patria.... (588)
At the same time that he admits to some of Spain's faults, Q uevedo 
also expresses hope for reform in the in tervention of a "rey santo, " a 
virtuous Christian king.
These ideas on reform may be difHcult to see in the Suenos. b u t 
they are not entirely  absent. In El sueno de la muerte. w ritten ju s t
after the death o f  Philip III, Quevedo echoes some of the co m m en ts
of Espana defendida. in a conversation between the narrator and th e  
shade of Enrique de Villena:
Quien reina aora (preguntô) en Espana? que es la p o s te ra  
curiosidad que he de saber, que me quiero bolber jigote, q u e  
me allo mejor. Muriô Philipo tercero, dixe yo. Eue santo Rey d e  
virtud inm em orable (dixo el M arques) segun le vi yo en las 
Estrellas prognosticado. Reina Philipo quarto dos dias a, d ixe 
yo. Ello pasa? asi que ya ha dado el terçero quarto para la o r a 
que yo esperaua? y diciendo y haçiendo se subiô por la re d o m a  
y la trastornô y saliô fuera, y yba diçiendo: Màs Justiçia se h a
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de haçer aora por vn quarto que en otros tiempos por doce 
millones. (235)
Q uevedos hope for justice under Philip IV would go unfulfilled as i t  
had under Philip III, but the desire for reform, through strong, 
righteous, leadership is unm istakable. Clearly, M orreale is m is tak en  
in her assessm ent of the Suenos when she says that they contain  
neither ideas for, nor hope o f reform.
Quevedo places considerable emphasis on the need for a 
righteous king, not merely a strong one. He vehem ently disliked th e  
depiction of the ideal ruler given in M achiavelli's The Prince, an d  
included Machiavelli among the many atheists whom he d e tes ted . 
The Suenos contain few references to kings, but one passage in 
Alguacil does provide a descrip tion  of the cruel, arrogant an d  
covetous kings who condenm them selves to Hell;
Ay Reyes en el ynffierno? (preguntè), y satisffiço a m i 
duda diçiendo: Todo el ynffierno es figuras, y ay m uchos
porque el sumo poder, liuertad y mando les haze sacar a las 
V irtudes de su medio y llegar los uiçios a su estremo; y 
biendose con la suma reuerençia de sus vasallos, y con la 
grandeça opuestos a diosses, quieren valer punto menos y 
pareçerles. Tienen muchos caminos para condenarse, y m uchos 
que le ayuden, porque vno se condena por la crueldad, y 
matando y desterrando los suyos, es vna ponçona coronada y 
vna peste real de sus Reynos. Otros se pierden por la codiçia, 
haciendo Amaçonas sus villas y çiudades a fuerça de g ran d es 
pechos, que en bez de ch a r dessustançian. Ottros se van al 
ynffierno por terzeras perssonas, y se condenan por poderes.
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flandose de inffames ministros; y es gusto berlos penar p o rq u e , 
como boçales en trauajos, se les dobla el dolor en q u a lq u ie r  
cossa. Solo tienen bueno los Reyes que como es gente h o n rra d a , 
nunca bienen solos, sino con pinta de dos o très Priuados, y a 
ueçes va el encaxe y se traen todo el reyno tras si, pues todos 
se gouiernan por ellos. Y en resoluçion los Reyes malos se v an  
al ynffierno por el camino real, y los Mercaderes por el de la 
plata. (151)
Once again, Quevedo states the principle regarding the con tag ious 
and destructive nature of corruption in that a king never co n d em n s 
himself alone; rather, he pulls at least some of his ministers d o w n  
with him, and sometimes his entire kingdom. This n e g a tiv e  
portrayal of kings does have an underlying ideal, one a lre a d y  
indicated rather clearly in Espana defendida. but the co n tra s tin g  
ideal of the righteous, Christian king, who cares for his subjects as  
the good shepherd does his flock, is discussed to its fullest extent in  
the two volumes of Quevedo s Politica de Dios.
Quevedo published the first volum e of Politica de Dios in 1626 , 
having w ritten it several years earlier. He dedicated the work to  
Philip IV, and in it he describes the m onarchy as a divinely in sp ire d  
institution that requires great work and sacrifice on the part of th e  
king in the care of his subjects: "A V uestro cuidado, no a v u e s tro
aluedrio, encom endô las gentes Dios nuestro Sehor, y en los Estados, 
Reynos, y M onarquias, os dio trabajo y afan honroso, no vanidad, n i 
descanso " (Politica 38). He contrasts work with vanity, echoing a 
passage from the Suenos on the vanity of princes (see Chapter F ive). 
This passage alone indicates som ething of the type of id ea lized
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monarch envisioned by Quevedo, but the rest of the work leaves no  
doubt but that he did possess a positive vision of what the m onarchy  
should be, since the entire thesis revolves around the notion that a 
king should im itate Christ in all things: "Imitad a Christo, y
leyendome a mi oidle a el, pues hablo en este libro con las p lu m as 
que le siruen de lenguas " (38). Drawing on passages from th e  
Gospels, Quevedo provides parallels that serve to instruct a king on 
the proper conduct in a variety of situations, including for exam ple, 
how to deal with m inisters and privados ,  the biblical parallel be ing  
found in Christ's relationships with his disciples. The positive  
idealizations of the Politica de Dios must be kept in mind w h en  
considering the underlying ideal of Quevedo’s satires.
The influence of Lucian on Quevedo has frequently b e e n  
exagerated, while that of Juvenal has been underestim ated. The 
association with Lucian leads to an unfortunate emphasis on 
Quevedo s cynicism  and pessimism, while the recognition of Juvenal's  
influence leads to an understanding that Quevedo does indeed do 
more than denounce in the Suenos. His satires contain a number o f 
passages that suggest the type of political reform  he envisioned. He 
expresses this underlying ideal much more directly in his political 
works, where he defends Counter-Reform ation views and p o rtra y s  
Spain as a great nation standing against the rest of the world as a 
bastion of Roman Catholicism with a strong, righteous king as its  
ruler. Although utopian and unattainable in many respects, Q uevedo 
had seen a close approximation of his ideal as a boy during the re ig n  
of Philip II. His desire to see a return to those days n e v e r
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m aterialized, but that hope rem ained a strong presence in his w orks, 
even in the Suenos.
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Chapter Seven:
Dante and the Suenos
Dante and Quevedo deal with many of the same themes an d  
issues in the Commedia and the Suenos. respectively. Yet th e y  
approach them in such different fashions that any direct parallels o r  
patterns of influence become difficult to identify. The serious to n e  
and highly structured poetry of D an te ' contrasts sharply with th e  
seem ingly frivolous, rambling prose of Quevedo. Whereas D ante 
faints in terror at the horrific sights to which he is witness during h is 
journey through Hell, Quevedo frequently  laughs during his.- T he 
Commedia. however, is not w ithout its moments of hum or, 
particularly the grotesque humor in which Quevedo delights. And, as 
seen in the analysis of the previous chapters, the Suenos re f le c t 
Q uevedos vast erudition in serious moral, philosophical, theological, 
and even political matters. A lthough Quevedo avoids d ire c t 
quotations of and obvious borrow ings from Dante, there are .
 ^ See John Freccero on "The S ig n if ican ce  of Terza R im a” (2 5 8 f f . )  
Dante's use o f  terza rima  and the tr ipar ti te  s truc tu re  of the poem allow him to  
co m m u n ica te  ideas that go beyond the literal level o f  the poem by means o f  
nu m e rica l  sy m b o lism .
-  "...cuando a Dante este hôrrido  espec tâcu lo  causa pavor y e s p a n t o .  
Quevedo rie, rie sin tasa. en largas y sonoras carcajadas. que en aquel l u g a r  
maldito d isuenan  y ex trahan mas todavfa que los mismos roncos lamentos y 
aullidos de dolor de los condenados. jCuàn profundo contraste , y q u e  
te m p eram en to  esp ir i tua l tan d iferen te  revela  en uno y otro poeta! " (G o n za le z  
de Amezûa 70). In his essay on "Fases y ca ra c tè re s  de la in fluencia  del D a n te  
en Espaha. " Gonzalez de Amezûa only devotes a few pages of general c o m m e n t s  
to Quevedo.
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nonetheless, a number of aspects in the Suenos that can best be 
understood in light of the trem endous precedent established by th e  
F lorentine poet.
Quevedo explicitly acknowledges the influence of Dante at th e  
beginning of the first dream in which he states that he fell as leep  
while reading the Commedia: "...habiendo cerrado los ojos con el libro
de Dante. " However, this admission appears only in the rev ised  
edition of 1631, the Juguetes version; in the original text, th e  
dream er falls asleep while reading about the second coming of Christ 
in the book of "beato Hypolito." The reference to Dante is but one of 
the many changes Quevedo made in the text in order to remove th e  
possibility of theological controversy and to avoid the criticism th a t 
had arisen in reaction to the first edition. The fact that these changes 
were intended to paganize, or secularize the satires indicates 
som ething of the attitude with which Quevedo viewed Dante's w ork. 
In spite of the Commedia's abundant religious themes, Quevedo 
apparently did not think of it as a religious text.^ In fact, his one 
significant comment on the poem dem onstrates that he read it w ith  
an eye towards its political content.
The passage occurs in the Marco Bruto. in which Q uevedo 
presents the various ancient witnesses who testify to the character of 
Brutus, portraying him as a man of honor and virtue. At one point, 
he notes that Dante did not share the same opinion:
 ^ Q uevedos  decision to refer  to Dante as a means of rem oving  r e l i g io u s  
c o n tro v e rsy  from the Suenos perhaps indicates ju s t  how much a t t i tu d e s  
reg a rd in g  the Commedia had changed  by the sev en teen th  century . Peter S. 
H awkins notes how during the Middle Ages the work was viewed by many as 
divinely inspired and having alm ost scriptural authority (133), a view fo s te r e d  
by Dante him self, especially in Paradiso 25.1 where he refers to his poem as 
“ s a c r e d . "
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El Dante signe contraria opinion, y pone a Casio y a B ru to  
con Judas, no solo conduciéndolos por traidores, sino p o r  
pésimos traidores. Deste fué causa el ser Dante de la facciôn 
gibelina y de los em peradores.—C anto 34 y postrero d e l 
Infierno. (Obras I, 919)
Although not strictly a Ghibelline as Quevedo states, Dante did ta k e  
what was essentially  the Ghibelline position during his exile, m ak in g  
many statements in the Commedia and the M onarchia in favor o f th e  
Empire and against both the papacy and the ruling factions o f 
Florence that had exiled him.^ In spite of the inexactitude, Q uevedo  s 
political reading anticipates some of the more sophisticated c r itic ism  
of recent years, such as that of Joan M. Ferrante who, in The Political 
Vision of the Divine Comedy (1984), considers political issues th e  
principal concern o f the Com media.
The inclusion of Dante’s contrary  opinion amidst the praise fo r  
Brutus, praise in which Quevedo shared, might indicate that Q uevedo  
disagreed with Dante and therefore bore some animus toward him . 
Quevedos adm iration for Brutus, however, was not w ith o u t 
qualification. While he does generally describe Brutus as a man o f  
great virtue, and goes to considerable lengths to justify some of h is  
actions, he cannot justify the betrayal and m urder of Caesar, b ec au se  
of his strongly held view that the monarchy was of divine origin:
Grave delito es dar muerte a cualquier hombre; mas d a r la  
al rey es maldad execrable, y traicion nefanda no solo poner e n
^ W. p. F r ieder ich  cha ra c te r ize s  the M onarch ia  as a "s taunch ly  p r o -  
G hibelline book" (46). Charles Till Davis makes the fo llow ing c o m m e n t :  
"Dante's 'G h ib e ll in ism , ' his advocacy o f  the im peria l cause, was an i m p o r t a n t  
but passing phase in the evolution o f  his thought.  His treatise on the e m p i r e .  
Monarchia. which d'Entrèves dates as c. 1312, was an aberration..." (67).
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él manos sino hablar de su persona con poca reverencia, o 
pensar de sus acciones con poco respeto. El rey bueno se ha d e  
amar; el malo se ha de sufrir. Consiente Dios al tirano, s ien d o  
quien le puede castigar y deponer, l y  no le consentira e l  
vasallo, que debe obedecerle? No necesita el brazo de Dios d e  
nuestros punales para sus castigos, no de nuestras manos p a ra  
sus venganzas. (961)
Because of that one act, Quevedo views Brutus as a great man w h o  
ended badly; he therefore agrees with Dante's condemnation of th e  
b e tray a l.
Quevedo also m entions Dante in Espana defendida. in which h e  
describes the poet as "docti'simo" with reference to "el Convivio 
Amoroso" (Obras I, 572). The reference, in addition to in d ica tin g  
Quevedo s respect for Dante, also suggests that Quevedo had se rio u s ly  
studied Dante's w orks at precisely the time in his life that he w as  
working on the first three Suenos. since he wrote Espaha d e fe n d id a  
in the year following the composition of El sueno del Infierno (1608'). 
His expression of adm iration for Dante early in his career, co u p led  
with the acknow ledgem ent of influence in the second edition, s ta n d s  
in contrast with the disdain he expressed for Lucian (see C h a p te r  
Six). And yet, there has been a tendency among critics to look to  
Lucian as Q uevedos model for otherw orldly  satire,^ when D ante 
offers a clearer p recedent at least with regard to many of th e  
otherw orldly e lem ents.
5 For example, Felicidad Buendia asserts that "[Quevedo] tuvo que e l e g i r  
un género satirico. Inspirôse en el escritor helenfstico Luciano de S am osa ta . . ."  
(Obras I. 136).
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The first and most obvious precedent may be seen in Q uevedo s 
choices of otherworlds for his satires. While Lucian offers a model of 
a pagan, mythological afterlife, Dante offers a p red o m in a n tly  
Christian one.* Quevedo deliberately  chose to break with bo th  
Classical and Renaissance tradition in his avoidance o f m ythological 
settings for his early satires (see Chapter Six), and his decision no 
doubt resulted in large part from the influence of Dante. In addition , 
Dante's model serves just as well as that of Lucian with regard to 
social criticism. As Erich A uerbach has observed, "The earthly w orld  
is encom passed in the other world of the Comedy..." (90). Just as 
Quevedo uses the Hell of the Suenos as a m etaphor for his ow n 
society, Dante before him  had employed Hell as a means of 
denouncing the corruption he saw in his own period of h isto ry , 
particularly the corruption o f the papacy and the city of Florence. I n 
fact. Ferrante has convincingly argued that Dante used the city o f 
Florence as the model for his Hell (65ff.). Quevedos political read in g  
of the Commedia. his aw areness of Ghibelline politics even in th e  
condem nation of Brutus and Cassius, indicates clearly that he saw in 
Dante a literary model in which the Christian afterlife could be used  
to conunent on the affairs o f this life.
Dante's vision of the Christian afterlife also provided Q uevedo 
with one very specific elem ent for the Suenos not to be found at all 
in Lucian, that element being demons, especially comic ones. Olaf
^ The setting created by Dante for the Commedia deserves t h e  
qualifica tion  o f  "predominately" C hris tian  because of such unorthodox ideas as  
the pagan Limbo, one o f  the many points o f  contention for D ante 's  d e t r a c t o r s  
through the centuries. Q uevedo, a well trained theologian him self, would h a v e  
been aware o f  such issues, which may have added to his ap p a re n t  i n c l i n a t i o n  
to read the work as something o the r  than a religious document.
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Lagercrantz has referred to the demons in Cantos XXI and XXII of th e  
Inferno as a "gang of waggish devils" (40) who create an a tm o sp h e re  
of farce with their coarse jokes and absurd behavior. James Iff la n d  
views these cantos of the Malebolge  as belonging to a "popular an d  
mirthful" tradition of Hell and som ewhat separate from  the rest o f 
Dante's "serious" and "pathos filled" journey (23). So, where humor is 
the exception in Dante, a "respite " according to Iffland (23), it 
becomes the rule in Quevedo, who has taken one elem ent from D ante 
and expanded on it to accommodate his satirical purposes. H ow ever, 
Dante's demons do more than engage in grotesque behavior such as 
making trum pets of their anuses (Inf. XXI. 139); they have a d e fin ite  
moral task to perform. The mirth of the Malebolge  in no w ay  
replaces or dispels the seriousness of the rest of the poem. In d eed , 
these cantos may be considered the most significant of the p o em  
with regard to Dante's political and social message, since th e  
Malebolge  deals with various types of fraud, "the most im portant o f 
[Dante's] sins " (Ferrante 166).
The main task of the demons in Dante's Hell is not to p ro v id e  
comic relief, but rather to act as the jailers and castigators of th e  
damned. They play their roles gleefully, taking delight in th e  
torment of lost souls, but they nevertheless do so only with d iv in e  
sufferance, according to a divine plan. Dante reminds us of this fact
when, in Inferno XXL he describes the pit of boiling pitch into w hich
the Barrators are plunged, and affirms that it exists "by the art o f
G od" (XXI. 16). The torments of Hell exist because God has put th e m  
into place. If the demons were not somehow fulfilling His p u rp o se . 
He would not allow them to exist. Quevedo likewise d esc rib es
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demons as instruments of divine justice. For example, in El sueno del 
Juicio final, large groups of demons appear with whips and sticks, 
herding resurrected  souls toward their judgem ent: "Era de ver v n a
legion de espiritus malos con açotes, palos y otros instrumentos, côm o 
trayan a la audiencia una m uchedum bre de animas del gordillo... 
(Suenos I, 133). These evil spirits display a definite ludic q u a lity , 
but their actions must be understood within the larger context o f 
their serious theological purpose.
Moreover, these demons, as much as they torm ent with w hips, 
meat hooks, fire, pitch, and other forms of "physical" torture, also 
delight in making moral pronouncem ents. In both Dante an d  
Quevedo, dem ons at times serve as the voice of the author to  
denounce with authority  and explain which sins have b e e n  
com mitted by a soul or group. Dante in Inferno XXI, provides th e  
comment of a black, winged demon who carries the souls of B a rra to rs  
down to the pit of pitch:
Then from our bridge, he called: "O Malebranche,
I've got an elder of Saint Zita for you!
Shove this one under—I’ll go back for m ore—
His city is well furnished with such stores; 
there, everyone’s a grafter but Bonturo; 
and there—for cash—they’ll change a no to a yes."  (37-42)
In Quevedo, it becomes even more clear that such  
pronouncem ents are meant to add to the torm ent of the d am n ed ,
since they force the condemned souls to think beyond their su ffe rin g
to the reason why they suffer. At one point in El sueno del In fie rn o .
a demon gives a lengthy discourse on the nature of nobility .
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explaining that it exists in virtuous action, not bloodlines: "Y el q u e
en el mundo es virtuosso, esse es hidalgo... " fSuenos I, 170). T he 
recipients of this sermon, a pretentious "Hidalgo" and "Cavallero," a re  
caused very visible anguish by what they hear: "Carcomiase el
Hidalgo de oyr estas cossas, y el Cauallero que estaba a su lado se 
afligia pegando los abanillos de cuello, y voluiendo las cuchilladas d e  
las calzas" (170). When he observes this activity, Quevedo th e  
narrator describes it as characteristic of Hell that the truth would b e  
used as an instrum ent of torm ent: O dixe yo entre mi, y cômo se
hecha de ver que este es el infierno, donde para atorm entar a los 
honbres con amarguras, les dizen las verdades!" (171).
The use of truth by these demons in this context is p e rfe c tly  
understandable , since they do so in a m ean-spirited  fash ion , 
instructing the damned about their folly when it is far too late fo r 
them to do anything about it. Life has ended, and the o p p o r tu n ity  
for repentance has passed. The truth only causes anguish. The 
actions o f these demons differ significantly from the p ec u lia r  
behavior of the demon in El alguacil endem oniado who speaks th e  
truth in order to forewarn his listeners who still inhabit the world o f 
the living. One expects dem ons to find some way to cause h arm , 
w hether by truth or lie, ju st as in Inferno XXI when M alacoda 
m aliciously misleads Dante and Virgil as to which path they sh o u ld  
take. However, as discussed in Chapter Five, the demon o f Alguacil is 
an aberration that arises because Quevedo uses him as an agent o f 
truth in this world. The dem ons that populate Juicio and In fie rn o . 
the first and third dreams, very much follow the tradition o f Dante.
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In addition to his use of demons, Dante also sets an im p o rta n t 
precedent in his treatm ent of human characters. "It has g en e ra lly  
been assum ed that one of the major achievem ents of the C om edy 
was the in troduction into the poem of contem porary figures a n d  
obscure persons of the poet’s acquaintance..." (Morgan 51). Q uevedo 
follows Dante's example, to the extent that he can; he had to w o rk  
within the limits placed on him both by his own h isto rica l 
circum stances and his artistic purpose. Regarding the latter, th e  
characters of the Suenos serve prim arily as targets for sa tirica l 
denunciation. Quevedo, therefore, has very little opportunity, w ith in  
the limits of his satire, to create positive portraits o f individuals fro m  
his life, such as Dante does with Beatrice. More relevant for Q uevedo, 
then, is Dante's treatm ent of the damned in the Inferno. H ow ever, 
with regard to contemporary characters, Dante had a certain fre ed o m  
that Quevedo did not. Having first been condem ned to exile, th e n  
given an additional sentence of death should he ever return to  
Florence, Dante may have been em boldened by these c ircum stances 
to name his enem ies and place acquaintances in Hell. Quevedo, o n  
the other hand, had to be much more cautious.
It would have been unwise for Quevedo to attack o p en ly  
contem poraries from his own society. He did so with Gongora a n d  
other writers, but prim arily on artistic grounds. In the Suenos. h e  
avoids naming contem porary individuals even when he seems to  
have a specific person in mind. For exam ple, the "Maestro d e  
E sgrim a" mentioned in Juicio (135) has sometimes been thought to b e  
the fencing m aster Luis Pacheco de Narvaez, with whom Q uevedo 
shared a m utual anim osity (see Ortenbach 42). However, even th is
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tentative type of identification is virtually im possible in most cases, 
such as when the narrator of Infierno comes across the soul of a 
bookseller he had known in life:
Pasè adelante por vn pasadizo muy oscuro, quando p o r 
mi nonbre me llamaron. Bolui a la voz los ojos cassi tan  
medrosso como ella, y hàllome vn honbre que por las tin ieb las 
no podia diuissar màs de lo que la llama que le torm entaua m e
permitia. Yo soy, dixo, Ay (lo yua a dezir yo, y prosiguiô tras su
nonbre), el Librero. (165)
It turns out that the bookseller finds himself in Hell because of b ad  
works, but not his own. Here Quevedo creates a play on the w ord  
"obras," which means both "deeds" and "literary works." Merely th e  
sale of bad works by others is enough to earn dam nation. Quevedo 
may very well have had a specific "Librero" in mind when he w ro te  
this passage, but he avoids placing the name in the written te x t - 
even though it apparently passed between the two characters in th e
scene—, and thereby ends with a general comment on booksellers as
a type, rather than an individual, which suits his satirical purpose all 
the better.
However, Quevedo does refer to many infam ous historical 
figures by name. For example, as already discussed in Chapter Two, 
he consigns Julius Caesar Scaliger to Hell for advocating th e  
superiority of Virgil to Homer. He also provides a list of severa l 
astrologers, alchem ists, and magicians, the most significant of th em  
being Michael Scot, whom Dante mentions and places in th e  
Malebolge  for the sin of fraud: "That other there, his flanks
extremely spare, / was Michael Scot, a man who certainly / knew
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how the game o f magic fraud was played" (Inf^ XX. 115-17). Q uevedo, 
clearly following Dante's example, describes Scot's sin not as the u se  
of magic, but as deception: "A Escoto el Ytaliano no vi allà p o r
echizero y magico, sino por m entirosso y enbustero " (186). The
emphasis on fraud undoubtedly reflects Q uevedos larger concern
with the deceptive world of appearances and the reality that lies 
beneath. Anyone who adds to that deception, creating false
appearances for personal gain, is w orthy of darrmation. G iussepe 
Mazzotta makes a similar point with regard to the character in Dante: 
The alchem ists, who believe that there is a secret, valuable core 
beneath the world of deceptive appearances, are like th e  
N eoplatonists, who seek to transcend the illusions of n a tu re . 
But these alchemists, just as the magician Michael Scot, n e v e r  
penetrate the veil of appearances and abide in coverings an d
disguises. Griffolino and M ichael Scot are both m asters of 
illusion: their "gioco" is, quite literally, the illusory d o u b lin g
and counterfeiting of being. (238)
While Dante and Quevedo share a sim ilar attitude toward M ichael 
Scot and his sin, they differ concerning his punishment.
For Quevedo, it seems enough that he places an in d iv id u a l 
among the dam ned in Hell. He rarely indicates any particular type o f 
punishm ent, referring only very generally to eternal fires an d  
demonic torm ent. Dante, on the other hand, applies the principle o f 
the contrapasso,^  the notion that each sin deserves a specific an d
^ "The 'co n tra p asso , '  which trans la te s  what St. Thomas A quinas in h i s  
com m entary  on Aristotle 's  Ethics and in the Summa t h e o l o g i a e  c a l l s  
'con trapassum ,' is the ethical p r in c ip le  o f  jus tice  that es tab l ishes  t h e  
sym m etrica l c o r re s p o n d e n c e  betw een a sin and the su ffering  for that s in  " 
(Mazzotta 80).
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corresponding punishm ent. For example, he places Michael Scot 
among the Diviners and Astrologers whose punishm ent is to h av e  
their heads turned around on their bodies and who must th e re fo re  
walk backwards in the valley that forms the fourth pouch of th e
Malebolge.  The type of reciprocity that exists between sin an d  
punishm ent in Dante requires an elaborate and w ell-p lan n ed  
categorization of offenses, something Quevedo seems reluctant to 
provide. Although he does refer to hom osexuals as repugnant ev e n  
to demons, and describes alchemists as "la cossa màs vil" (185), th ese
are merely exam ples of hyperbole for effect, and do not indicate an
attem pt to place sin in any descending order o f seriousness. 
Quevedo s attitude, in this respect, may reflect the influence of Stoic 
doctrine, as E ttinghausen observes:
His satire on stupidity in word and deed in his e a rly
M emoriales. Prem àticas. and Geneologias reveals a scorn for th e
vulgus  that harks back to the Stoics and the Latin satirists; an d
his unw illingness to categorize or arrange in order of d e m e rit 
the varied butts of his attacks recalls the Stoics' doctrine th a t 
all vices are equal. With the possible exception of the first, all 
the Suenos contain Stoical ideas. (126).
Although E ttinghausen's comments specifically address satirical vices 
rather than theologically categorized sins, his analysis still p ro v id es 
an explanation as to why Quevedo did not choose to adopt th e  
contrapasso  for his Hell, preferring, in this instance. Stoic p rincip les 
to those of the Thom ism  that influenced Dante.
In addition to Michael Scot, another historical figure plays an
important role in the underw orlds of both authors, Judas Iscariot. A
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com parison of how Dante and Quevedo present the figure of Judas 
reveals some significant sim ilarities within their vastly d if fe re n t 
approaches, for they both expand the implications of the c h a ra c te r  
beyond that of his own historical and theological relevance and use  
his name and sins as represen tative of corruption in their ow n 
societies. In accordance with teaching already well established in th e  
Church Fathers, Dante and Quevedo view Judas as an a rc h e ty p a l 
figure whose sins may be seen reflected in the actions of p e rso n s  
contem porary to the authors. Dante presents these p e rso n s  
individually, in separate cantos, so that all of Judas’s sins a re  
represented in the Inferno. Quevedo, in contrast, uses a more d ire c t 
approach in which the narrator of El sueno del Infierno comes across 
Judas during his wanderings and rails against him, comparing him to 
members of his own Spanish society. In the comparison, th o se  
Spaniards become types o f Judas.
In order to analyze the differing approaches of the two au th o rs , 
the first question that should perhaps be addressed regarding Ju d as 
is that of his sin and punishm ent. For what sin or sins is he  
condem ned? What is his place in Hell? In the Gospel of M a tth ew
27:4, Judas is quoted as saying that he sinned in that he b e tra y e d  
innocent blood. This is the sin for which Dante consigns him to th e  
deepest part of Hell in Inferno 34 with the other famous b e tra y e rs , 
Brutus and Cassius, all being chewed in the mouth of Satan w ho 
rebelled against his Maker. However, Judas was guilty of other sins. 
He hanged himself, a sin worse than m urder according to T hom as 
Aquinas,* and he not only betrayed his Master, but he did so fo r
* As noted by Scott (70) in his analysis o f  the suicide of Cato.
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money. In the Gospel of John he is called a thief because he was n o t 
a faithful and honest steward when entrusted  with the Lord's p u rse . 
The question o f placem ent within Hell figures significantly in D ante 's 
scheme. Is a figure guilty of many sins punished on the basis of h is  
worst one? The principle of the c o n tra p a sso  must be kept in mind in  
making this determ ination, but there are other factors to consider as 
well.
According to John A. Scott, the individual's social and h is to rica l 
circum stance must be taken into account when considering w h e th e r  
or not that person is guilty of a certain sin:
...we should state that, for the w orld-judge of the Com edv.
human conduct had to be judged by moral laws known to th e  
individual; suicide was not a sin for a pagan whose conscience 
dictated otherwise. We thus find Dido and Cleopatra among th e  
lustful (Inf. V. 62-63), not among the suicides, and Lucretia in  
Limbo (Inf. IV. 128) despite her condem nation by St.
Augustine (70).
This cultural relativ ism  regarding the applicability of sin a n d  
punishm ent to the characters of the Inferno may be one of th e  
methods utilized by Dante to create "exceptions" to the ac cep ted  
theological rules concerning salvation and dam nation in order m a k e  
possible some surprising placem ents in the Commedia. For exam ple , 
Cato is given a prom inent place in Purgatory even though he w as 
both a pagan and com m itted suicide. However, Dante's c re a tiv e
placements do not mean that he exonerates his characters of all s in
except the one for which he shows them being punished. C erta in ly
Dante considers Vanni Pucci in Inf. XXIV an individual guilty of m a n y
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sins, and this is no less the case with Judas. The question of h is 
placem ent, then, although it may seem to derive from his worst sin,
is really one of progression, or "the biblical and patristic notion o f
sins engendering more sins " (Cassell 46).
The progression is neither chronological nor linear. Judas's last 
sin was to commit suicide, and yet he is not physically placed am ong 
the suicides of the Inferno. Still, placem ent should not be viewed as 
restric tion  to one area o f the poem. One need only look at th e  
exam ple of Ulysses, whose name and story are either repeated o r  
alluded to at several junctures throughout the work, to realize that it  
might also be wise to look for less-than-obvious allusions to Judas, 
whose importance is partially to be found in the description of Virgil 
in Inf. XXXIV. 61 as "That soul up there who has to suffer the most." 
Anthony K. Cassell has examined the imagery of the suicide cantos a t  
length, and believes that the image of the trees in Inf. VIII is m e an t 
to evoke the common m edieval portrayal of Judas hanging h im self 
from a tree. His argum ent rests primarily on the reference in line 
107 of Canto VIII to bodies being hung on stumps as well as th e  
com m entary written by Dante's son, Pietro Alighieri, who "m entions 
Judas in reference to Pier della Vigna and his sin of despair " (Cassell 
47). Cassell's argum ent is convincing and helpful to th e  
understanding of the poem. But where Dante does not explicitly  
condemn Judas for suicide, Quevedo does, describing his sins as those  
not o f a man, but rather o f  a eunuch;
...porque el me parezio Capon. Y no es posible menos, ni qu e
tan mala inclinazion y animo tan doblado se hallase si no es en  
quien (por serlo) no fuesse honbre ni muger. Y quièn sino v n
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Capon pudiera condenarse por Ileuar las boisas? Y quièn sino 
vn Capon tubiera tan poca verguenza que vesara a Cristo p a ra  
vendelle? Y quièn sino vn Capon tubiera tan poco animo que se 
aorcara, sin acordarse de la mucha misericordia suya? (178) 
Quevedo, here, does mention in order Judas's three sins, re fe rrin g  
first to the purse, then his betrayal with a kiss, then his suicide. 
With regard to the last sin, the reference to "tan poco animo " m eans 
that Quevedo also recognizes that Judas killed him self as an act o f 
d esp a ir.
If we accept the proposition that Judas's suicide is re p re s e n te d  
in the Commedia in the person of Pier della Vigna, then there w ould  
seem to be little difference in the views of Dante and Quevedo on th e  
matter other than to note that Quevedo condemns it more explicitly . 
However, the question of courage vs. despair is one that should be 
examined more closely when comparing the attitudes of these tw o 
writers regarding this sin. It seems to be on the basis of courage th a t 
Dante views Cato's suicide as a righteous act, a patriotic stand fo r 
liberty and the continuation of the Republic in Rome. 
Correspondingly, Cato is given a prom inent place as a saved soul in  
the Purgatorio. the exem plary figure of free will in Dante's schem e. 
Scott has argued that the justification of suicide in Dante was b ased  
on the influence of Stoic philosophy and the writings of Seneca (71). 
Stoic ideas and ideals were of even greater importance for Quevedo, 
who incorporated so much of the doctrine into the Suenos. H ow ever, 
Quevedo, unlike Dante, could not reconcile his Christian beliefs w ith  
the Stoic praise o f suicide under certain circumstances:
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While Quevedo's account of the basic doctrines of Stoic 
moral philosophy was taken principally from Epictetus, his 
outline of the aims of Stoicism is primarily Senecan: to seek  
virtue for its own sake, to raise one's soul above ill fortune, to  
live with the body but not for it, to live with a view to dying, 
and neither to despise nor fear death. His approving account o f 
the Stoa's aims is, however cut short by what he calls th e  
scandal of Stoicism: the Paradox which perm itted, and u n d e r
certain circum stances recom m ended the sage to take his ow n 
life (Ettinghausen 30).
Although Quevedo does not address the example of Cato in th e  
Suenos. he does provide a comment in the Marco B ruto  that ind icates 
something of his position on the issue: "Necio ahorro es el del m iedo.
Dase Caton la muerte porque César no se la dé: si fué por esto, él fué
en SI propio vencido... " (Obras I, 954). Clearly, Quevedo also 
considered Cato's suicide an act of despair, not heroism, and he w ould  
not have countenanced going against Christian doctrine concern ing  
suicide in order to see the Roman patriot as an "exception" as d id  
Dante. Quevedo held firm views on suicide that do not offer th e  
ambiguities that must be resolved in Dante's treatment of the sin.
If suicide was Judas's last sin, the one that began his jo u rn ey  
into the deepest part of Hell was theft. The designation o f "thief" w as 
applied to Judas not only in the Gospel of John, but it was also 
commonly used by such writers as St. Augustine:
Behold he is a thief, this Judas! And that you make not light o f 
that, a thief and sacrilegious, not any common kind o f  thief! A 
thief who stole from the purse, yea, but that of the Lord! From
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the purse, yea, but from the sacred purse! If in the courts o f 
law a d ifference is made between the crim e of common th e f t  
and peculation, for it is called peculation when it is the stealing  
of public property  and the stealing of private property is 
judged not so heinous as that of the stealing of public p ro p erty , 
how much more sternly shall the sacrilegious thief be ju d g ed  
who has dared to rob, not in any common way, but to rob th e
Church! He who steals aught from the Church is one with Judas
the lost.’
Cassell cites this passage from St. Augustine in order to establish th a t  
Judas is a figure whose covetousness leads to his betrayal of Christ. 
The connection that Cassell does not make, as he had between Judas 
and Pier della Vigna in Inf. VIII, is the one this passage c rea tes  
between Judas and an important figure from Canto XXTV. If "he w ho 
steals aught from the Church is one with Judas the lost," then su re ly  
Vanni Fucci is one with Judas.
In Inf. XXrV, Dante and Virgil have entered  the seventh pouch 
of the M alebo lge  and find themselves among the thieves. One of th e  
sinners catches their attention and they ask his name. He iden tifies 
himself as Vanni Fucci, and when Dante asks to know what sin has 
thrust him into Hell, he turns to Dante and says, "I am set down so 
far because I robbed / the sacristy of its fair ornam ents, / an d  
someone else was falsely blamed for that" (XXIV. 137-39). Not on ly  
does Vanni Fucci's theft from the Church associate him with Judas,
but there is an added connection in that an innocent was blamed an d
^ Cassell takes this passage from St. Augustine, In Joannis Evangelium. 
Tractatus L. 9-10.
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suffered persecution because of Vanni Fucci’s actions, recalling  
Judas's lament before he w ent to hang himself that he had sinned by  
betraying innocent blood. This connection between Judas and V anni 
Fucci seems as sure as that which exists between Judas and Pier della  
Vigna. Thus Dante establishes a progression in the Inferno in w hich 
Judas is represented, or prefigured, at least obliquely, in the cantos 
that deal with all three of the sins for which he was famous, s ta rtin g  
with suicide, moving to theft, then ending with Judas in the d e e p e s t 
part of Hell suffering more than any other for his betrayal o f Christ.
For Dante, Judas's worst sin was his betrayal of his Master. 11 
is interesting that this may not have been the case w ith Quevedo. 
W hereas Dante the pilgrim  does not converse with Judas in h is 
Inferno. Quevedo the dream er's longest dialogue is with Judas. 
During this conversation, Quevedo asks him why he sold his M aster 
for so small a sum. In response, Judas offers a theological defense o f 
his actions:
Pues vossotros por que os quejais de esso? que a vosotros b ien  
os estubo, pues fue el remedio y arcaduz para vuestra salud. 
Yo soy el que me he de quejar, que soy a quien le estubo mal; y 
ya ha hauido Herejes que me han tenido veneraçion, porque di 
prinzipio a la entrega a la medizina de vuestro mal. (178) 
Quevedo the dream er seems to take a harsh stance tow ards Judas 
during their conversation, but Quevedo the author allow ed Judas to 
say these words in his defense, and not just on this occasion; he h ad  
portrayed Judas saying sim ilar words standing before the Throne of 
Judgement in El sueno del Juicio final. For this reason, Quevedo w as 
criticized during his own tim e, accused of trying to exonerate th e
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betrayer of Christ (see Vilar 106). There is apparently an element to  
Q uevedo’s thought which views Judas's actions as an evil w hich 
resulted in a greater good, as part of a Divine p lan .'°  As Jean V ilar 
has observed, "En el sistema de pensam iento de Quevedo, la n eced ad  
aparece como el instrumento por el cual se muestra a los hombres la 
divina providencia a los fines de su justificaciôn" (118). Man's ow n 
foolishness then, which leads to his own destruction, is an im p o rta n t 
instrum ent of God in bringing man to his salvation. Vilar a t tr ib u te s  
this idea to Quevedo's m isanthropy, which causes him to view m an  
trapped in his own sin. This is consistent with the overall sa tirica l 
and caustic nature of much of Quevedo's literary production.
If any doubt exists as to w hether Judas's se lf-ju stifica tion  
reflects Quevedo's own theological views, that doubt disappears w ith  
the second half of Judas's comments, an obvious attack by Q uevedo 
on corrupt clergy:
Y no penseis que soy yo solo el Judas, que despues que Cristo 
murio ay otros peores y mas ingratos, pues no solo le venden , 
pero le venden y compran, açotan y crucifican, y lo que es m as 
que todo, ingratos a la vida, pasion, muerte y resurecçion, le 
maltratan y persiguen en nombre de hijos suyos. (178)"
Riam undo Lida has made some sim ilar com m ents about Q uevedo 's
Ju d a s :
Que su crimen mas grave no haya sido la tra ic iôn  puede a c a so  
sorprender a muchos lectores de hoy (como hubiera soprendido tal vez a 
Dante), pero no tanto a los lectores de Cervantes y Quevedo. Hace un o s  
ahos Juan Bautista A valle-A rce ha aducido con razon. a proposito de la  
idea misma de muerte desesperada (la de Grisôstomo, en el Quijote). a q u e l  
pasaje de Cervantes en que el padre de la Gran Sultana sienta c o m o  
indudable  "que mas peco en aho rca rse  / Judas, que en vender a C ris to"  
(Lida 187).
' * As one might expect, this ant-clerical passage was removed from the 
J u g u e te s  version .
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With this comment, Quevedo turns the discussion of Judas's sins in to  
a continuation of his more general critique of the sins and vices of h is  
own society. As seen in the previous two chapters, Quevedo w as 
especially concerned with the corrupting power of money, and h e re , 
he turns his attention to the corruption it has wrought in the C hurch 
by those who "sell" Christ. Quevedo considers Judas the progenitor o f 
this particular sin, and those of his own society who have tu rn e d  
religion into a money-making enterprise, types of Judas.
Quevedo's condem nation o f corrupt clergy recalls D ante 's 
invective against simoniacal popes in Inf. XDC. There, in the T h ird  
Pouch of the Malebolge, Dante and Virgil come across the S im onists 
whose punishm ent consists of being placed head-first into pits w ith  
flames burning their protruding feet. At one point, Dante notices a 
"shade suffers and quivers more than all his other comrades... " (XIX. 
31-32), Pope Nicholas III, to whom Dante addresses the follow ing 
remark: "And Peter and the others never asked / for gold or s ilv e r
when they chose Matthias /  to take the place of the tran sg re ss in g  
soul" (Inf. XIX. 94-96). Of course, the "transgressing soul, " m en tio n e d  
merely in passing, is Judas. It might be carrying the p rev io u s  
analysis too far, however, to suggest that one of the sins of Judas is 
represented in the figure of Nicholas III. Where Quevedo makes no 
distinction between him who sold Christ and those who sell th e  
offices and sacraments of the church, Dante apparently does. He 
mentions Simon Magus, who gave the sin its name, in the first line o f 
Canto XDC, and calls all others guilty of the sin disciples of Sim on 
Magus. Any connection with Judas in Dante seems tenuous. 
Nonetheless, the possibility that Judas might be prefigured yet again
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is intriguing if only because o f Quevedo's perspective and th e  
connection he establishes between Judas and the simonists in th e  
S uenos.
As horrible as avarice and corruption were to Quevedo, h e  
apparently  considered duplicity Judas's worst sin. The S uenos 
contain a reference to Judas's "doble animo," (sic) but Quevedo d e a ls  
with this issue most clearly in another work, entitled C onsideraciones 
sobre el testamento nuevo y vida de C risto:
Cristo Nuestro Senor did a Judas mojado el pan en la cena, 
y dijo Crisdstomo: Per panis tictionem illius significat f ic t io n e m .
Un bocado tenido es un Judas fingido, y el mismo Lucifer no 
tuvo animo de entrar en el corazdn de Judas hasta que com id 
este pan mojado: Et post bucellam introbit in eum Sathanas.
Porque sdlo el que tram a una traicidn puede com ulgar a 
un Lucifer, o porque Luzbel se apodera luego de un fing ido  
corazdn. ;Cuantos corazones hay de éstos! [...]
M onstruoso Proteo es un hombre falso, traidor a fe c ta n d o  
suavidades con un corazdn diam antino, por fuera un co rd ero , 
por dentro un ledn; una palom a Candida en lo que se ve, u n  
gavilân rapante de las honras en lo que se oculta: m o n s tru o
com puesto de risa y rencor, de m alicia en el alma y de liso n ja  
en la lengua. (Obras I, 1306)
Once again, Judas serves as the archetypal figure, in this case fo r  
disingenuous behavior, all false men being types of Judas. Q uevedo 's  
reference to this type o f man as a monstrous Proteus, who appears to  
be one thing when he is actually another, again dem onstrates th e  
concern with false appearances, especially  in the context of m o ra l
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hypocrisy. Dante presents a rem iniscent m onstrous figure in In f . 
XVII, in Geryon, "that filthy effigy / of fraud" (XVII. 7-8) who w ea rs  
the face of a just man but has the body of a monster.
As stated at the outset, Quevedo and Dante deal with many o f 
the same themes and issues, but they do so in vastly d iffe re n t 
fashions. The com parison of their use of the figure of Judas se rv es 
more to highlight their differences than indicate any direct influence. 
Other than the reference to Michael Scot, Quevedo seems to h av e  
borrow ed few details from Dante. However, Dante's influence w ith  
regard to the broader brush strokes on Quevedo's canvas seem s 
undeniable. M erely the fact that Quevedo depicts a conv ersa tio n  
with Judas in Hell, probably indicates some inspiration from th e  
many conversations with the damned depicted in Dante's In fe rn o .*- 
Quevedo's use of the Christian afterlife and the comic, serm onizing  
demons, both owe som ething to the general influence of th e  
Commedia. In addition, Quevedo's political reading of the work m u st 
not be forgotten. Such a reading, coupled with his political reading o f 
Juvenal's satire discussed in Chapter Six, provides some insight as to  
how Quevedo arrived at the creation of a comic Hell. Rather th a n  
continue with the traditional suggestion that Lucian served as 
Quevedo's model, it seems much more plausible to look at th e  
com bined influences of Juvenal and Dante, the former p rov id ing
Isle N o lt in g -H au ff  genera lly  a ttr ibutes these conversa tions  to t h e  
in f luence  o f  Lucian; "A unque la parte fundam en ta l del Infierno  se c o m p o n e  
principalm ente de estilo  directo . los episodios s in g u la res  son muy cortos. Solo 
hay dialogos mas intensos en los episodios de Judas y de Mahoma, que s o n  
diâlogos de muertos'.  segiin modelo de Luciano" (84). However, it seems t h a t  
Dante’s model serves jus t  as well.
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social criticism  in a satirical context, the latter providing social 
criticism  in an otherworldly context.
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Chapter Eight:
Conclusion
The most salient feature of the Suenos may indeed be th e  
delight the author takes in judging and condem ning various g roups 
and types from his society. At almost regular in tervals, in El sueno  
del Juicio final and El sueno del In fie rno . the first person narrator, i n 
reaction to the scenes of Judgement and dam nation, repeats th e  
phrase "diome risa ver " or variations such as "diuertiome " (sic). In H  
alguacil endem oniado. the narrator listens in delight as the d em on  
names those groups that inhabit Hell, urging him  to give m ore 
details. The dream er's fascination with the dam nation and su ffering  
of others, on the face of it, seems malicious at tim es. One w ould  
think that he would be disposed to expressing more compassion an d  
sympathy for the foibles of humanity and its propensity  for m aking  
bad moral choices in light of the ease with which the d re a m e r  
him self mistook the proper road of life at the beginning of In fierno . 
and before he knew any better, found him self in Hell. However, tw o 
things should be noted here. First, taking delight in exposing th e  
vices of others is a typical feature of satire. Second, Quevedo does 
provide enough qualifying statem ents to show his aw areness of th e  
seriousness of dam nation, and, indeed, he even to shows som e 
compassion for those he damns.
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At the end of Juicio. after the Last Judgment has taken place, 
and those judged assigned their final reward, the dream er h ea rs  
noise and cries coming from a part of the valley, and approaches to
in v estig a te :
Lleguè por ver lo que hauia, y vi en vna cueua honda la
garganta del infierno, y en ella penar muchos. Alii vi v n 
Letrado no reuoluer tantas leyes como caldos, y un Escriuano 
com iendose letras que no hauia querido leer. Vi todos los
ajuares del Infierno, y las ropas y tocados de las condenadas 
estauan alii presos con Alguaciles; y vn A uariento contando 
mas duelos que dineros, vn Medico penando en un orinal, y vn  
Boticario en vna melicina. Diome tanta risa ver esto que m e
despertaron las carcajadas, y fue mucho quedar de tan tr is te
sueno mas alegre que espantado. (Suenos I, 139)
In spite of the sadness of the dream, explicitly m entioned here, th e  
dreamer cannot help but laugh at the scene before him, and when he  
awakes, he describes the overall effect of the dream  as having le ft 
him more happy than frightened, "mas alegre que espantado." It is 
important to note that he does not say happy rather than frigh tened ; 
both emotions come into play. Although secondary to the humor, th e  
serious underlying tone rem ains intact. In describing the em otional 
reaction experienced by the dream er, Quevedo may well be 
indicating the reaction he intends to provoke in the reader. First an d  
foremost, the reader should laugh, be entertained and enjoy th e  
work, but to a lesser degree, the reader should be both sad an d  
frightened in order to learn from it. In the sadness, there is
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compassion for the lost souls, and the fright provides the m o tiv a tio n  
to avoid joining them, motivation to live a just life.
But what exactly should the reader find amusing a n d  
entertaining about dam ned souls? When the dreamer laughs, he 
does not do so simply because he sees others suffering—to do so 
would be evil in and o f itself—, rather he laughs at who th o se  
persons are and how they suffer. When Quevedo mentions th e  
"Medico penando en vn orinal, y vn Boticario en vna melicina," he  
presents types from his society already widely ridiculed because of 
their fraud and incom petence. He also creates one of the few  
examples of a satirical contrapasso  in the Suenos. probably in sp ire d  
by Dante, in which the doctor suffers in a chamber pot, and th e  
apothecary in a medicine jar, items associated with their f ra u d u le n t 
adm inistration of care. The humor results from both the g en era l 
disrepute of these characters and the appropriateness of th e ir  
punishm ent. However, the punishm ent is only appropriate in a 
satirical context. Dante might well have them eternally su ffe ring  
from leprosy or some other disease they failed to cure, or put th e m  
into a level of the M a le b o lg e with the fraudulent. Quevedo chose th e  
chamber pot and medicine jar not simply because of the poetic 
justice they provide, but because of the humor that exists in 
proposing punishments of such a ludicrous nature.
The majority of the humor in the Suenos relies on som e 
elem ent of the ludicrous in order to point out human folly, as w hen , 
in Juicio. an astrologer shouts that it cannot be Judgment Day, since 
Saturn has not risen to its proper place in the heavens (139). He 
remains firm in his conviction in spite of the fact that God, who m ad e
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all the heavens, had indeed declared it to be Judgem ent Day. A nd 
elsewhere, an adulteress remarks that had she known she was going 
to be condemned, she would not have bothered to go to mass on ho ly
days (138). The com m ent is ridiculous in that she should h a v e
known already that going to mass with an unrepentant heart a n d  
leaving with unchanged ways would serve no purpose. Q uevedo 
tends to follow this pattern, taking the sin seriously, but find ing
humor in those who com mit them because of their inanities. In th is
fashion, he can both correct folly and punish evil, essential goals o f
satire as Gilbert Highet explains: "The purpose of satire is, th ro u g h
laughter and invective, to cure folly and punish evil; but if it does no t 
achieve this purpose it is content to jeer at folly and expose evil to 
bitter contempt" (156). Of course, by joining the ridiculous and inane 
with the condemnation of sin, Quevedo runs the risk of appearing to 
make light of sin. The notion of divine judgem ent, so important to  
Quevedo's scheme, may seem diminished when it incorporates bed
pans into its punishments. These passages, if read in isolation, m ight 
lead one to the conclusion that Quevedo, like Lucian, had no re sp e c t 
for God or anyone else. However, the larger context does o ffe r
significant clarification.
Use Nolting-Hauff has noted that "Las possibilidades poéticas 
del conceptismo determinan el desarrollo artistico de Quevedo" (295). 
The "concepto" in Baroque poetry typically involves the joining o f 
two or more normally unrelated ideas, symbols, or motifs, in order to 
form an ingenious new metaphor, and Quevedo was perhaps th e  
greatest master of the style. Nolting-Hauff postulates that Q uevedo's 
"conceptismo " controlled the developm ent of the Suenos. as he took
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elem ents o f the medieval dream -vision within which he developed a 
continual series of satirical jokes, form ing a totally renew ed g e n re  
(295). Recognition of Quevedo's poetic genius and style may exp la in  
how he not only brings together the serious and the comic w ith o u t 
seeing any inherent contradiction, but also how he reconciles a 
num ber o f philosophical traditions and doctrines.
The m ultifaceted nature of Quevedo's philosophical be liefs 
presents significant problems for any reader, especially in his s a tire s  
w here the philosophy is subordinate to  the humor. However, th e  
Suenos must be approached as philosophical texts in order to g rasp  
fully the message of reform, the positive alternative, underlying th e  
condem nation. For example, the condem nation of dialecticians in  
Juicio and the repeated advice to distrust outer appearances can on ly  
be understood fully in light of Q uevedo's reception of A cadem ic 
sceptism  as transm itted through Lactantius. However, Q uevedo 
com plicates matters by adapting scepticism  to Stoicism, applying th e  
m istrust o f outward appearances to disingenuous human conduct, 
hypocrisy. In this way. Stoic moral philosophy becomes ancillary to  
Academic scepticism  in Quevedo's thought. Of course, Quevedo's u se  
of these classical disciplines is always governed by Christian doctrine . 
The Suenos not only teach the Stoic doctrine of virtue for its ow n 
sake, but they also add the Christian tenet of virtue for H eaven 's  
sake, for the sake of one's soul. The union of the two doctrines in  
Quevedo's work, especially when the author deals with the issue o f 
death, has provoked accusations o f contradiction and nihilism , but fo r 
Quevedo there is no contradiction. In his mind, each v iew  
com plem ents the other and is easily reconciled, providing th e
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ideological basis from which he form ulates sermons on the t ru e  
nature of outer appearances, death, nobility, and the d e s tru c tiv e  
nature of money. Although the ideological basis may be difficult to  
identify and interpret, the sermons are not, and leave no doubt as to  
the ideals o f moral conduct which Quevedo espouses.
More difficult to argue, but no less important, are Q uevedo 's 
larger social concerns. To some extent, he addresses them in th e  
Suenos with his numerous references to judges, constables, m in is te rs , 
and even, on a couple of occasions, kings. Corruption amongst th e se  
officials spreads corruption through society and destroys any ho p e  
for justice and order. These passages alone sufficiently suggest th a t  
Quevedo denounces these groups in the hope of reform. A glance a t  
his works outside the Suenos confirms it. In the Polftica de Dios a n d  
Espana defendida. he describes positive role models with which h e  
would like to replace the negative ones o f his satires. In addition h e  
describes the positive characters on the road to Heaven, a p assag e  
made more accessible when studied through the influence of Juvenal. 
These descrip tions together begin to provide an idea of the p e rfe c t 
society envisioned by Quevedo, a society of righteous warriors a n d  
poor, humble, incorruptible people, led by a strong, devout king.
It is worth reiterating that Quevedo read the works of T hom as 
More, Juvenal and Dante primarily as political documents. R a th er 
than focus on the depiction of the ideal society, the sa tir ica l 
description o f Roman society, or the journey through Hell, P u rg a to ry , 
and Paradise, Quevedo recognized the political and social s ta te m e n ts  
these authors proposed in works that ostensibly deal with so m eth in g  
else. It should not be surprising, then, that Quevedo would b o rro w
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from these works and traditions in order to form his own c re a tio n  
from which he could suggest reforms indicative of his C o u n te r- 
Reformation views, at the same time that he exercised his w it
artistically and com ically.
Although there are definite aspects of pessimism a n d
misanthropy in Quevedo, he always held out some hope that man as
an individual could live up to his potential, make the right m o ra l
choices, and that the larger society would follow. That hope can b e  
seen in the underlying ideal of the Suenos.
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